

Terrorism Open Source Intelligence Report (TOSIR) No. 382 7 May 2009

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[Article 2](#) **“Pakistan Strife Raises U.S. Doubts on Nuclear Arms,”** by David E. Sanger, [New York Times](#), 4 May 2009. *As the insurgency of the Taliban and Al-Qaeda spreads in Pakistan, senior American officials say they are increasingly concerned about new vulnerabilities for Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal, including the potential for militants to snatch a weapon in transport or to insert sympathizers into laboratories or fuel production facilities. The United States does not know where all of Pakistan’s nuclear sites are located, and its concerns have intensified in the last two weeks since the Taliban entered Buner, a district 60 miles from the capital. The spread of the insurgency has left American officials less willing to accept blanket assurances from Pakistan that the weapons are safe.*

[Article 3](#) **“U.S. Options in Pakistan Limited: Nation Rife With Security Issues, Infighting, Anti-American Sentiment,”** by Karen DeYoung, [Washington Post](#), 4 May 2009. *President Obama and his National Security Council were told that neither a Taliban takeover nor a military coup was imminent and that the Pakistani nuclear arsenal was safe. Beyond the immediate future, however, the intelligence was far from reassuring. Security was deteriorating rapidly; the Pakistani government was mired in political bickering; the army, still fixated on its historical adversary India, remained ill-equipped and unwilling to throw its full weight into the counterinsurgency fight. But despite the threat the intelligence conveyed, Obama has only limited options for dealing with it. The tools most readily at hand are money, weapons, and a mentoring relationship with Pakistan’s government and military that alternates between earnest advice and anxious criticism.*

[Article 4](#) **“The London Bombings: The Real Plotters of the Terrorist Attacks May Never Be Brought to Justice,”** [Economist](#), 30 April 2009. *It was not long after the bombs exploded on 7 July 2005 that police discovered the identities of the men who had carried and detonated them. But the four British Islamists who murdered 52 people on London’s public transport network killed themselves in the process. Nearly four years on, no one has been convicted for the crimes, though police suspect that perhaps 20 people were in on it. A trial on which officers had pinned their last hopes of a conviction ended on 28 April with all three defendants acquitted of any role in the plot, though they did find two of the defendants guilty of conspiring to receive terrorist training, for which each was jailed for seven years.*

[Article 5](#) **“Grappling with the Dirty Bomb Threat,”** by Humphrey Hawksley, [BBC News](#), 27 April 2009. *The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction is once again at the top of the security agenda—and not only from hostile states such as Iran and North Korea. President Obama has turned his focus to stockpiles of dangerous chemical and radiological materials that remain at risk from being stolen by terror groups planning to make what is known as a dirty bomb. American intelligence agencies believe a dirty bomb strike is almost inevitable in a major city within the next five years. In his NATO speech in Prague, Mr. Obama set a deadline and pledged to clear up all unsecured nuclear material within four years. The crux of President Obama’s problem is that if all nuclear and radiological material is to be made safe, there has to be complete international cooperation. So far that is not forthcoming.*

[Article 6](#) **“Al-Qaeda Used Hotmail, Simple Codes in Planning,”** by Pamela Hess, [Associated Press](#), 30 April 2009. *In the days following the 11 September terrorist attacks, alleged Al-Qaeda operations mastermind Khalid Sheikh Mohammed intended to use his free Hotmail account to direct a U.S.-based operative to carry out an attack, according to a guilty plea agreement filed by Ali Saleh Kahlah al-Marri in federal court. The document shows how Al-Qaeda, at least in 2001, embraced prosaic technologies like pre-paid calling cards, public phones, computer search engines, and simplistic codes to communicate, plan, and carry out its operations. As a result of his guilty plea, al-Marri could be sentenced up to a maximum 15-year term in federal prison. Al-Marri was arrested in December 2001. Suspected as an Al-Qaeda sleeper agent, he was held without charge for more than five years.*

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1. **“The Taliban’s Atomic Threat: The Extremists Who Harbored Al-Qaeda Could Get Control of Pakistan’s Nuclear Arsenal,”** by John R. Bolton, [Wall Street Journal](#), 2 May 2009 (<http://www.wsj.com>). [KBTSPakWT, KBTTNuclear]. John R. Bolton, former U.S. ambassador to the United Nations, is a senior fellow at the American Enterprise Institute and the author of [Surrender Is Not an Option: Defending America at the United Nations and Abroad](#) (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2007). *We quote:*

At his press conference Wednesday evening, **President Barack Obama endorsed Pakistan’s official position that it has secure control over its nuclear weapons arsenal.** Mr. Obama said he was “gravely concerned” about the situation there, but is “confident that the nuclear arsenal will remain out of militant hands.”

