

Terrorism Open Source Intelligence Report (TOSIR) No. 404 8 October 2009

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[Article 1](#) **“FBI Director: Al-Qaeda-Linked Somali Group Could Attack U.S.,”** by Catherine Herridge, [Fox News](#), 2 October 2009. *The director of the FBI, Robert Mueller, has stated on the record that the Al-Qaeda-linked group Al-Shabaab is no longer content to strike within the East African nation of Somalia. Al-Shabaab has exploded since 2006, and it is becoming a full-fledged Al-Qaeda affiliate, similar to Al-Qaeda in Iraq. Initially the group’s militias fought against the Somali government and Ethiopian forces who oppose an Islamic state in East Africa, but now the group’s focus is turning toward the establishment of a “caliphate” or broad Islamic state not limited to Africa. In addition, the use of simultaneous attacks and suicide bombings—the signature of Al-Qaeda—has now taken hold in Somalia. Last year a Minneapolis man, Shirwa Ahmed, became the first known American suicide bomber, according to the FBI. Ahmed travelled from Minnesota to the training camps of Al-Shabaab.*

[Article 2](#) **“Eight Years after 9/11: Confronting the Terrorist Threat to the Homeland,”** Statement by Michael Leiter, Director, [National Counterterrorism Center](#), before the Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee, 30 September 2009. *Al-Qaeda is under more pressure, is facing more challenges, and is a more vulnerable organization than at any time since the attacks on 11 September 2001. For eight years, the United States and its allies have mounted a robust and multi-front offensive against Al-Qaeda, as well as sustained an effective defensive program, making it more difficult—although still quite possible—for terrorists to attack the U.S. homeland and U.S. interests abroad. Al-Qaeda continues to pursue plans for homeland attacks and is likely focusing on prominent political, economic, and infrastructure targets designed to produce mass casualties, visually dramatic destruction, significant economic aftershocks, and/or fear among the population.*

[Article 3](#) **“Police Chiefs Endorse Anti-Terror Community Watch,”** by Eileen Sullivan and P. Solomon Banda, [Associated Press](#), 5 October 2009. *A store clerk’s curiosity about why Najibullah Zazi was buying large quantities of beauty supply products indicated that something about the transaction wasn’t quite right—and it’s an example of the kind of citizen vigilance that can combat terror. Los Angeles police Commander Joan McNamara cited this incident as a police chiefs meeting in Denver adopted a model for a nationwide community watch program that teaches people what behavior is truly suspicious and encourages them to report it to police. The Major Cities Chiefs Association, composed of the chiefs of the 63 largest police departments in the United States and Canada, endorsed iWatch at the group’s conference Saturday.*

[Article 4](#) **“Newly Declassified Files Detail Massive FBI Data Mining Project,”** by Ryan Singel, [Wired.com](#), 23 September 2009. *A fast growing FBI data mining system billed as a tool for hunting terrorists is being used in hacker and domestic criminal investigations, and now contains tens of thousands of records from private corporate databases, declassified documents show. The FBI’s National Security Branch Analysis Center (NSAC) brings the government closer than ever to implementing the “Total Information Awareness” system first dreamed up by the Pentagon in the days following the 11 September attacks. But the proposal has long been criticized by privacy groups as ineffective and invasive. Critics say the new documents show that the government is proceeding with the plan in private, and without sufficient oversight.*

[Article 5](#) “**The Death of a Top Indonesian Militant,**” by Scott Stewart, [Stratfor](#), **23 September 2009**. *On Saturday, 19 September 2009, the Indonesian National Police announced that a DNA test has positively identified a man killed on 17 September as Noordin Mohammad Top. He was killed in a raid on a safe house in the outskirts of Solo, Central Java, that resulted in a prolonged firefight between Indonesian authorities and militants. Top, an accomplished operational commander, was responsible for a number of terrorist attacks in Indonesia, including the 2002 and 2005 Bali bombings, the 2003 JW Marriott bombing in Jakarta, the 2004 attack on the Australian embassy in Jakarta, and most recently, the 17 July bombings of the JW Marriott and the Ritz-Carlton hotels in Jakarta.*

[Article 6](#) “**U.S. Undaunted by Jolo Attack,**” by Sheila Crisostomo, [Philippine Star](#), **1 October 2009**. *The death of two American soldiers and a Filipino Marine in Sulu last Tuesday will not break the resolve of the U.S. government to help the Philippines in its time of need, said U.S. Ambassador Kristie Kenney. A contingent of U.S. troops will be arriving in the country to assist in the ongoing relief and rehabilitation operations for the hundreds of thousands displaced by floodwaters and flashfloods caused by the storm “Ondoy” last Saturday. Meanwhile, the military blamed the Abu Sayyaf bandit group for the roadside bombing that killed the two American servicemen and a Filipino Marine in Indanan, Sulu. It was the first time the 600-strong U.S. contingent in the Philippines had been targeted by an improvised explosive device, a frequent tactic used by insurgents in Iraq and Afghanistan.*

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1. “FBI Director: Al-Qaeda-Linked Somali Group Could Attack U.S.,” by Catherine Herridge, [Fox News](#), **2 October 2009** (<http://www.foxnews.com>). [KBTSSomalia, KBTQNetwork, KBTUIslam, KBTGFBI] *We quote:*

