

# Terrorism Open Source Intelligence Report (TOSIR) No. 377 2 April 2009

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[Article 1](#) **“The Coming Swarm,”** by John Arquilla, New York Times, 14 February 2009. *With three Afghan government ministries in Kabul recently hit by simultaneous suicide attacks, by a total of just eight terrorists, it seems that a new “Mumbai model” of swarming, smaller-scale terrorist violence is emerging. The basic concept is that hitting several targets at once, even with just a few fighters at each site, can cause fits for elite counterterrorist forces that are often manpower-heavy, far away, and organized to deal with only one crisis at a time. So how are swarms to be countered? The simplest way is to create many more units able to respond to simultaneous, small-scale attacks and spread them around the country. We need to get smaller, closer, and quicker. The sooner the better.*

[Article 2](#) **“IEDs: The Poor Man’s Artillery,”** The Week, 20 February 2009. *The term “improvised explosive device” (IED) can refer to any do-it-yourself bomb. But since the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003, it has come to describe the lethal variety of roadside and car bombs used by insurgents in Iraq and Afghanistan. These devices have accounted for around 70 percent of America’s 4,223 combat deaths in Iraq and are increasingly being used in Afghanistan. They have been used in wars since World War I, but IEDs have proven so effective recently because they’re cheap, simple to build, and hard to spot and defend against. They also have a tremendous strategic impact within the context of an insurgency. A particularly troubling feature of this phenomenon is the ease with which the technology is refined, shared, and spread by hundreds of insurgent groups around the world. Many think it is only a matter of time before these devices appear in large numbers in the West.*

[Article 3](#) **“Drug Cartels’ New Weaponry Means War,”** by Ken Ellingwood and Tracy Wilkinson, Los Angeles Times, 15 March 2009. *In a disturbing trend within Mexico’s drug wars, traffickers have escalated their arms race, acquiring military-grade weapons, including hand grenades, grenade launchers, armor-piercing munitions, and antitank rockets with firepower far beyond that which have dominated their arsenals. The proliferation of heavier armaments points to a menacing new stage in the Mexican government’s two-year-old war against drug organizations, which are evolving into a more militarized force prepared to take on Mexican army troops as well as to attack each other. There are even more ominous developments: Authorities reported three thefts of several hundred pounds of blasting material from industrial explosives plants—material that may have been destined for car bombs or remotely detonated roadside devices, like those used in Iraq.*

[Article 4](#) **“Learning from the Real Battle of Algiers,”** by Robert J. Avrech, Big Hollywood, 8 January 2009. *“The Battle of Algiers,” a 1965 film directed by Gillo Pontecorvo, a perennial favorite on college campuses, is hailed as a modern classic. But let’s be clear, the film is a work of leftist propaganda, beautifully crafted, to be sure, but a film that seeks to justify Islamic terror by proposing that the French were so brutal that the Algerians had no choice but to resort to unrestrained terror. The daily homicide and roadside bombings in Iraq, Afghanistan, and elsewhere, like in Algeria, are part of a carefully constructed tactic that is part of a grand strategy aimed at the soft heart of the Western middle class. We must be patient and yes, steadfast. It takes time, blood, and treasury to defeat evil, but it can and must be done.*

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## Articles

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1. **“The Coming Swarm,”** by John Arquilla, New York Times, 14 February 2009 (<http://www.nytimes.com>). [KBTZTactics, KBTSIndiaMumbai, KBTHStateLocal, KBTKAlerts] John Arquilla teaches in the special operations program at the Naval Postgraduate School and is the author of Worst Enemy: The Reluctant Transformation of the American Military. We quote from this op-ed piece:

Monterey, California—**With three Afghan government ministries in Kabul hit by simultaneous suicide attacks this week**, by a total of just eight terrorists, **it seems that a new “Mumbai model” of swarming, smaller-scale terrorist violence is emerging.**

[Al-Qaeda has coordinated swarm attacks in many places—even 9/11 had similar traits]

**The basic concept is that hitting several targets at once, even with just a few fighters at each site, can cause fits for elite counterterrorist forces that are often manpower-heavy, far away, and organized to deal with only one crisis at a time.**

This approach certainly **worked in Mumbai, India, last November**, where five two-man teams of Lashkar-e-Taiba operatives held the city hostage for two days, **killing 179 people. The Indian security forces**, many of which had to be flown in from New Delhi, **simply had little ability to strike back at more than one site at a time.**

While it’s true that the assaults in Kabul seem to be echoes of Mumbai, the fact is that **Al-Qaeda and its affiliates have been using these sorts of swarm tactics for several years. Jemaah Islamiyah**—the group responsible for the Bali nightclub attack that killed 202 people in 2002—**mounted simultaneous attacks on 16 Christian churches in Indonesia on Christmas Eve in 2000**, befuddling security forces.