[Two scenarios could lead to several nuclear weapons slipping out of military control]

His words are not reassuring in light of the Taliban’s military and political gains throughout Pakistan. Our security, and that of friends and allies world-wide, depends critically on preventing more adversaries, especially ones with otherworldly ideologies,

from acquiring nuclear weapons. **Unless there is swift, decisive action against the Islamic radicals there, Pakistan faces two very worrisome scenarios.**

One scenario is that instability continues to grow, and that the radicals disrupt both Pakistan's weak democratic institutions and the military. Often known as Pakistan's "steel skeleton" for holding the country together after successive corrupt or incompetent civilian governments, **the military itself is now gravely threatened from within by rising pro-Taliban sentiment.** In these circumstances—especially if, as Secretary of State Hillary Clinton testified recently, **the nuclear arsenal has been dispersed around the country—there is a tangible risk that several weapons could slip out of military control. Such weapons could then find their way to Al-Qaeda or other terrorists,** with obvious global implications.

The second scenario is even more dangerous. Instability could cause the constitutional government to collapse entirely and the military to fragment. This could allow a well-organized, tightly disciplined group to seize control of the entire Pakistani government. **While Taliban-like radicals might not have even a remote chance to prevail in free and fair elections, they could well take advantage of chaos to seize power.** If that happened, a radical Islamicist regime in Pakistan would control a substantial nuclear weapons capacity.

Not only could this second scenario give international terrorists even greater access to Pakistan's nuclear capabilities, the risk of nuclear confrontation with India would also increase dramatically. Moreover, **Iran would certainly further accelerate its own weapons program, followed inexorably by others in the region** (e.g., Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Turkey) obtaining nuclear weapons, perhaps through direct purchase from Islamabad's new regime.

[Failed nonproliferation policies penalized Pakistani military for its nuclear program]

To prevent either scenario, **Pakistan must move to the top of our strategic agenda, albeit closely related to Afghanistan.** (Pashtuns on both sides of the border are the major source of Taliban manpower, although certainly not the only locus of radical support.) **Contrary to Western "international nannies," the primary conflict motivators in both countries are ethnic and tribal loyalties, religious fanaticism, and simple opportunism.** It is not a case of the "have nots" rising against the "haves," but of True Believers on a divine mission. Accordingly, **neither greater economic assistance, nor more civilian advisers upcountry, nor stronger democratic institutions, will eliminate the strategic threat nearly soon enough.**

We didn't get here overnight. **We are reaping the consequences of failed nonproliferation policies that in the past penalized Pakistan for its nuclear program** by cutting off military assistance and **scaling back the International Military Education and Training (IMET) program that brought hundreds of Pakistani officers to the United States.** Globally, **this extraordinarily successful program** has bound generations of foreign military leaders to their U.S. counterparts. Past cut-offs with Pakistan have harmed our bilateral relationship. Perhaps inevitably, **the Pakistani officers who haven't participated in IMET are increasingly subject to radical influences.**

Moreover, **the Bush administration, by pushing former President Pervez Musharraf into unwise elections and effectively removing him from power, simply exacerbated the instability within Pakistan's already frail system.** Mr. Musharraf's performance against the terrorists left much to be desired, and he was no democrat. **But removing him was unpleasantly reminiscent of the 1963 coup against South Vietnam's Diem regime, which ushered in a succession of ever weaker, revolving-door governments,** thus significantly facilitating the ultimate Communist takeover. Benazir Bhutto's assassination, while obviously unforeseen, was a direct consequence of our excessive electoral zeal.