They could strike the United States. That grim assessment is **the first time the FBI director or any other senior law enforcement or intelligence official has stated on the record that the Al-Qaeda-linked group Al-Shabaab is no longer content to strike within the East African nation of Somalia.** During a hearing on Capitol Hill on Wednesday [30 September], **FBI Director Robert Mueller was asked if members of Al-Shabaab, which translates as “mujahideen youth,” would send American recruits back to the United States to launch attacks.**

[Al-Shabaab pledged a formal allegiance to Osama bin Laden]

“I would think that we have seen some information that the leaders would like to undertake operations outside of Somalia,” Mueller told the Senate Homeland Security Committee. Mueller said he is **“absolutely” concerned that Americans who traveled to**

Somalia to train as terrorists would have U.S. legal status and would therefore be able to return to the United States and carry out attacks.

A U.S. counterterrorism official told Fox News that **Al-Shabaab has exploded since 2006, and it is becoming a full-fledged Al-Qaeda affiliate**, similar to Al-Qaeda in Iraq. **Initially the group's militias fought against the Somali government and Ethiopian forces** who [oppose] an Islamic state in East Africa, the official said, but **now the group's focus is turning toward the establishment of a "caliphate" or broad Islamic state not limited to Africa.**

In fact, in an exclusive briefing on Thursday, a U.S. counterterrorism official told Fox News that Al-Shabaab's leadership is bona fide Al-Qaeda. **In many cases, the operatives who guide the group in East Africa have pledged allegiance to Osama bin Laden in person, and in some cases the Al-Qaeda leader has entrusted them with missions outside of the Afghanistan-Pakistan border**, according to the official. **Training camps are now well-established in Somalia, and as many as 1,100 foreign fighters have joined the Al-Shabaab movement**, the president of Somalia's transitional government told a crowd gathered at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington on Wednesday.

A U.S. counterterrorism official said there are other troubling developments. **A recent videotape from Al-Shabaab pledged a formal allegiance to bin Laden**, and the intelligence community is now **monitoring jihadist Websites to see if bin Laden will respond and "officially" bless their relationship**, the official said.

[Nearly two dozen men from the United States believed to have joined Al-Shabaab]

In addition, **the use of simultaneous attacks and suicide bombings—the signature of Al-Qaeda—has now taken hold in Somalia.** In October last year, **a Minneapolis man, Shirwa Ahmed, became the first known American suicide bomber**, according to the FBI. Ahmed, who travelled from Minnesota to the training camps of Al-Shabaab, is **one of nearly two dozen men from the United States who authorities believe joined the group. The FBI is currently investigating another man, an 18-year-old from Seattle, who may be the second documented case of an American suicide bomber.** Investigators are comparing the man's DNA with remains from an attack in the Somali capital last month.

In early September, Fox News exclusively identified **the American mouthpiece for Al-Shabaab as a native of Daphne, Alabama. Born Omar Hammami**, the big-eared and bright-eyed teenager **now goes by the name Abu Mansour al-Amriki, or simply "The American."**

After Fox News uncovered al-Amriki's identity, his family told a local television station in Mobile, Alabama, that their son traveled to Somalia with his wife but lost his passport there, where he became indoctrinated by Al-Shabaab. **One source within Mobile's Muslim community said that, after dropping out of college, Hammami travelled to Toronto, where he eventually married a Somali woman and became indoctrinated there by "angry" individuals.** Both Hammami's family and the source within Mobile's Muslim community said **Hammami has not spoken to his family in years.**

TOSIR Note: FBI Director Mueller's full 30 September 2009 statement is available at http://hsgac.senate.gov/public/index.cfm?FuseAction=Hearings.Hearing&Hearing_ID=5b17b0b6-afce-4488-80a0-0c3db92fe8f8.

The foregoing is Article No. 1 (TR404A01) in the [Terrorism Open Source Intelligence Report](#) (TOSIR), No. 404, 8 October 2009, prepared by Interaction Systems Incorporated (isinreports@mindspring.com).

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2. "Eight Years after 9/11: Confronting the Terrorist Threat to the Homeland," Statement by Michael Leiter, Director, [National Counterterrorism Center](#), before the Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee, 30 September 2009

(http://hsgac.senate.gov/public/index.cfm?FuseAction=Hearings.Hearing&Hearing_ID=5b17b0b6-afce-4488-80a0-0c3db92fe8f8). [KBTGNCTC, KBTGNCS, KBTGStrategies, KBTWSummary, KBTQNetwork, KBTQStrategy] We have changed the order of some of the below *quoted* paragraphs:

. . . Al-Qaeda is under more pressure, is facing more challenges, and is a more vulnerable organization than at any time since the attacks on 11 September 2001. For eight years, **the United States and its allies have mounted a robust and multi-front offensive against Al-Qaeda, as well as sustained an effective defensive program,** making it more difficult—**although still quite possible**—for terrorists to attack the U.S. homeland and U.S. interests abroad.