**Even 9/11 itself had swarm-like characteristics**, as four small teams of Al-Qaeda operatives simultaneously seized commercial aircraft and turned them into missiles, flummoxing all our defensive responses. In the years since, **Al-Qaeda has coordinated swarm attacks in Saudi Arabia, Tunisia, Turkey, Yemen, and elsewhere.** And at the height of the insurgency **in Iraq, terrorists repeatedly used swarms on targets as small as truck convoys and as large as whole cities.**

[Nightmare possibilities include synchronized assaults on shopping malls, high-rise offices]

**This pattern suggests that Americans should brace for a coming swarm.** Right now, **most of our cities would be as hard-pressed as Mumbai was to deal with several simultaneous attacks.** Our elite federal and military counterterrorist units would most

likely find their responses slowed, to varying degrees, by distance and the need to clarify jurisdiction.

**While the specifics of the federal counterterrorism strategy are classified**, what is in the public record indicates that **the plan contemplates having to deal with as many as three sites being simultaneously hit and using “overwhelming force” against the terrorists**, which probably means mustering as many as 3,000 ground troops to the site. If that’s an accurate picture, it doesn’t bode well.

**We would most likely have far too few such elite units** for dealing with a large number of small terrorist teams carrying out simultaneous attacks across a region or even a single city.

**Nightmare possibilities include synchronized assaults on several shopping malls, high-rise office buildings**, or other places that have lots of people and relatively few exits. **Another option would be to set loose half a dozen two-man sniper teams in some metropolitan area**—you only have to recall the havoc caused by **the Washington sniper in 2002** to imagine how huge a panic a slightly larger version of that form of terrorism would cause.

**[Making response teams smaller, closer, quicker critical to battling swarm-type attacks]**

**So how are swarms to be countered? The simplest way is to create many more units able to respond to simultaneous, small-scale attacks and spread them around the country.** This means jettisoning the idea of overwhelming force in favor of small units that are **not “elite” but rather “good enough”** to tangle with terrorist teams. **In dealing with swarms, economizing on force is essential.**

**We’ve actually had a good test case in Iraq over the past two years.** Instead of responding to insurgent attacks by sending out large numbers of troops from distant operating bases, **the military strategy is now based on hundreds of smaller outposts in which 40 or 50 American troops are permanently stationed and prepared to act swiftly** against attackers. Indeed, their very presence in Iraqi communities is a big deterrent. **It’s small surprise that overall violence across Iraq has dropped by about 80 percent in that period.**

For the defense of American cities against terrorist swarms, the key would be to use local police officers as the first line of defense instead of relying on the military. **The first step would be to create lots of small counterterrorism posts throughout urban areas** instead of keeping police officers in large, centralized precinct houses.

**This is consistent with existing notions of community-based policing, and could even include an element of outreach to residents** similar to that undertaken in the Sunni areas of Iraq—even if it were to mean **taking the paradoxical turn of negotiating with gangs about security.**

**At the federal level, we should stop thinking in terms of moving thousands of troops across the country and instead distribute small response units far more widely.** Cities, states, and Washington should work out **clear rules in advance for using military forces in a counterterrorist role, to avoid any bickering or delay during a crisis.** Reserve and National Guard units should train and field many more units able to

take on small teams of terrorist gunmen and bombers. Think of them as **latter-day Minutemen**.

**Saudi Arabia, Tunisia, Turkey, and Yemen all responded to Al-Qaeda attacks with similar “packetizing” initiatives** involving the police and armed forces; and while that hasn’t eliminated swarm attacks, **the terrorists have been far less effective and many lives have been saved.**

**As for Afghanistan, where the swarm has just arrived, there is still time to realize the merits of forming lots of small units and sprinkling them about in a countrywide network of outposts.** As President Obama looks to send more troops to that war, let’s make sure the Pentagon does it the right way. Yes, the swarm will be heading our way, too. **We need to get smaller, closer, and quicker. The sooner the better.**

The foregoing is Article No. 1 (TR377A01) in the **Terrorism Open Source Intelligence Report (TOSIR)**, No. 377, 2 April 2009, prepared by Interaction Systems Incorporated (isincreports@mindspring.com).