[President Obama's talks with presidents of Afghanistan, Pakistan will be crucial]

To prevent catastrophe will require considerable American effort and unquestionably provoke resistance from many Pakistanis, often for widely differing reasons. **We must strengthen pro-American elements in Pakistan's military so they can purge dangerous Islamicists from their ranks; roll back Taliban advances;** and, together with our increased efforts in Afghanistan, **decisively defeat the militants on either side of the border. This may mean stifling some of our democratic squeamishness and acquiescing in a Pakistani military takeover,** if the civilian government melts before radical pressures. So be it.

Moreover, **we must strive to keep Indo-Pakistani relations stable, if not friendly,** and pressure Islamabad to put nuclear weapons proliferator and father of Pakistan's nuclear program A. Q. Khan back under house arrest. At the same time, **we should contemplate whether and how to extract as many nuclear weapons as possible from Pakistan,** thus somewhat mitigating the consequences of regime collapse.

President Obama's talks next week in Washington with the presidents of Afghanistan and Pakistan provide a clear opportunity to take the hard steps necessary to secure Pakistan's nuclear arsenal and defeat the Taliban. **Failure to act decisively could well lead to strategic defeat in Pakistan.**

The foregoing is Article No. 1 (TR382A01) in the **Terrorism Open Source Intelligence Report (TOSIR)**, No. 382, 7 May 2009, prepared by Interaction Systems Incorporated (isinreports@mindspring.com).

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2. "Pakistan Strife Raises U.S. Doubts on Nuclear Arms," by David E. Sanger, New York Times, 4 May 2009 (<http://www.nytimes.com>). [KBTSPakWT, KBTTNuclear] We *quote*:

Washington, D.C.—**As the insurgency of the Taliban and Al-Qaeda spreads in Pakistan, senior American officials say they are increasingly concerned about new vulnerabilities for Pakistan's nuclear arsenal,** including the potential for militants to snatch a weapon in transport or to insert sympathizers into laboratories or fuel production facilities.

The officials emphasized that there was no reason to believe that the arsenal, most of which is south of the capital, Islamabad, faced an imminent threat. President Obama

said last week that he remained confident that keeping the country's nuclear infrastructure secure was the top priority of Pakistan's armed forces.

[U.S. officials largely relying on assurances from the Pakistani military]

But the United States does not know where all of Pakistan's nuclear sites are located, and its concerns have intensified in the last two weeks since the Taliban entered Buner, a district 60 miles from the capital. **The spread of the insurgency has left American officials less willing to accept blanket assurances from Pakistan that the weapons are safe.**

Pakistani officials have continued to deflect American requests for more details about the location and security of the country's nuclear sites, the officials said. Some of the Pakistani reluctance, they said, stemmed from **longstanding concern that the United States might be tempted to seize or destroy Pakistan's arsenal** if the insurgency appeared about to engulf areas near Pakistan's nuclear sites. But they said **the most senior American and Pakistani officials had not yet engaged on the issue, a process that may begin this week, with President Asif Ali Zardari scheduled to visit Mr. Obama in Washington on Wednesday.**

"We are largely relying on assurances, the same assurances we have been hearing for years" said one senior official who was involved in the dialogue with Pakistan during the Bush years, and remains involved today." **"The worse things get, the more strongly they hew to the line, 'Don't worry, we've got it under control.'"** **In public, the administration has only hinted at those concerns, repeating the formulation that the Bush administration used: that it has faith in the Pakistani Army.**

"I'm confident that we can make sure that Pakistan's nuclear arsenal is secure," Mr. Obama said Wednesday, "primarily, initially, because the Pakistani Army, I think, recognizes the hazards of those weapons falling into the wrong hands." He added: **"We've got strong military-to-military consultation and cooperation."**

[President Zardari's command and control over nuclear arsenal considered tenuous at best]

But that cooperation, according to officials who would not speak for attribution because of the sensitivity surrounding the exchanges between Washington and Islamabad, **has been sharply limited** when the subject has turned to the vulnerabilities in the Pakistani nuclear infrastructure. **The Obama administration inherited from President Bush a multiyear, \$100 million secret American program to help Pakistan build stronger physical protections around some of those facilities**, and to train Pakistanis in nuclear security.