- Most importantly, **Al-Qaeda's safe haven**—where they are hosted by Taliban and Pakistani militants—**in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) is shrinking and becoming less secure, complicating the group's ability to plan, train, and move** within Pakistan's tribal areas.
- **Al-Qaeda has suffered significant leadership losses during the past 18 months, interrupting training and plotting,** potentially disrupting plots that are under way, and **leaving leadership vacuums that are increasingly difficult to fill.** Despite our counterterrorism progress, **Al-Qaeda and its affiliates and allies remain resilient and adaptive enemies** intent on attacking U.S. and Western interests—with **Al-Qaeda's core in Pakistan** representing the most dangerous component of the larger Al-Qaeda network. **We assess that this core is actively engaged in operational plotting and continues recruiting, training, and transporting operatives, to include individuals from Western Europe and North America.**
- **Three years ago the British, with U.S. help, disrupted a plot in its late stages that could have killed thousands of people flying from Europe to the U.S. homeland.** Two years ago we helped disrupt a **credible plot in Germany** that was very near execution.
- **The recent arrest and indictment of Najibullah Zazi on a charge of conspiracy to use weapons of mass destruction (explosive bombs) against persons or property in the United States is an example of the strong teamwork needed between local police departments and federal departments**

and agencies that is critical to protecting our country from potential terrorist attacks. As stated in the indictment, Zazi is alleged to have knowingly and intentionally conspired with others to use explosive bombs and other similar devices against persons or property within the United States.

- **We assess that Al-Qaeda continues to pursue plans for homeland attacks and is likely focusing on prominent political, economic, and infrastructure targets designed to produce mass casualties, visually dramatic destruction, significant economic aftershocks, and/or fear among the population.** The group also likely remains interested in targeting mass transit systems, and other public venues, viewed as relatively soft targets as evidenced by past Al-Qaeda attacks in London.

[Al-Qaeda affiliates in Yemen, North Africa, Iraq, and Pakistan]

As Al-Qaeda's affiliates continue to develop and evolve, the threat posed by many of these groups to U.S. interests abroad, and potentially to the homeland, has grown. The affiliates **possess local roots and autonomous command structures and represent a talent pool that Al-Qaeda core may tap to augment operational efforts.** The affiliates **have proven capable of attacking Western targets in their regions and they aspire to expand operations further.** . . .

Yemen. We have witnessed **the reemergence of Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), with Yemen as a key battleground and potential regional base of operations** from which Al-Qaeda can plan attacks, train recruits, and facilitate the movement of operatives. We are concerned that if AQAP strengthens, **Al-Qaeda leaders could use the group and the growing presence of foreign fighters in the region to supplement its transnational operations capability.**

North Africa and the Trans-Sahara. Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) **has expanded its operational presence in North Africa beyond Algeria**, using a safe haven in northern Mali and increasing low-level operations in Mauritania and **has conducted more than a dozen attacks against Western interests in the region.** We have seen **increased interest by the group to conduct attacks in Europe**—to include public statements threatening France and other European powers—as well as the United States. **AQIM's increased focus on kidnap-for-ransom operations**, particularly of Western hostages, **has allowed for the group's expansion**, helping fund recruitment, training, propaganda, and terrorist attacks.

Iraq. Counterterrorism success in Iraq **has lowered the external threat from Al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI)—a key Al-Qaeda affiliate in the region—and has damaged the Al-Qaeda brand, with many donors reticent to support the kinds of gruesome attacks that became the hallmark of AQI.** Although AQI's leaders continue to publicly threaten the West, to include the U.S. homeland, we assess that their ability to do so has been substantially diminished by coalition military and Iraqi security operations. However, **the group remains the largest and most operationally active of Al-Qaeda's affiliates and continues to threaten coalition forces in the region.**

Lashkar-e-Tayyiba. The Pakistan-based Sunni extremist group Lashkar-e-Tayyiba (LT)—an Al-Qaeda ally—**poses a threat to a range of interests in South Asia. Their attacks in Kashmir and India have had a destabilizing effect on the region,**

increasing tensions and brinkmanship between New Delhi and Islamabad. **The group's attack last year in Mumbai, India**, resulted in U.S. and Western casualties, and the group continues to plan attacks in India that could harm U.S. citizens and damage U.S. interests. **LT's involvement in attacks in Afghanistan against U.S. and coalition forces and provision of support to the Taliban and Al-Qaeda extremists there** pose a threat to U.S. and coalition interests. We assess that LT—or LT-trained individuals—**could pose a direct threat to the homeland, especially should they collude with Al-Qaeda operatives.**

[Al-Shabaab and Al-Qaeda operatives in Somalia]

East Africa is an important locale for Al-Qaeda. The leaders of the Somalia-based insurgent and terrorist group Al-Shabaab are working with a limited number of East Africa-based Al-Qaeda operatives. Al-Shabaab has actively conducted terrorist-style attacks in Somalia against the Somali government and its perceived allies or supporters, including African Union peacekeepers. **Al-Shabaab's rank and file fighters—who are predominantly interested in removing the current government of Somalia [versus] pursuing Al-Qaeda's global agenda—have gained control over specific locations in central and southern Somalia**, in an effort to create an Islamic state throughout greater Somalia.

Training programs run by Al-Shabaab in southern Somalia have attracted hundreds of violent extremists from across the globe, to include dozens of recruits from the United States. We assess that U.S. persons—the majority of whom are ethnic Somali—who have traveled to Somalia to fight and train with Al-Shabaab have been primarily motivated by nationalism and identification with the Somali cause, rather than by Al-Qaeda's global agenda. However, **the potential for Al-Qaeda operatives in Somalia to commission Americans to return to the United States and launch attacks against the homeland remains of significant concern.** The recent death of East Africa-based senior Al-Qaeda operative **Saleh Nabhan** could disrupt for the time being Al-Qaeda's linkage with Al-Shabaab and hinder external attack planning in the region.