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2. **“IEDs: The Poor Man’s Artillery,” The Week, 20 February 2009.** [KBTTBombs, KBTZTactics, KBTTSecurity, KBTKAlerts] We *quote* from this article posted at [http://www.theweek.com/article/index/93179/IEDs\\_The\\_poor\\_mans\\_artillery](http://www.theweek.com/article/index/93179/IEDs_The_poor_mans_artillery):

**“Improvised explosive devices” [IEDs] have migrated from Iraq to Afghanistan,** where they now account for most U.S. injuries and deaths. **What makes them so lethal?**

**What is an IED?**

**The term “improvised explosive device” can refer to any do-it-yourself bomb.** But since the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003, **it has come to describe the lethal variety of roadside and car bombs used by insurgents in Iraq and, increasingly, Afghanistan.** These devices, hidden in potholes, amid rubbish, and even inside animals, have **accounted for around 70 percent of America’s 4,223 combat deaths in Iraq and have wounded more than 38,000 U.S. soldiers there.**

**In Afghanistan,** the number of IED incidents last year rose to **more than 1,000, a 33 percent increase from 2007, and claimed 161 lives.** “IEDs are the biggest threat we face,” says Major General Jeffrey Schloesser, the top U.S. commander in eastern Afghanistan. The IED, says former CIA operative and author Robert Baer, **“has leveled the battlefield in favor of insurgent and terrorist groups.”**

**Have IEDs been used in past wars?**

**Absolutely. In World War I, Lawrence of Arabia used railway and roadside bombs** to disrupt Turkish supply routes and create, as he put it, “an uncertain terror for the enemy.” **Soviet guerrillas used IEDs in World War II. In Vietnam,** IEDs caused a third of all American casualties, and **in Northern Ireland,** the Provisional Irish Republican Army made wide use of the devices.

**What's unusual now is the extent to which they have become the signature weapon of the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan.**

**Why have IEDs proved so effective?**

First of all, **they're cheap**, typically costing no more than \$100. **They also are simple to build and, given their limitless variety, hard to spot and defend against. They also have a tremendous strategic impact.**

**In the context of an insurgency, IEDs don't just maim and kill; their presence also makes every civilian a suspect, every car a possible bomb. This has the effect of driving up the military's suspicion of and hostility toward the local populace.**

The killings of Iraqi civilians by U.S. Marines in Haditha in 2005 and by Blackwater security personnel in Baghdad in 2007 both followed IED attacks. **"The IED is the enemy's artillery system,"** says retired General Montgomery Meigs. **"But they didn't come through three-dimensional space in a parabolic trajectory. They came through a social trajectory and a social network in the community."**

**How are IEDs made?**

**"All you need is a battered old car, a couple of hundred pounds of homemade explosives, and a detonator,"** says ex-CIA officer Baer. **In Iraq, nearly all the bombs were crude devices initially made from the explosives left in Saddam Hussein's armories.**

**But they have evolved to include artillery shells powerful enough to kill soldiers inside 30-ton fighting vehicles, with detonators that can be triggered by such common technology as dishwasher timers and mobile phones. And any advance in technology is quickly spread on the Internet.**

**Are all IEDs homegrown?**

**Probably not. The U.S. military is convinced that IEDs developed by Iranian-backed Hezbollah for use against Israeli soldiers in southern Lebanon were exported to Iraq.**

**Iran has also been implicated in the development of the "explosively formed projectile" [EFP], which first appeared in Iraq in 2005. The EFP can fire a molten bolt, often copper, through the armor of the most heavily built vehicles. "Believe me,"** says one Marine, **"you don't want to know what that does to the guys inside."**

**How have regular armies dealt with IEDs?**

**The United States has poured more than \$20 billion into the Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization. That money has funded development of heavier armored vehicles; 37,000 radio jammers to disrupt detonators; more than 6,000 drones and robots used to set off the devices; and increasingly creative techniques for detecting bombs, including the use of honey bees and hunting dogs.**

Allied forces also now ship fragments from detonated IEDs to labs for analysis, in an effort to trace the devices to their origins. There has also been a heavy emphasis on

**improving intelligence in order to identify the networks responsible** for building and distributing the devices.

**Have these efforts paid off?**

**It would appear so. Roadside bombs remain the No. 1 killer of U.S. troops in Iraq. But the U.S. Army reports a 50 percent drop in IED attacks from 2007 to 2008.** Authorities say more devices are being found before they can be set off, while body armor and stronger vehicles are noticeably improving “survivability ratios.” **But critics say it’s impossible to distinguish the effects of the anti-IED campaign from the broader success of the U.S. surge and overall reduction in violence.**

They also point to **the rise of attacks in Afghanistan**, where countermeasures so far have proved ineffective. The Pentagon acknowledges that **as long as there is a viable insurgency in Afghanistan, IEDs will take their terrible toll.** “We are in a long war, a persistent conflict with a group of insurgents who want to wear down our will so we quit—that’s the purpose of an IED,” says Pentagon spokeswoman Irene Smith. “The enemy recognizes IEDs as the weapon of choice.”