But much of that effort has now petered out, and American officials have never been permitted to see how much of the money was spent, the facilities where the weapons are kept, or even a tally of how many Pakistan has produced. The facility Pakistan was supposed to build to conduct its own training exercises is running years behind schedule.

Administration officials would not say if the subject would be raised during Mr. Zardari's first meeting with Mr. Obama. But even if Mr. Obama raises the subject, it is not clear how fruitful the conversation might be.

Mr. Zardari heads the country's National Command Authority, the mix of political, military, and intelligence leaders responsible for its arsenal of 60 to 100 nuclear weapons. But in reality, his command and control over the weapons are considered tenuous at best; that power lies primarily in the hands of the Army chief of staff, General Ashfaq Parvez Kayani, the former director of Inter-Services Intelligence, the country's intelligence agency. For years the Pakistanis have waved away the recurring American concerns, with the head of nuclear security for the country, General Khalid Kidwai, dismissing them as "overblown rhetoric."

[Pakistan producing more plutonium for new weapons even as it faces instability]

Americans who are experts on the Pakistani system worry about what they do not know. "For years I was concerned about the weapons materials in Pakistan, the materials in the laboratories," said Rolf Mowatt-Larssen, who ran the Energy Department's intelligence unit until January, and before that was a senior CIA officer sent to Pakistan to determine whether nuclear technology had been passed to Osama bin Laden. **"I'm still worried about that, but with what we're seeing, I'm growing more concerned about something going missing in transport,"** said Mr. Mowatt-Larssen, who is now at Harvard's Kennedy School of Government.

Several current officials said that they were worried that insurgents could try to provoke an incident that would prompt Pakistan to move the weapons, and perhaps use an insider with knowledge of the transportation schedule for weapons or materials to tip them off. That concern appeared to be what Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton was hinting at in testimony ten days ago before the House Appropriations Committee. Pakistan's weapons, she noted, "are widely dispersed in the country."

"There's not a central location, as you know," she added. **"They've adopted a policy of dispersing their nuclear weapons and facilities." She went on to describe a potential situation in which a confrontation with India could prompt a Pakistani response,** though she did not go as far as saying that such a response could include moving weapons toward India—which American officials believed happened in 2002. Other experts note that **even as Pakistan faces instability, it is producing more plutonium for new weapons, and building more production reactors.**

David Albright and Paul Brannan of the Institute for Science and International Security wrote in a recent report documenting the progress of those facilities, **"In the current climate, with Pakistan's leadership under duress from daily acts of violence by insurgent Taliban forces and organized political opposition, the security of any nuclear material produced in these reactors is in question."** The Pakistanis, not surprisingly, **dismiss those fears as American and Indian paranoia,** intended to dissuade them from nuclear modernization. But the government's credibility is still colored by the fact that it used equal vehemence to denounce as fabrications the reports that Abdul Qadeer Khan, one of the architects of Pakistan's race for the nuclear bomb, had sold nuclear technology on the black market. In the end, those reports turned out to be true.

The foregoing is Article No. 2 (TR382A02) in the **Terrorism Open Source Intelligence Report (TOSIR)**, No. 382, 7 May 2009, prepared by Interaction Systems Incorporated (isincreports@mindspring.com).

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3. **“U.S. Options in Pakistan Limited: Nation Rife With Security Issues, Infighting, Anti-American Sentiment,”** by Karen DeYoung, *Washington Post*, 4 May 2009. [KBTSPakWT, KBTGStrategies] We *quote* from this item from <http://www.washingtonpost.com>:

As Taliban forces edged to within 60 miles of Islamabad late last month, the Obama administration urgently asked for new intelligence assessments of whether Pakistan’s government would survive. In briefings last week, senior officials said, **President Obama and his National Security Council were told that neither a Taliban takeover nor a military coup was imminent and that the Pakistani nuclear arsenal was safe.**

Beyond the immediate future, however, **the intelligence was far from reassuring. Security was deteriorating rapidly, particularly in the mountains along the Afghan border that harbor Al-Qaeda and the Taliban**, intelligence chiefs reported, and there were signs that those groups were working with indigenous extremists in Pakistan’s populous Punjabi heartland.

The Pakistani government was mired in political bickering. The army, still fixated on its historical adversary India, remained ill-equipped and unwilling to throw its full weight into the counterinsurgency fight.