Although Al-Shabaab has not yet conducted an attack outside of Somalia, we have identified several potential transnational terrorist plots involving individuals trained in Somalia. For example, Australian police in August arrested four men involved in **plotting an attack against an Australian Army base**, two of whom reportedly trained at a camp in Somalia.

[Al-Qaeda's media campaign continues rapid production rate—focuses on three themes]

Al-Qaeda propaganda statements this year have provided valuable insight into the group's strategic intentions and have reiterated their commitment to attacking U.S. and Western interests worldwide. **Public Al-Qaeda statements rarely contain a specific threat or telegraph attack planning.**

- **The recently released statement that threatens Germany with near-term attacks if the election fails to favor the candidate who will withdraw German troops from Afghanistan is an exception to standard Al-Qaeda practice** as it features a specific threat timed to influence the German elections scheduled for 27 September.

- Al-Qaeda statements have addressed **three main themes this year**—first, **the group’s continued desire to attack U.S. interests**; second, **the group’s claim that it has inspired or partnered with emerging and sometimes more successful fronts in Somalia, the Sahel, and the Arabian Peninsula**, which it says serves the same purpose and achieves the same aims as past major operations; and third, **Al-Qaeda’s claim that its actions on and since 9/11 have caused significant damage to the U.S. economy**.
- **Al-Qaeda has also released a number of statements this year directed at Pakistan. We assess that this is in direct response to Pakistani military actions against their safe havens** in the tribal areas and nearby settled areas such as the Swat Valley. Despite increasing pressure on their safe haven this year, **al-Sahab, the Al-Qaeda media arm, is still rapidly producing propaganda** and will probably outpace last year’s production.

[Violent Shia extremists, WMD terrorism, and homegrown violent extremists]

Violent Shia extremists. While not aligned with Al-Qaeda, we assess that **Lebanese Hezbollah remains capable of conducting terrorist attacks on U.S. and Western interests**, particularly in the Middle East. **It continues to train and sponsor terrorist groups in Iraq** that threaten the lives of U.S. and coalition forces, and **supports Palestinian terrorist groups’ efforts to attack Israel and jeopardize the Middle East peace process**. Although its primary focus is Israel, the group holds the United States responsible for Israeli policies in the region and would likely consider attacks on U.S. interests, to include the U.S. homeland, if it perceived a direct threat from the United States to itself or Iran. **Hezbollah’s secretary general, in justifying the group’s use of violence against fellow Lebanese citizens last year, characterized any threat to Hezbollah’s armed status and its independent communications network as red lines.**

Weapons of mass destruction (WMD) terrorism. The threat of WMD terrorism to the homeland **remains a grave concern**. Documents recovered in Afghanistan indicated that Al-Qaeda was pursuing a sophisticated biological weapons program and testing chemical agents. **Since 9/11, we have successfully disrupted these and other terrorist efforts to develop a WMD capability**. However, Al-Qaeda and other groups continue to seek such a capability for use against the homeland and U.S. interests overseas. **While terrorists face technical hurdles to developing and employing WMD, the consequences of a successful attack force us to consider every possible threat** against the homeland, even those considered low probability.

Homegrown violent extremists. Homegrown Muslim extremists **who have little if any connection to known terrorist organizations have not launched a successful attack in the United States**. The handful of homegrown extremists who have sought to strike within the homeland since 9/11 **have lacked the necessary tradecraft and capability to conduct or facilitate sophisticated attacks.**

[National Counterterrorism Center aims to coordinate “all elements of national power”]

U.S. government strategy to counter terrorism. The 9/11 commission, reflecting on the paucity of joint action and planning that characterized the U.S. government’s approach to terrorism before the 2001 attacks, **recommended the creation of a “a civilian-led unified joint command for counterterrorism,” combining both strategic**

intelligence and joint operational planning. The Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (IRTPA) brought this recommendation to life through legislation, **creating the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) and its strategic operational planning authorities. For the first time, an organization outside the Executive Office of the President was given the responsibility for government-wide coordination of planning and integration of department and agency actions involving “all elements of national power,”** including “diplomatic, financial, military, intelligence, homeland security, and law enforcement activities within and among agencies.”

Pursuant to this authority, **the director of NCTC is responsible for providing strategic counterterrorism plans and for effectively integrating counterterrorism intelligence and operations across agency boundaries,** both inside and outside the United States. The baseline U.S. government strategy for countering terrorism is the NCTC-authored and **presidentially-approved National Implementation Plan for Counterterrorism (NIP).** The NIP consists of four “pillars” that correspond to national policy: (1) **protect and defend against terrorists;** (2) **attack their capacity to operate;** (3) **work diligently to undermine the spread of violent extremism and retard radicalization around the world;** and (4) **prevent terrorists from utilizing WMD.**

The NIP establishes a firm strategic foundation for action by requiring that each department and agency work collectively to achieve the end states described in the objectives and sub-objectives of each pillar. However, **without a sustained, focused effort to implement the NIP—a process that brings together lead and partner departments and agencies and the National Security Council to actively work to overcome the operational, legal, resource, and policy impediments to achieving the NIP’s strategic objectives—the plan would be of limited value.**