**Refining the roadside bomb**

**A particularly troubling feature of the IED phenomenon is the ease with which the technology is refined and spread.** Bombers have been known to record their attacks, then post the images to the Internet, along with instructions on how to make the devices. **The techniques are constantly being shared and refined by hundreds of insurgent groups.** In Afghanistan, an increasing number of IEDs are being set off by text message, a trend that will only rise as the country extends its mobile phone network.

**Security experts say there are now up to 300 IED attacks a month in other countries around the world.** The powerful remote-controlled IED that killed 13 people in Algeria last June was probably based on designs originally from Iraq, and **many think it is only a matter of time before these devices appear in large numbers in the West. Security companies in America are already offering “IED awareness training”** to emergency crews and estimate that by 2012, the global market in fighting the devices could be worth \$23 billion.

The foregoing is Article No. 2 (TR377A02) in the [Terrorism Open Source Intelligence Report \(TOSIR\)](#), No. 377, 2 April 2009, prepared by Interaction Systems Incorporated (isincereports@mindspring.com).

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**3. “Drug Cartels’ New Weaponry Means War,” by Ken Ellingwood and Tracy Wilkinson, [Los Angeles Times](#), 15 March 2009** (<http://www.latimes.com>). [KBTSMexico, KBTHBorder, KBTZTactics] We *quote*:

Reporting from Zihuatanejo, Mexico, and Mexico City—It was **a brazen assault**, not just because it targeted the city’s police station, but for **the choice of weapon: grenades.** **The 21 February attack on police headquarters in coastal Zihuatanejo**, which injured four people, **fit a disturbing trend of Mexico’s drug wars.**

**Traffickers have escalated their arms race, acquiring military-grade weapons, including hand grenades, grenade launchers, armor-piercing munitions, and antitank rockets** with firepower far beyond the assault rifles and pistols that have dominated their arsenals.

**Most of these weapons are being smuggled from Central American countries or by sea, eluding U.S. and Mexican monitors who are focused on the smuggling of semi-automatic and conventional weapons purchased from dealers in the U.S. border states of Texas, New Mexico, Arizona, and California.**

**[Grenades, military-grade weapons reported in ten Mexican states over last six months]**

**The proliferation of heavier armaments points to a menacing new stage in the Mexican government's two-year-old war against drug organizations,** which are evolving into a more militarized force prepared to take on Mexican army troops, deployed by the thousands, as well as to attack each other.

**These groups appear to be taking advantage of a robust global black market and porous borders,** especially between Mexico and Guatemala. **Some of the weapons are left over from the wars that the United States helped fight in Central America,** U.S. officials said.

**"There is an arms race between the cartels,"** said Alberto Islas, a security consultant who advises the Mexican government. "One group gets rocket-propelled grenades, the other has to have them."

**There are even more ominous developments: Authorities reported three thefts of several hundred pounds of blasting material** from industrial explosives plants in Durango during a four-day period last month. **Authorities believe the material may have been destined for car bombs or remotely detonated roadside devices, which have been used with devastating effect in Iraq,** killing more than 1,822 members of U.S.-led forces since the war there began nearly six years ago. **The Mexican army has recovered most of the material, and there has been no reported use of such devices.**

**Grenades or military-grade weapons have been reported in at least ten Mexican states during the last six months,** used against police headquarters, city halls, a U.S. consulate, TV stations, and senior Mexican officials. **In a three-week period ended on 6 March, five grenade attacks** were launched on police patrols and stations and the home of a commander in the south-central state of Michoacan. **Other such attacks occurred in five other states during the same period.**

**At least one grenade attack north of the border, at a Texas nightclub** frequented by U.S. police officers, has been tied to Mexican traffickers.

**[U.S. officials detected smuggling of military-grade equipment into Mexico 18 months ago]**

How many weapons have been smuggled into Mexico from Central America is not known, and **the military-grade munitions are still a small fraction of the larger arsenal in the hands of narcotics traffickers.** **Mexican officials continue to push Washington to stem the well-documented flow of conventional weapons from the**

**United States**, as Congress holds hearings on the role those smuggled guns play in arming Mexican drug cartels.

There is no comprehensive data on how many people have been killed by heavier weapons. But **four days after the assault on the Zihuatanejo police station, four of the city's officers were slain in a highway ambush six miles from town** on the road to Acapulco. In addition to the standard AK-47 and AR-15 assault rifles, **the attackers fired at least six .50-caliber shells into the officers' pickup. The vehicle blew up when hit by what experts believe was a grenade or explosive projectile.** The officers' bodies were charred. "These are really weapons of war," said Alberto Fernandez, spokesman for the Zihuatanejo city government. "We only know these devices from war movies."

**U.S. law enforcement officials say they detected the smuggling of grenades and other military-grade equipment into Mexico about a year and a half ago**, and observed a sharp uptick in the use of the weapons about six months ago. The Mexican government said it has seized 2,239 grenades in the last two years, in contrast to 59 seized over the previous two years.