[**Obama backed five-year \$7.5 billion economic assistance package to Pakistan**]

But despite the threat the intelligence conveyed, **Obama has only limited options for dealing with it.** Anti-American feeling in Pakistan is high, and a U.S. combat presence is prohibited. **The United States is fighting Pakistan-based extremists by proxy, through an army over which it has little control, in alliance with a government in which it has little confidence.**

The tools most readily at hand are money, weapons, and a mentoring relationship with Pakistan’s government and military that alternates between earnest advice and anxious criticism. As criticism has dominated in recent weeks—along with reports that the administration is wooing Pakistani President Asif Ali Zardari’s principal political opponent, former prime minister Nawaz Sharif—the partnership has grown strained. “What are the Americans trying to do, micromanage our politics?” a senior Pakistani official said testily. “This is not South Vietnam.”

As Zardari arrives this week for his first official visit with Obama—part of a tripartite summit with Afghan President Hamid Karzai—the administration has asked **Congress to quickly approve hundreds of millions of dollars in emergency military aid for Pakistan.** That money, and billions more over the next several years, is to come with new authority for the Defense Department to decide what to spend it on.

Obama has also backed a five-year \$7.5 billion economic assistance package and is resisting congressional efforts to impose strict conditions on any aid to Pakistan. **Last month, the administration orchestrated an international donors’ conference in Tokyo that netted \$5.5 billion in pledges for Pakistan.**

[U.S. officials considering whether drone attacks have reached point of diminished returns]

When he sits down with Zardari on Wednesday at the White House, **Obama will urge him to put more effort into building domestic support by meeting critical public needs and to resolve his differences with Sharif and others so that he can concentrate on governing**, according to officials who discussed sensitive and fluid Pakistan issues on the condition of anonymity. **Of particular concern are hundreds of thousands of Pakistanis who have been displaced by fighting in the North-West Frontier Province**, U.S. officials said.

Security proposals up for discussion with Zardari and other members of his high-level delegation **include counterinsurgency training for Pakistani army troops at U.S. bases** in the Persian Gulf, Afghanistan, the United States, or elsewhere. **The administration wants to expand a small, in-country training force—now limited to about 70 Americans**—that is working with the Frontier Corps, the local, poorly armed force in the border regions.

As 17,000 additional U.S. troops deploying to southern Afghanistan this spring and summer begin to push Taliban fighters toward the Pakistan border, there are hopes the extremists can be trapped in “hammer and anvil” operations with Pakistani forces in the southern province of Baluchistan. Right now, however, **Pakistan fields only one army brigade and about 40,000 minimally trained and equipped Frontier Corps members in the vast region**, according to U.S. officials.

In deference to Pakistani objections, the administration has not initiated covert ground attacks, approved by the Bush administration last year, in mountain villages farther to the north, in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas, where it believes high-value Al-Qaeda figures are located. **But Obama authorized stepped-up attacks on the area by missiles launched from unmanned drone aircraft.**

Although the missile attacks are privately approved by the Pakistani government, despite its public denunciations, they are highly unpopular among the public. As Zardari’s domestic problems have grown, **the Obama administration last month cut the frequency of the attacks.** Some senior U.S. officials think they have reached the point of diminishing returns and the administration is debating the rate at which they should continue.

[White House closely watching Pakistani military offensive in Buner region]

Always simmering, administration concern about Pakistani governance rose sharply last month when **the Parliament approved an agreement between regional authorities and the Taliban to authorize sharia, or Islamic law, in the Swat valley**, located about 100 miles northwest of Islamabad. **Rather than lay down their arms in exchange, Taliban forces began moving eastward.** By the third week in April, they had **established a presence in Buner district, 60 miles from the capital**, with no apparent government resistance.

The day after the Buner reports surfaced, Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton infuriated the Pakistani government by telling Congress it was “abdicated to the Taliban and to the extremists” and that the situation posed a “mortal threat” to the world. “Absolutely, they’re getting irritated,” a senior U.S. official said of the

Pakistanis. Clinton, he said, “knows she went too far” in her unscripted testimony. “But on the other hand,” he said, **“it was that kind of statement that helped wake up the Pakistanis.”**

A Pakistani military offensive in the Buner region was underway Tuesday, even as Obama’s national security team met at the White House, and continued through the weekend. Administration officials said they were watching to see whether the military followed through or would simply stop without finishing the job, as it has in the past.