[Some synchronization efforts of the National Counterterrorism Center]

Although I am unable to speak to all of our efforts or provide extensive detail in an unclassified setting, below I offer **a few examples of the more granular synchronization efforts we are pursuing in conjunction with the White House and departments and agencies throughout the U.S. government.**

- **Interagency Task Force (ITF).** The ITF, established in June 2007, is **charged with ensuring that U.S. government counterterrorism activities—and the resources to support them—are correlated rapidly with a constantly evolving threat picture and level of risk.** The ITF may focus, as directed by the National Security Council, on an individual threat, but more typically it seeks to develop and coordinate overall strategic interagency action appropriate to the aggregate threat picture. Led by NCTC, **the ITF comprises a core group of department and agency representatives who constantly examine current intelligence to ensure ongoing prevention efforts are synergistically executed. If additional, more alarming intelligence is obtained, the ITF formulates domestic and overseas options for senior policymakers** to enable an appropriately tailored U.S. government response to any given threat.
- **Exercises.** NCTC also develops and facilitates national and local exercises **to improve domestic preparedness at all levels of the U.S. government, as well as that of our international partners.** The most recent capabilities review exercise hosted by NCTC tested the federal response to a Mumbai-style attack in an urban

environment. **These exercise “lessons learned” have been shared, in coordination with the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and the FBI, with other federal, state, and local authorities** in an effort to bring our law enforcement and homeland security communities closer together.

- **Global engagement.** NCTC continues to play a large role in **interagency efforts to counter violent extremism**, both around the world and at home. For example, NCTC coordinated the development of **a strategic communications strategy for the [departments and agencies] to support efforts led by the President’s Special Representative on Afghanistan and Pakistan (SRAP) and Central Command in Afghanistan and Pakistan.** Working with these partners, plus others in the State Department, Department of Defense, and the Intelligence Community, NCTC produced **a coordinated interagency plan that is now being used by the State Department and commanders in the field.**
- **Afghanistan/Pakistan.** Working closely with SRAP, NCTC **has coordinated CT-related planning efforts designed to support development and implementation of a broader U.S. government strategy in this key region.** NCTC led an interagency effort to refine specific counterterrorism objectives and develop measures of performance, as well as to identify and synchronize associated department and agency actions and initiatives to achieve these strategic objectives. NCTC also **assisted departments and agencies with identifying associated resource requirements and implementation timelines.** . . . NCTC has also developed an analytical tool that is providing, for the first time, **a deep look at ongoing U.S. government programs that seek to build ties with the Afghan and Pakistani people.** This tool is helping senior government leaders evaluate the efforts that have been made in the past and **identify new types of programs that should be pursued.**
- **Region-specific efforts.** **Outside of South Asia,** NCTC is working with our interagency partners—such as the Departments of Defense, State, Justice, and Treasury, and key members of the Intelligence Community—**to develop and coordinate the implementation of plans designed to disrupt and diminish the capability of specific terrorist organizations and their networks, and to eliminate identified regional safe havens.** **Planning efforts** include the development of whole-of-government strategic objectives; interagency synchronization of initiatives designed to achieve those objectives; the identification of necessary resources and key milestones; and development of potential foreign partner actions.

[Budgets and assessments important part of counterterrorism strategy and planning]

On the domestic front, NCTC enables, informs, and supports federal, state, and local government efforts to engage with communities across our country. Central to this effort is NCTC’s leadership of an interagency group to coordinate engagement projects and activities conducted by the FBI, DHS, State, Justice, Treasury, and others. In particular, **NCTC has worked diligently through this group with its partner agencies to enhance the level of engagement between the U.S. government and Somali-Americans and to build communities that are increasingly resistant to the threat posed by extremism.**

Budget. Working with our mission partners, we have helped develop **a methodology for departments and agencies to use in aligning their resources for counterterrorism.** As

a result, we were able to align counterterrorism resources to **the strategic objectives of the National Implementation Plan**, as well as provide **recommendations for new areas of emphasis** in the Fiscal Year 2011 budget build. Subsequently, the Office of Management and Budget and the National Security Council issued **budgetary guidance to the [departments and agencies] to implement these recommendations**.

Assessments. In order to successfully guide development of strategies and plans to counter an active and agile enemy, NCTC **monitors and assesses overall NIP implementation as well as the impact of subordinate CT plans and guidance**. NCTC's strategic impact assessments are **designed to provide a tangible and well-understood "feedback loop" to counterterrorism planners and policymakers that takes a wide variety of vital factors into consideration**, including strategic and operational outcomes arising from U.S. government and partner nation counterterrorism programs and activities; developments in enemy strategy and actions; and changes in the operating environment. **The goal is to provide a useful tool that may be used to refine and guide the next generation of counterterrorism strategy and plans.** . . .

The foregoing is Article No. 2 (TR404A02) in the **Terrorism Open Source Intelligence Report (TOSIR)**, No. 404, 8 October 2009, prepared by Interaction Systems Incorporated (isincreports@mindspring.com).