**[Multiple incidents in Mexico, one in Texas, have highlighted cartels' weapons upgrade]**

The enhanced weaponry represents **a wide sampling from the international arms bazaar, with grenades and launchers produced by U.S., South Korean, Israeli, Spanish, or former Soviet bloc manufacturers. Many had been sold legally to governments, including Mexico's**, and then were diverted onto the black market. Some may be sold directly to the traffickers by corrupt elements of national armies, authorities and experts say.

**The single deadliest attack on civilians by drug traffickers in Mexico took place on 15 September at an Independence Day celebration in the central plaza of Morelia**, hometown of President Felipe Calderon and capital of Michoacan. **Attackers hurled fragmentation grenades at the celebrating crowd, killing eight people** and wounding dozens more.

Amid the recent spate of attacks in Michoacan, **federal police on 20 February announced the discovery of 66 fragmentation grenades in the fake bottom of a truck** intercepted in southern Mexico, just over the border from Guatemala. The two men arrested with the cargo told police they were transporting the grenades to Morelia.

**Grenades used in three attacks in Monterrey and Texas were linked to a single Monterrey warehouse**, packed with explosives and high-caliber guns, reportedly belonging to the Gulf cartel. **Mexican authorities raided the warehouse in October and seized the cache, which contained South Korean-manufactured grenades similar to the American M67 fragmentation grenade.** Grenades from the same lot were used in a 6 January attack on the Televisa television station in Monterrey, which caused damage but no injuries, and during a 12 October attack against the U.S. consulate in Monterrey. The device at the consulate did not detonate.

Late on the night of 31 January, a Saturday, **a man tossed a grenade into the El Booty Lounge in Pharr, Texas.** Three off-duty Texas police officers were there, though

authorities would not say whether they were the target. **The explosive, which did not detonate, was traced to the Monterrey warehouse.**

**Traffickers using M203 40-millimeter grenade launchers last year attacked and killed eight Mexican federal police officers in Culiacan,** the capital of Sinaloa state. In the northern border city of Nogales, **the Sonora state police commander was killed on 2 November in an ambush by purported traffickers firing AK-47s and lobbing grenades.** He had been returning from a meeting with U.S. authorities in Arizona to discuss gun smuggling. **In the western state of Durango, three people, including a 3-year-old child, were killed in a grenade attack in January.**

**[Ordinary citizens can obtain high-powered guns in U.S.—easy to smuggle into Mexico]**

The firepower has gone beyond grenades. **Armed with light antitank weapons, would-be assassins went after the nation's top counternarcotics prosecutor in December 2007. The assailants were intercepted** before they reached Jose Luis Santiago Vasconcelos, who was not hurt. The weapons seized were linked to the notorious Sinaloa cartel. **"They were betting on being able to escalate with a spectacular strike precisely to terrify society,"** Santiago Vasconcelos said at the time. (He was killed in November in a plane crash.)

Beyond the weaponry, **drug gangs for several years have demonstrated the ability to form squads and employ military tactics, including the use of assault rifles, hand grenades, grenade launchers, and fully automatic weapons** to pin down army forces. **This has enabled them to attack army patrols frontally,** as they did with lethal results on 7 February in the central state of Zacatecas, killing one sergeant and critically wounding a colonel.

"At this stage, the drug cartels are using basic infantry weaponry to counter government forces," a U.S. government official in Mexico said. **"Encountering criminals with this kind of weaponry is a horse of a different color,"** the official said. "It's not your typical patrol stop, where someone pulls a gun. **This has all the makings of an infantry squad, or guerrilla fighting.**"

**The fear of guerrilla warfare was compounded in February when 270 pounds of dynamite and several hundred electric detonators were stolen from a U.S. firm in the state of Durango.** On Valentine's Day, **about 20 masked gunmen,** led by a heavysset man wearing gold rings and chains, stormed the warehouse of a subsidiary of Austin Powder Co., an industrial explosives manufacturer, according to official accounts. They overpowered guards and emptied the warehouse.

**Two similar thefts were reported within four days in the same area. Although the Mexican army recovered most of the dynamite, the incident augurs an even bloodier trend,** officials said. **"There is only one reason to have bulk explosives,"** said Thomas G. Mangan, spokesman in Phoenix for the U.S. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives. **"An improvised explosive device. A car bomb."**

In addition to grenades, **high-powered guns such as the .50-caliber Barrett sniper rifle have become a weapon of choice** in narcotics traffickers' arsenals, Mangan said. Unlike grenades and anti-tank weapons, **the .50-caliber guns can be obtained by ordinary**

**citizens in the United States and smuggled easily into Mexico**, like the tons of assault rifles and automatic pistols.