Meanwhile, Pakistan’s government says it is in no mood for criticism or conditions on aid. After “billions of dollars were poured into Pakistan under the dictatorship” of General Pervez Musharraf by the Bush administration, Pakistani ambassador to Washington Husain Haqqani said yesterday, the Obama administration has produced little but promises and disapproval of the democratically elected government.

“It is unfair to blame the civilian leadership that is bravely mobilizing the nation against terrorism when it is our American partners who have also slowed us down in the war effort by slowing down the flow of assistance,” Haqqani said. “We trust that President Obama’s emphasis on Pakistan will also translate promises into deliverables.” “You can’t spend more in Iraq and Afghanistan,” he said, “and then wonder why the effort in Pakistan is lagging behind.”

The foregoing is Article No. 3 (TR382A03) in the [Terrorism Open Source Intelligence Report \(TOSIR\)](#), No. 382, 7 May 2009, prepared by Interaction Systems Incorporated (isincreports@mindspring.com).

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4. “The London Bombings: The Real Plotters of the Terrorist Attacks May Never Be Brought to Justice,” Economist, 30 April 2009 (<http://www.economist.com>). [KBTSBritain, KBTDLondon7July] *We quote:*

It was not long after the bombs exploded on 7 July 2005 that police discovered the identities of the men who had carried and detonated them. But the four British Islamists who murdered 52 people on London’s public transport network killed themselves in the process.

[Three defendants acquitted of role in London plot—though two jailed for seven years]

Nearly four years on, no one has been convicted for the crimes, though police suspect that perhaps 20 people were in on it. A trial on which officers had pinned their last hopes of a conviction ended on 28 April with all three defendants acquitted of any role in the plot. Officers now doubt anyone will ever be sent down for the atrocity.

The case against Waheed Ali, Sadeer Saleem, and Mohammed Shakil rested on their apparently close relationship with the 7 July bombers. They lived in the same part of Leeds and left DNA and fingerprints in the flat where the bombs were assembled. They had been to militant training camps in Pakistan; Mr. Ali had served with the Taliban in Afghanistan alongside Mohammad Sidique Khan, the leader of the

suicide attack. In court, Mr. Ali boasted that he was willing to fight abroad, and against British soldiers.

All three men visited London in late-2004 along with two of the eventual bombers, in what prosecutors claimed was a reconnaissance mission. Mobile phone records showed that they had been near the King's Cross, Edgware Road, and Aldgate East Underground stations, three of the eventual targets. The defendants said the reason for the trip was to let Mr. Ali say goodbye to his sister before he traveled to Afghanistan.

Jurors gave them the benefit of the doubt, though they did find Mr. Ali and Mr. Shakil guilty of conspiring to receive terrorist training, for which each was jailed for seven years.

[Police criticized for not acting soon enough in one plot—and acting too soon in another]

The government has resisted calls for an independent inquiry into the terrorist attack and its investigation, arguing that it would tie up the security services at a time when they are needed on the front line.

But a report from the parliamentary committee on intelligence and security, to be published in May, **could highlight mistakes made by the security services, without which the bombers might have been intercepted before the attack.** West Yorkshire police supposedly failed to follow up a request by MI5, Britain's domestic spying agency, for information on Khan, whom they had spotted during surveillance of Omar Khyam. Mr. Khyam was convicted in 2007 for his part in a plot to set off a bomb in a nightclub or a shopping center. **The report will also amplify questions about why police did not act sooner:** Khan had been noted and followed by secret service agents more than a year before 7 July.

That will be hard to take, for officers are under fire elsewhere for acting precipitately. Last month 12 people, 11 of them Pakistanis, were arrested in connection with what police said was a “very, very big” terrorist plot. After all were released without charge, police were criticized for acting before the alleged plotters had incriminated themselves enough for a conviction.

Back in Leeds, detectives are certain that people are withholding information about those who helped to set up the 7 July attack. Several sets of fingerprints in the bomb factory remain unidentified.