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3. **"Police Chiefs Endorse Anti-Terror Community Watch,"** by Eileen Sullivan and P. Solomon Banda, **Associated Press**, 5 October 2009. [KBTHStateLocal, KBTKAlerts] From <http://www.google.com/hostednews/ap/article/ALeqM5jjBtFzn5wwzu39fUZGs9MfHJmyUgD9B3TH801> we *quote*:

Denver, Colorado—**A store clerk's curiosity about why Najibullah Zazi was buying large quantities of beauty supply products indicated that something about the transaction wasn't quite right—and it's an example of the kind of citizen vigilance that can combat terror**, a police commander said Saturday. **Los Angeles police Commander Joan McNamara** cited this summer's incident as a police chiefs meeting in Denver adopted **a model for a nationwide community watch program that teaches people what behavior is truly suspicious and encourages them to report it to police**.

[iWatch aims to provide quick, easy way for public to report suspicious behavior]

Federal authorities allege Zazi, 24, tried to make a homemade explosive using ingredients from beauty supplies purchased at Denver-area stores. He has been jailed in New York on charges of conspiracy to detonate a weapon of mass destruction in a plot that may have targeted New York City. **Zazi has denied the charges**. Zazi reportedly told an inquisitive clerk he needed a large amount of cosmetic chemicals because he had "lots of girlfriends." **While his purchases weren't reported to authorities because suppliers often buy large quantities, the police chiefs hope a coordinated publicity effort will make people think differently about such encounters**.

Los Angeles police Chief William Bratton, who developed the iWatch program with McNamara, called it the 21st century version of Neighborhood Watch. **The Major Cities Chiefs Association**, headed by Bratton and composed of **the chiefs of the 63**

largest police departments in the United States and Canada, endorsed iWatch at the group's conference Saturday.

iWatch would have provided an easy way for that Colorado store clerk and others to report suspicious activity so police could launch investigations earlier, McNamara said. "That clerk had a gut instinct that something wasn't right," she said. Using brochures, public service announcements, and meetings with community groups, **iWatch is designed to deliver concrete advice on how the public can follow the oft-repeated post-11 September recommendation, "If you see something, say something."**

[Program designers say privacy, civil liberties protections built into iWatch]

Program materials list nine types of suspicious behavior that should compel people to call police, and 12 kinds of places to look for it. Among the indicators: [a] **If you smell chemicals or other fumes.** [b] **If you see someone wearing clothes that are too big and too heavy for the season.** [c] **If you see strangers asking about building security.** [d] **If you see someone purchasing supplies or equipment that could be used to make bombs.** The important places to watch include government buildings, mass gatherings, schools, and public transportation.

The program also is designed to ease reporting by providing a toll-free number and Web page the public can use to alert authorities. Los Angeles put up its Website this weekend. **"It's really just commonsense types of things,"** Bratton said, adding that his department is providing technical assistance to other agencies that want to adopt the program.

But American Civil Liberties Union policy counsel Mike German, a former FBI agent who worked on terrorism cases, said the indicators are all relatively common behaviors. **He suspects people will fall back on personal biases and stereotypes of what a terrorist looks like when deciding to report someone to the police.** "That just plays into the negative elements of society and doesn't really help the situation," German said.

After the 9/11 attacks, the Bush administration proposed enlisting postal carriers, gas and electric company workers, telephone repairmen, and other workers with access to private homes in a program to report suspicious behavior to the FBI. Privacy advocates condemned this as too intrusive, and **the plan was dropped. Bratton and McNamara said privacy and civil liberties protections are built into this program.** "We're not asking people to spy on their neighbors," McNamara said. If someone reports something based on race or ethnicity, the police will not accept the report, and someone will explain to the caller why that is not an indicator of suspicious behavior, McNamara said.

[Other programs have encouraged public, law enforcement to report suspicious behavior]

The iWatch program isn't the first to list possible indicators of suspicious behavior. Some cities, like Miami, have offered a public list of seven signs of possible terrorism. Federal agencies also have put out various lists. **Other efforts encourage the public and law enforcement to report such signs through dozens of state-run "fusion centers" across the country.** One such center, the Colorado Information Analysis Center, has a form on its Website to report suspicious activity.

Bratton hopes the iWatch program becomes as successful and as well known as the Smokey the Bear campaign to prevent wildfires. “There he is with his Smokey the Bear hat, similarly here, we hope that this program, even though it’s in its birthing stages right now, in a few years will become that well known to the American public.”

TOSIR Note: The [Associated Press](#) item included Web links: **Major Cities Chiefs Association:** <http://www.majorcitieschiefs.org>. **Los Angeles Police Department:** <http://www.lapdonline.org>. **Los Angeles iWatch Website:** <http://www.iWatchLA.org>.

The foregoing is Article No. 3 (TR404A03) in the [Terrorism Open Source Intelligence Report](#) (TOSIR), No. 404, 8 October 2009, prepared by Interaction Systems Incorporated (isincreports@mindspring.com).

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4. “**Newly Declassified Files Detail Massive FBI Data Mining Project,**” by Ryan Singel, [Wired.com](#), 23 September 2009. [KBTKDataMining, KBTGFBI, KBTKIntel] From this item at <http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2009/09/fbi-nsac> we *quote*:

A fast growing FBI data mining system billed as a tool for hunting terrorists is being used in hacker and domestic criminal investigations, and now contains tens of thousands of records from private corporate databases, including car rental companies, large hotel chains, and at least one national department store, declassified documents obtained by [Wired.com](#) show.