**[Mexican police weapons, equipment no match for those being stockpiled by drug cartels]**

**Mexican law enforcement**, such as the police in Zihuatanejo, **is grossly outgunned**. **Officers have protested, seeking better protective gear, weaponry, and pay. Shortly after the Zihuatanejo attacks, police officers staged a brief work stoppage outside their headquarters**, where scars from the grenade attack were still visible. One of the blasts left a cereal bowl-shaped divot in the stone pavement and pockmarks on the front of the police building. It went off 100 feet from the nearest street, prompting some officers to suspect that the assailants employed a grenade launcher.

**Police have piled sandbags four feet high around the compound and security is tight. Commanders have bought ten bulletproof vests, but say they need at least 280** to equip the city's 343 officers. The police commander, Pablo Rodriguez, said his **officers are terrified. They are armed with semiautomatic .223-caliber rifles** made in Italy, Germany, and Mexico. The rifles, with folding stocks, are snazzy, but they are **no match for the weapons being stockpiled by the drug cartels**. "They are good weapons, but to counteract the types of weapons they're using against us, they're not equal," Rodriguez said. His **officers know they don't stand a chance**. Not five days after the highway attack that blew up the police truck, Rodriguez had jobs to fill. **Twenty-two of his cops had abruptly quit**.

The foregoing is Article No. 3 (TR377A03) in the **Terrorism Open Source Intelligence Report (TOSIR)**, No. 377, 2 April 2009, prepared by Interaction Systems Incorporated (isincreports@mindspring.com).

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**4. "Learning from the Real Battle of Algiers," by Robert J. Avrech, Big Hollywood, 8 January 2009** (<http://bighollywood.breitbart.com/ravrech/2009/01/08/learning-from-the-real-battle-of-algiers>). [KBTIFranceExper, KBTSAlergia, KBTZGen, KBTZStrat, KBTCMedia, KBTZIslam] *We quote:*

**Fade In:**

**Intertitle: Movies Are a Moral Landscape**

**"The Battle of Algiers" (1965) [a film] directed by Gillo Pontecorvo, a perennial favorite on college campuses, is hailed as a modern classic**. Certainly the skillful use of black and white cinema verite is highly effective, making the viewer feel as if he's been plunged into the heart of the Algerian maelstrom. The scenes of torture and terror are stomach churning and bring chills to any civilized viewer.

**But let's be clear, the film is a work of leftist propaganda, beautifully crafted, to be sure, but a film that seeks to justify Islamic terror by proposing that the French were so brutal that the Algerians had no choice but to resort to unrestrained terror**.

Sound familiar? You better believe it. **When homicide terrorists first struck in Israel, spokesmen for Fatah, Hamas, Hezbollah, and the slick terrorist network, Al Jazeera, immediately claimed that the, ahem, powerless Palestinians, had no choice against the brutal and inhuman Israelis.** In short, Jewish victims—the murdered, the maimed, and the psychologically broken—were blamed for the bloody Islamic atrocities.

**Director Gillo Pontecorvo was an assimilated Italian Jew from a wealthy family. But like so many secular Jews, he was drawn to the fanatical religious cult of Communism. “The Battle of Algiers” is his penultimate work of cinematic propaganda. It’s right up there with Nazi filmmaker Leni Riefenstahl’s fawning documentaries “Triumph of the Will” and “Olympia,” which elevated Hitler and Nazism to the status of pagan Gods. Riefenstahl’s finely crafted films helped set the stage for the Holocaust by promoting the notion of an Aryan master race destined to cleanse and rule the world.**

**But now, let’s examine the real Battle of Algiers, free from the powerfully romantic, but deeply dishonest imagery presented by Pontecorvo where Islamic terrorists are accorded heroic and mythic status.** In truth, they were a bunch of sharia-spouting thugs, oppressors of women, and virulent Jew haters—your basic, blood-thirsty Islamofascists.

**The finest source for the history of the Algerian conflict is A Savage War of Peace, Algeria, 1954-1962 by Alistair Horne. It is the definitive account of, undoubtedly, the dirtiest colonial war of the 20th century.** We tend to think of the French as a bunch of pussies, their tanks and troops welded into reverse gear, but in Algeria, the French were determined and unbelievably ferocious. **Once the Algerians revolted, the French army and especially the French Foreign Legion—including numerous German POW volunteers, plus several Nazi war criminals escaping persecution—followed a scorched earth policy.**

**In 1954, the Legion was deployed from Indochina to Algeria. The shock and humiliation of the defeat at Dien Bien Phu was fresh in the minds of the proud Legionnaires and they were determined to erase that shameful episode. But the Legion were not the only troops ready to sacrifice and claim victory.**