The foregoing is Article No. 4 (TR382A04) in the **Terrorism Open Source Intelligence Report (TOSIR)**, No. 382, 7 May 2009, prepared by Interaction Systems Incorporated (isinreports@mindspring.com).

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5. **“Grappling with the Dirty Bomb Threat,”** by Humphrey Hawksley, **BBC News**, 27 April 2009 (<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/8014863.stm>). [KBTTNuclear] *We quote:*

The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction is once again at the top of security agenda—and not only from hostile states such as Iran and North Korea.

[President Obama has pledged to clear up all unsecured nuclear material within four years]

President Barack Obama has turned his focus to stockpiles of dangerous chemical and radiological materials that remain at risk from being stolen by terror groups planning to make what is known as a dirty bomb. **Much of it is in the former Soviet Union, but it's also being kept in other parts of the world by countries** that have nuclear power plants or had plans to build a nuclear bomb, but abandoned them.

American intelligence agencies believe a dirty bomb strike is almost inevitable in a major city within the next five years, and last month the British government conceded that such an attack was highly likely and could happen without warning at any time.

In his NATO speech in Prague, **Mr. Obama set a deadline and pledged to clear up all unsecured nuclear material within four years.** “We must ensure that terrorists never acquire a nuclear weapon. This is the most immediate and extreme threat to global security. **One terrorist with one nuclear weapon could unleash massive destruction,**” he said. “We know that there is unsecured nuclear material across the globe. **To protect our people, we must act with a sense of purpose without delay.**” **But it might not be that easy.**

[Extent of the danger is uncertain because no one knows the extent of the proliferation]

The sight of nuclear installations in the former Soviet Union protected only by a broken fence and rusting padlock was common in the 1990s. Plans were put in place to make it all secure, but they were never fully carried out. **Figures vary, but it's thought that between 40 percent and 60 percent of all dangerous materials remain unsecured and at risk of theft. Much of it is still hidden or governments are not allowing international inspectors in to check** on the safety measures they have put in place.

“No one knows the extent of the danger because we don't know the extent of the proliferation,” says U.S. Senator Richard Lugar [Republican-Indiana] who, together with former Senator Sam Nunn [Democrat-Georgia], initiated the main American program to make nuclear material secure. **“Some nations are not cooperative and are not prepared to make available their material that might have been left over.”**

Senator Lugar's office wall is covered with photographs on the subject. One is of him in Russia with then Senator Barack Obama looking at nuclear armed submarines. In another, he is holding **a briefcase. Inside this is a small chemical warhead**—precisely the type of weapon that it's feared terror groups could get hold of. **“In the event that you used this one correctly, you could kill all the people in an 80,000-seat stadium,”** he says. “If something that could kill that many people could be carried around at that size, this is a very difficult thing to stop.”

[Complete international cooperation needed to make all nuclear, radiological material safe]

Most countries, friend or foe, guard their nuclear secrets closely, with governments claiming they can be responsible for their own lethal material. **“There are nuclear materials that are inadequately secured in dozens of countries all over the world,”** says Matthew Bunn of Harvard's Belfer Center and author of an annual report called Securing the Bomb. “My belief is that **pretty much every country where there are**

nuclear weapons or plutonium, or highly enriched uranium that is used to make nuclear weapons, has more to do to improve security.”

The issue was highlighted in South Africa in November 2007 when raiders broke through the perimeter fence of the nuclear site in **Pelindaba** near Pretoria. **While South Africa gave up its nuclear weapons program many years ago, it kept its dangerous, highly enriched uranium. “One of the raiding teams went through a 2000-volt security fence,** disabled the intruder detector so no alarm went off, **reached the emergency control center** where they got into a struggle with a worker and shot him in the chest,” says Mr. Bunn.

“They spent 45 minutes inside the guarded perimeter of the site without ever being engaged by the site security force. Then **they went back through the fence at the same point they went in and they’ve never been caught. The U.S. government offered to help the South Africans install better security, but South Africa said they didn’t need help** because they knew how to handle these materials.”

There lies the crux of President Obama’s problem. If all nuclear and radiological material is to be made safe, there has to be complete international cooperation. So far that is not forthcoming. “There’s way too much of it,” says Tim Roemer, a close Obama adviser who was on the [9/11 commission] that predicted a dirty bomb attack within five years. “This needs to be the number one problem of the president and vice president to work on every day.”