Headquartered in Crystal City, Virginia, just outside Washington, **the FBI’s National Security Branch Analysis Center (NSAC) maintains a hodgepodge of data sets packed with more than 1.5 billion government and private sector records about citizens and foreigners, the documents show, bringing the government closer than ever to implementing the “Total Information Awareness” system first dreamed up by the Pentagon in the days following the 11 September attacks.**

Such a system, **if successful, would correlate data from scores of different sources to automatically identify terrorists and other threats before they could strike.** The FBI is seeking to quadruple the known staff of the program. **But the proposal has long been criticized by privacy groups as ineffective and invasive. Critics say the new documents show that the government is proceeding with the plan in private, and without sufficient oversight.**

[FBI’s NSAC too broad to be considered mission-focused but too patchy to be Orwellian]

Composed of government information, commercial databases, and records acquired in criminal and terrorism probes, **the FBI’s NSAC is too broad to be considered mission-focused, but still too patchy to be Orwellian. Here’s the data we know about:**

- **International travel records of citizens and foreigners.**
- **Financial forms** filed with the Treasury by banks and casinos.
- **55,000 entries on customers of Wyndham Worldwide**, which includes Ramada Inn, Days Inn, Super 8, Howard Johnson, and Hawthorn Suites.

- **730 records from rental car company Avis.**
- **165 credit card transaction histories from Sears.**
- **Nearly 200 million records transferred from private data brokers such as Accurint, Acxiom, and Choicepoint.**
- **A reverse White Pages with 696 million names and addresses tied to U.S. phone numbers.**
- **Log data on all calls made by federal prison inmates.**
- **A list of all active pilots.**
- **500,000 names of suspected terrorists from the Unified Terrorist Watch List.**
- **Nearly three million records on people cleared to drive hazardous materials on the nation's highways.**
- **Telephone records and wiretapped conversations captured by FBI investigations.**
- **17,000 traveler itineraries from the Airlines Reporting Corporation.**

“We have a situation where the government is spending fairly large sums of money to use an unproven technology that has a possibility of false positives that would subject innocent Americans to unnecessary scrutiny and impinge on their freedom,” said Kurt Opsahl, a lawyer with the Electronic Frontier Foundation. **“Before the NSAC expands its mission, there must be strict oversight from Congress and the public.”** The FBI declined to comment on the program. . . .

The foregoing is Article No. 4 (TR404A04) in the **Terrorism Open Source Intelligence Report (TOSIR)**, No. 404, 8 October 2009, prepared by Interaction Systems Incorporated (isincreports@mindspring.com).

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5. **“The Death of a Top Indonesian Militant,”** by Scott Stewart, **Stratfor**, 23 September 2009 (<http://www.stratfor.com>). [KBTMJ, KBTSIndonesia] *We quote:*

On Saturday, 19 September 2009, the Indonesian National Police announced that a DNA test has positively identified a man killed on 17 September as Noordin Mohammad Top. Top was killed in a raid on a safe house in the outskirts of Solo, Central Java, that resulted in a prolonged firefight between Indonesian authorities and militants. **Police said four militants were killed in the incident and three more were taken into custody.** (Two of them were arrested before the raid.) **Authorities also recovered a large quantity of explosives during the raid that they believe the militant group was preparing to use in an attack on Indonesian President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono. . . .**

[Top pressured by Indonesian authorities, ideological opposition from Jemaah Islamiyah]

Top was an accomplished operational commander. He was responsible for a number of terrorist attacks in Indonesia, including the 2002 and 2005 Bali bombings, the 2003 JW Marriott bombing in Jakarta, the 2004 attack on the Australian embassy in Jakarta, and most recently, the 17 July bombings of the JW Marriott and the Ritz-Carlton hotels in Jakarta.

Because of these attacks, **Top and his militant colleagues were under extreme pressure from the Indonesian authorities, who were aided by the Australian and American intelligence services. Many of Top's closest associates, like Ridhwan Isam al-Deen al-Hanbali and Azahari bin Husin, were arrested or killed, and operations launched by Indonesian authorities thwarted several of the group's planned attacks between 2005 and 2009.**

But external pressure was not the only challenge facing Top. **He was also forced to deal with mounting ideological opposition to high-profile terror attacks from within Jemaah Islamiyah itself, a difference of opinion that led to Top's split with Jemaah Islamiyah and his decision to form the new group Tanzim Qaedat al-Jihad in early 2006.**

Yet in spite of all this external and internal pressure, **Top was still able to recruit new operatives, secure funding, and maintain tight operational security.** Top's penchant for security even sparked rumors that he had some sort of mystical protection, rumors fanned by the many false reports of his capture or death. . . .

In a further challenge to Tanzim Qaedat al-Jihad, two of Top's key lieutenants also died in the 17 September operation. These were **Maruto Jati Sulistyono**, thought to have been one of Top's main bomb makers; and **Bagus Budi Pranoto**, who had previously served a three-and-one-half-year prison sentence for hiding Top and Azahari. Pranoto, AKA Urwah, was thought to have been a polished recruiter. . . .

The foregoing is Article No. 5 (TR404A05) in the **Terrorism Open Source Intelligence Report (TOSIR)**, No. 404, 8 October 2009, prepared by Interaction Systems Incorporated (isinreports@mindspring.com).