**“ . . . the [French] army, incorporating Senegalese units legendary for their ferocity, subjected suspected Muslim villages to systematic *ratissage*—literally a ‘raking over,’ a time-honored word for pacifying operations. This involved a number of summary executions. Of the less accessible *mechtas*, or Muslim villages, more than forty were bombed by Douglas dive-bombers. . . .”**

**And this was just the opening salvo of the battle. It got worse. Much worse. The level of ferocity—on both sides—almost unimaginable.**

#### **Interpolation: Because Yours Truly Sees Connections between Past and Present**

**The Palestinians are a lucky people. Because their enemies are Jews. Any other foe, especially other Arabs, would have wiped them off the face of the earth a long time ago.**

Item: **In February 1982 the Syrian regime, feeling threatened by the Muslim Brotherhood, committed a massacre of over 25,000 men, women, and children in the town of Hama, where the Brotherhood was centered.** Scores of young girls were gang-raped by the Syrian soldiers and then shot in the public bathroom “Hamam Alsadia.”

**If Israel is foolish enough to surrender Judea and Samaria to the Palestinians, as she did with Gaza, then Jordan will have to square off against Hamas and Hezbollah who will step into the vacuum,** for the Palestinians will certainly move to overthrow the detested Hashemite Kingdom. Payback for the 1970 Black September.

Anyhoo. **If that happens, buckle up for some old fashioned blood-letting.** You can bet that the Jordanians will not use targeted assassinations like the Israelis. Uh-uh, **it’ll be mountains of Palestinian corpses choking the River Jordan. Or the conflict will spell the end of the Jordanian state**—created by Winston Churchill—and you can just say, “Howdy” to a completely insane Iranian proxy state.

### **End Interpolation: Now You Know, There Are Worlds within Worlds**

**The leaders of the Algerian revolt kept telling one another and their cadres to have patience. Democracies,** they lectured their followers, **cannot stand long wars;** democracies have a built-in weakness: elections. And wars are bad for elections. Democracies demand immediate results.

“We can hang on forever,” Ahmed Ben Bella explained to his men, **“we can fight and fight, whereas democracies like France have to go to their citizens and explain why their men are dying.** And sooner or later, they will grow sick of it. **Democracies are inherently weak for they have no patience.”**

This theme rises again and again in Horne’s amazing book, and though the French fought in Algeria for eight long and bloody years, Ben Bella was right. In fact, **the Battle of Algiers almost brought revolution to the streets of France, and mutiny in the French army.**

Now, let’s be clear, **the current wars in Iraq/Afghanistan and a dozen other shores where the Islamists sow their bloody work, are not colonial wars.** The French had a million citizens in Algeria living as privileged subjects. **The wars in Iraq/Afghanistan, etc., are wars of liberation against fanatical, sharia-yearning terrorists who are part of a worldwide caliphate pansurgency.** The war in Iraq was a war to overthrow one of the worst dictators this planet has ever seen. Plus: **Saddam Hussein was actively supporting Mid East terror.** Let’s not forget that he was **paying \$25,000 to the families of Palestinian suicide bombers.**

But the idea about the lack of patience in democracies is lodged in my cortex like a steel spike. **Everywhere I go I hear people lamenting: “How long is this war going to take?”** As if they are standing in line at MacDonal’d’s. **Perhaps we are too used to instant solutions in our lives. And the Islamic terrorists know it.** They count on it.

This is not the Battle of Algiers, and this is not Viet Nam. **If we had pulled out of Iraq before the successful troop surge**—opposed by Barack Obama and Joe Biden—well, no

ally would trust us ever again, and **the terrorists would have won an enormous victory.** And that would have been disastrous. Truly, **we need to learn patience.**

#### **Dissolve:**

**One could easily argue that Al-Qaeda and the worldwide Islamic terrorist pansurgency has its roots in the Algerian War. The Algerian insurgents were, at the beginning, a mix of Westernized intellectuals and Muslim fundamentalists, but soon enough the Islamic jihadists took control.** Simply put, they were merciless, willing to commit the kind of atrocities that placed them in the vanguard.

**It is vital to understand that what's going on in Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Indonesia, the Philippines, and, of course Israel, is part of an old and reliable guerrilla playbook.** If you don't understand Islamic terror and its parallel political stages, then you are fated to be crushed beneath the wheels of the Islamic fascists. **There is nothing improvised about the daily homicide and roadside bombings. It is a carefully constructed tactic that is part of a grand strategy aimed at the soft heart of the Western middle class.** And the Battle of Algiers is where the terrorists first perfected, well, terror.

**The strategy for modern terrorism was well defined by the Brazilian guerrilla leader, Carlos Marighela, before he was hunted down and killed:**

**“It is necessary to turn political crisis into armed conflict by performing violent actions that will force those in power to transform the political situation of the country into a military situation.** That will alienate the masses, who, from then on, will revolt against the army and the police and blame them for this state of things.”