The foregoing is Article No. 5 (TR382A05) in the [Terrorism Open Source Intelligence Report](#) (TOSIR), No. 382, 7 May 2009, prepared by Interaction Systems Incorporated (isincreports@mindspring.com).

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6. “**Al-Qaeda Used Hotmail, Simple Codes in Planning,**” by Pamela Hess, [Associated Press](#), **30 April 2009** (<http://www.ap.org>). [KBTZTactics, KBTCInternet, KBTQOverview] *We quote:*

Washington, D.C.—**In the days following the 11 September terrorist attacks, alleged Al-Qaeda operations mastermind Khalid Sheikh Mohammed intended to use his free Hotmail account to direct a U.S.-based operative to carry out an attack, according to a guilty plea agreement filed by Ali Saleh Kahlah al-Marri in federal court.**

[Al-Marri admitted he trained in Al-Qaeda camps in Pakistan between 1998 and 2001]

The document shows how Al-Qaeda, at least in 2001, embraced prosaic technologies like pre-paid calling cards, public phones, computer search engines, and simplistic codes **to communicate, plan, and carry out its operations. Al-Marri also surfed the Internet to research cyanide gas,** using software to cover his tracks, according to the document filed Thursday in federal court in Peoria, Illinois. He marked the locations of dams, waterways, and tunnels in the United States in an almanac. The government claims this reflects intelligence that Al-Qaeda was planning to use cyanide gas to attack those sites.

As a result of his guilty plea, **al-Marri could be sentenced up to a maximum 15-year term in federal prison.** In a stipulation of facts filed as part of the plea agreement, **al-Marri admitted that he trained in Al-Qaeda camps and stayed in terrorist safe houses in Pakistan between 1998 and 2001.** There, he learned how to handle weapons and how to communicate by phone and e-mail using a code.

After arriving in the United States on 10 September 2001—a day before Al-Qaeda’s long-plotted terror strikes in New York and Washington—**al-Marri stored phone numbers of Al-Qaeda associates in a personal electronic device. He used a “10-code” to protect the numbers**—subtracting the actual digits in the phone numbers from 10 to arrive at a coded number, according to a person close to the investigation.

In a 10-code, eight becomes a two, for example. **Other Al-Qaeda members used the same code**, according to the plea agreement. Al-Marri sent e-mails to Khalid Sheikh Mohammed’s Hotmail account HOR70@hotmail.com—addressed to “Muk” and signed “Abdo.” **The details of that code were included in an address book found in an Al-Qaeda safe house in Pakistan.** An attempt by the Associated Press to reach that address did not indicate the account had been closed, but it went unanswered.

[Al-Marri arrested in December 2001, held without charge for five years]

Al-Marri initially tried to use a Yahoo e-mail account to contact Mohammed, but it failed to go through. So he switched to Hotmail as well. **When al-Marri arrived in the United States, he created five new e-mail accounts to communicate with Mohammed**, using the 10-code to send him his cell phone number in Peoria. **From September to November, al-Marri tried and failed to contact members of Al-Qaeda in Pakistan using prepaid calling cards and public phones**, sometimes traveling 160 miles to use a different phone.

Al-Marri was arrested in December 2001, three months after entering the United States on a student visa. He was shortly thereafter **declared an “enemy combatant”** and taken into military custody. The “enemy combatant” designation was dropped when he was indicted by a federal grand jury in Illinois.

Suspected as an Al-Qaeda sleeper agent, **he was held without charge for more than five years. His attorneys say he was tortured while in military custody. There is no indication in the plea agreement that al-Marri ever made contact with other alleged Al-Qaeda agents inside the United States.** Al-Marri admitted that before entering the United States, he met and had regular contact with Khalid Sheikh Mohammed and with Mustafa Ahmad al- Hawsawi, who allegedly helped the 11 September hijackers with money and Western-style clothing.

The foregoing is Article No. 6 (TR382A06) in the Terrorism Open Source Intelligence Report (TOSIR), No. 382, 7 May 2009, prepared by Interaction Systems Incorporated (isincreports@mindspring.com).

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