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6. "U.S. Undaunted by Jolo Attack," by Sheila Crisostomo, **Philippine Star**, 1 October 2009 (<http://www.philstar.com>). [KBTSPHilippines, KBTMASG, KBTTBombs] We quote:

Manila, Philippines—**The death of two American soldiers and a Filipino Marine in Sulu last Tuesday will not break the resolve of the U.S. government to help the Philippines in its time of need**, U.S. Ambassador Kristie Kenney said yesterday.

[Planned military exercise between U.S., Filipino forces transformed into aid operation]

"What happened to the Filipino and U.S. soldiers is completely devastating. **They were supposed to build a school in a community in Jolo that needed education facilities.** They lost their lives helping others and we are deeply touched. **We are thankful to all Filipinos who send their sympathy and words of advice,**" Kenney told reporters during a visit to an evacuation center in Tatalon, Quezon City.

Kenney said **a contingent of U.S. troops would be arriving in the country to assist in the ongoing relief and rehabilitation operations in Metro Manila.** The U.S. troops, based in Okinawa, Japan, are **arriving with heavy equipment, medicine, and other necessities for distribution to the hundreds of thousands displaced by floodwaters and flashfloods caused by the storm "Ondoy" last Saturday.**

Kenney said the planned joint military exercise between U.S. and Filipino forces would instead be transformed into an aid operation for survivors of the deadly weekend disaster. “We are working with the Philippine armed forces to redirect a long-planned exercise,” Kenney told reporters. “There will be medical teams, equipment to help clear debris, bulldozers, forklifts, and we will have some heavy-lift helicopters so we can help start cleaning up Manila so people can move on with their lives,” she said. . . .

Kenney added **the American contingent would bring other relief goods, including \$4-million worth of medical supplies.** The ambassador did not specify how many U.S. troops would arrive in the country. . . . **U.S. troops are expected to be deployed in calamity-stricken areas around Metro Manila.** . . .

[Attack was first time 600-strong U.S. contingent in the Philippines targeted by an IED]

Kenney led the advance party yesterday, joined by a small contingent of U.S. soldiers who came from Sulu to help in flood relief efforts. **The American troops came from the same unit of the two soldiers [who] were killed by a roadside bomb in Sulu last Tuesday.** Asked if the United States would ask for more security for its military personnel, Kenney said they do not intend to do so. “I’m not doing anything about that. **We work through them (the Armed Forces of the Philippines, or AFP) and will let them determine the next step because they are in charge,**” Kenney said.

President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo . . . [has] ordered Defense Secretary Gilbert Teodoro to leave the investigation of the roadside bombing in Sulu to the Anti-Terrorism Council (ATC) under Executive Secretary Eduardo Ermita. The President directed Teodoro [and the AFP] to focus on the ongoing relief and rehabilitation efforts.

The military . . . [has] blamed the Abu Sayyaf bandit group for the roadside bombing that killed the two American servicemen and a Filipino Marine in Indanan last Tuesday. Western Mindanao Command chief Major General Benjamin Dolorfino said the **Abu Sayyaf and its Jemaah Islamiyah cohorts could have used an improvised explosive device (IED) planted along the road in Barangay Kagay that wounded two other Filipino Marines.**

The two American soldiers and a Filipino Marine were part of a contingent of a humanitarian mission to construct a clinic and a barangay hall in the area. The slain American soldiers were **identified as Staff Sergeant Jack Martin and Sergeant First Class Christopher Shaw, members of the Joint Special Operations Task Force-Philippines** assigned to the Naval Construction Battalions, or Seabees, which gather skilled craftsmen like electricians and carpenters into special military units. **The Filipino Marines were accompanying the American soldiers in a convoy when the IED exploded,** destroying the Humvee vehicle they were riding in.

“We suspected the Abu Sayyaf behind the bombing because they don’t want development to come to the areas,” Dolorfino said. . . . He said the initial investigation revealed the blast was caused by **an IED that “most likely” had a pressure switch for a trigger. He said the IED could not have been triggered by remote control using a mobile phone because there was no signal in the area.** “The bomb was planted and we presumed nobody was there because there was no secondary firing following the explosion,” he said.

Pentagon spokesman Bryan Whitman told reporters in Washington on Monday **it was the first time the 600-strong U.S. contingent in the Philippines had been targeted by an IED, a frequent tactic used by insurgents in Iraq and Afghanistan.** Dolorfino revealed **Abu Sayyaf leader Albader Parad had warned of attacks on American troops** to avenge their losses following the military offensive in the area. Despite the attack, Dolorfino said **the U.S. military would continue humanitarian projects in many areas of Sulu but with tighter security.** . . .

Dolorfino backed up the [U.S.] embassy's statement that **the U.S. troops were not involved in combat operations, saying they were helping to construct clinics, village halls, school buildings, and other development projects in the region.** He said the Abu Sayyaf bandits were trying to prevent development aid from reaching the populace so that they could blame the government for the lack of facilities and further sow discontent. . . .

The foregoing is Article No. 6 (TR404A06) in the Terrorism Open Source Intelligence Report (TOSIR), No. 404, 8 October 2009, prepared by Interaction Systems Incorporated (isincreports@mindspring.com).

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