Marighela's philosophy is simple: **using terrorism will inevitably provoke the forces of law and order to strike back with overwhelming force and repression, thereby alienating the hitherto uncommitted native population.** The idea is to polarize the situation into two extreme camps and make impossible any dialogue of compromise by eradicating the “soft center.”

Wrote Marighela:

**“The government can only intensify its repression thus making the life of its citizens harder than ever. . . . The population will refuse to collaborate with the authorities,** so that the latter will find the only solution to their problems lies in having recourse to the actual physical liquidation of their opponents. The political situation of the country will become a military situation. . . .”

**It was along this simple but effective doctrine that the Algerians started their war against civilians—without mercy, without quarter. The opening attack came in a small hot place called Philippeville.**

#### **Establishing Shot:**

**Philippeville was a small mining center of about 130 Europeans and about 2,000 Muslims, who for years had coexisted amicably.** Apparently, labor relations were extremely good with a rare degree of equality between Muslim and European. **It appears**

**that the whole Muslim community was aware of what was about to happen on 20 August 1955.** A number of Muslim families even left town. But no one warned the Europeans.

#### Montage:

Shortly before noon, **four groups of fifteen to twenty Muslim men attacked the village, taking it completely by surprise. They were led by Muslim mineworkers who knew each house and their neighbors.** Intimately. Telegraph lines were cut, the emergency radio transmitter was found to be “out of order,” and the village constable who was equipped with warning rockets had “disappeared.” **The Muslim attackers went from house to house, slaughtering all the European occupants: men, women, children, and infants.** All the time egged on by Muslim women with their eerie ululations. **From the mosque came exhortations to slit the throats of women and nurses in the cause of jihad.**

It was not until two o’clock in the afternoon that a French Para unit managed to reach the town. An appalling sight greeted them. In houses literally washed with blood, **European mothers were discovered with their throats slit and their bellies slashed open** by billhooks. **Children had suffered the same fate,** and infants in arms had had their brains dashed against the wall. A mother disemboweled, her five-day old baby slashed to death and replaced in her open womb. **Four entire families had been wiped out to the last member;** only six who had barricaded themselves in a house in the center of the village and had held out with sporting rifles and revolvers had survived.

Men returning from the mines had been ambushed in their cars and hacked to pieces. **Altogether thirty-seven Europeans had died,** including ten children under fifteen, and another thirteen had been left for dead. Not surprisingly, **Pontecorvo did not include the Philippeville massacre in his film.** Dramatically, it would have shredded his carefully constructed thesis. **The reaction of the French army was immediate. Out in the streets they found:**

“ . . . **bodies literally strewed the town. The Arab children, wild with enthusiasm—to them it was a great holiday—rushed about yelling among the grown-ups. They finished off the dying.** In one alley we found two of them kicking in an old woman’s head. We had to kill them on the spot: they were crazed. . . .”

#### Wide Angle:

**The reprisals were severe. The Algerians claim that as many as 12,000 were killed** by the French. **The French claim, 1,273. We will never know the truth.**

**But the Philippeville Massacre had its intended impact.** The polarizing effect that Marighela spoke of immediately took place. **The Battle of Algiers went on for eight long bloody years, and the brutality on both sides was unspeakable—**for there was a burning river of blood between the French and the Algerians after Philippeville.

**In Iraq/Afghanistan, Israel, etc., the genocidal terrorists are working from the exact same playbook.** They are murdering innocent civilians indiscriminately. **The hope is that the governments will clamp down with even greater ferocity and the population will join the terrorists.**

With General David Petraeus, his updated Counterinsurgency manual, and the successful surge, **the Americans are playing it smart. They are reacting calmly and professionally. The terrorists are getting desperate, thus the horrific and futile use of homicide bombers**, the majority of them outcast Muslim women and young children, many mentally challenged. **But on the home front, the mainstream media, and especially Hollywood, have not a clue as to the grand strategy the terrorists are using.** They see car bombs, body parts, chaos, and assume that all is lost. They do not understand warfare.

Worse, **they do not understand evil.** In fact too many journalists enable evil with their foolish dispatches. And **Hollywood strengthens the bloody hands of the Islamic terrorists with a shameful parade of anti-American movies**—all which have failed miserably at the box office. **But there are some of us—yes, in Hollywood—who understand Islamic terrorists**, some of us who understand evil, comprehend that **this is a long war that will be fought on a hundred far shores. We must be patient and yes, steadfast. It takes time, blood, and treasury to defeat evil, but it can and must be done** or we will be thrown back to the seventh century and its barbarian masters. . . .

## **Fade to Black**

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