

Terrorism Literature Report

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[Article 1](#) “Fighting Cosmic Warriors: Lessons from the First Seven Years of the Global War on Terror,” by Heather S. Gregg, *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism*, Vol. 32, No. 3, March 2009. *The current U.S. strategy of dismantling the Al-Qaeda network and denying its operatives sanctuary appears to be validating the ideology of Al-Qaeda that Islam is in imminent danger and requires the faithful to take up arms in defense of the faith. U.S. rhetoric in the Global War on Terrorism also confirms militant Islam’s Manichean perception that the world is divided into two opposing camps, those that uphold the faith and those that seek to destroy it. The United States needs to remain engaged in this fight, but in a way that will not feed Al-Qaeda’s cosmic war thinking. Indirectly supporting groups that offer an alternative interpretation of the faith could redirect the theology, which is the best real world strategy for winning a cosmic war.*

[Article 2](#) “Another Frontier to Fight: International Terrorism and Islamic Fundamentalism in North Africa,” by John M. Nomikos and Aya Burweila, *International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence*, Vol. 22, No. 1, March 2009. *Signifying the increasing importance of North Africa in international terrorism, Al-Qaeda’s Committee in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) is the result of the alliance between Al-Qaeda and the region’s best organized and prolific terrorist group, Algeria’s Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC). The AQIM has three objectives: (1) to unite jihadists in the region and bring them under the umbrella of all Al-Qaeda; (2) to recruit and send suicide bombers to join the insurgency in Iraq; and (3) to carry out attacks in Europe and North America. To be truly effective in combating terrorism, governments must adopt the “Educative Solution” which is a combination of educational efforts by democratic political parties, the mass media, trade unions, churches, schools, colleges, and other major social institutions to persuade terrorism supporters that terrorism is both undesirable and counterproductive to the realization of their political ideals.*

[Article 3](#) “Jihad after Iraq: Lessons from the Arab Afghans,” by Mohammed M. Hafez, *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism*, Vol. 32, No. 2, February 2009. *The defeat of Al-Qaeda in Iraq may generate new threats associated with the dispersal of its fighters in the region and around the world. Veterans of earlier insurgencies and civil wars in Afghanistan, Bosnia, and Chechnya moved from one conflict to another, lending combatants valuable skills and networks of support. The flight of Iraq’s irreconcilable insurgents is a greater threat to global security than the one posed by the Arab Afghans because of the range of combat experiences and skills acquired in Iraq since 2003. This article revisits the history of Arab veterans of the anti-Soviet struggle in Afghanistan to draw out lessons for countering the current bleed out from Iraq.*

[Article 4](#) “Looking for Waves of Terrorism,” by Karen Rasler and William R. Thompson, *Terrorism and Political Violence*, Vol. 21, No. 1, January 2009. *This article uses ITERATE data on international terrorism from 1968 to 2004 to test David C. Rapoport’s wave-like behavior of modern terrorism. Rapoport’s argument is particularly distinctive because of its emphasis on generational waves of terrorism which observes four waves since the late-1870s. The data provides empirical support for the Rapoport model that depicts succeeding waves of anarchism, nationalism, leftist/Marxism, and religious fundamentalism. Waves do indeed appear to characterize contemporary terrorist activity.*

[Article 5](#) “Review,” by Joshua Sinai, *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism*, Vol. 32, No. 2, February 2009—a review of *The Mind of the Terrorist: The Psychology of Terrorism from the IRA to Al-Qaeda*, by Jerrold Post (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007). *This book attempts to provide a framework for understanding modern day terrorism’s psychological mindset. Dr. Post’s theoretical framework is based on his generational pathways to terrorism matrix, which he developed in 1984. It postulates that an individual’s loyalty or disloyalty to one’s parents and the nature of the parents’ relationship to the regime are important determinants of whether that person becomes a nationalist-separatist or social revolutionary terrorist. Dr. Post’s generational pathways model to terrorism matrix is problematic for at least three reasons. The Mind of the Terrorist is an inconsistent and flawed overview of modern day terrorist groups and their leaders.*

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1. “Fighting Cosmic Warriors: Lessons from the First Seven Years of the Global War on Terror,” by Heather S. Gregg, *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism*, Vol. 32, No. 3, March 2009. [KBTGStrategies, KBTQStrategy, KBTWSummary] Heather S. Gregg is affiliated with the Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California. We *quote* from this article available at <http://www.informaworld.com/smpp/content~content=a909177379~db=all~jumptype=rss>:

In the days following the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks on New York and Washington, D.C., **President Bush announced that the United States would execute a Global War on Terror (GWOT)** with the aim of routing out terrorist entities wherever they existed and, specifically, dismantling Al-Qaeda: **“Our war on terror begins with Al-Qaeda, but it does not end there. It will not end until every terrorist group of global reach has been found, stopped, and defeated.”**

Seven years later, the U.S. government claims that it has taken out three-fourths of Al-Qaeda’s leadership. The Bush administration has also executed two wars—Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) in Afghanistan and Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) in Iraq—with the aim of denying assets to global-minded terrorists. Despite these efforts, Al-Qaeda and “Al-Qaeda-esque” terrorist operations have continued in Europe, North Africa, and the Middle East. The persistence of terrorist activities suggests that a new strategy is needed, one that reaches beyond dismantling the Al-Qaeda network and its assets. . . .

[Al-Qaeda message that Islam under attack seemingly validated by Iraq, Afghanistan wars]

. . . The current U.S. strategy of dismantling the Al-Qaeda network and denying its operatives sanctuary appears to be validating the ideology of Al-Qaeda that Islam is in imminent danger and requires the faithful to take up arms in defense of the faith.

U.S. rhetoric in the GWOT also **confirms militant Islam's Manichean perception that the world is divided into two opposing camps**, those that uphold the faith and those that seek to destroy it.

The U.S. government needs to remain engaged in this fight, but with a new strategy, one that will fight the organization and delegitimize the ideology. This strategy includes, above all, **a plan that will not divide the world into two opposing camps and will allow space for other voices and other interpretations of the faith to be heard**, including for individuals trying to redirect Islamic theology away from Al-Qaeda.

. . . **[Polling data]** suggests that, on some level, the message and actions of Al-Qaeda appear to be resonating with Muslims around the globe. **First and foremost, the U.S. government should pursue a policy that does not validate Al-Qaeda's message that Islam is under attack and requires Muslims to wage jihad in defense of the faith.** Unfortunately, **two conventional wars against Muslim countries appear to have validated this very claim.** Polling data shows that large numbers of Muslims disagreed with the U.S. decision to go to war in Afghanistan and even more so in Iraq. Moreover, **substantial numbers of Muslims polled believe that these wars are aimed at weakening Islam**, including Turkey, a non-Arab country.

[United States faces catch-22's with democratization policy and in Iraq, Afghanistan]

Polling data suggest that **the continued violence and unrest in both Iraq and Afghanistan is further validating this worldview.** However, **withdrawing from these countries at this point may actually feed this perception instead of delegitimize it.** Both Afghanistan and Iraq are in a fragile, insecure state and the removal of U.S. and international forces prior to the stabilization of these countries **could fuel Al-Qaeda's ideology that the West seeks to destroy the Muslim world and that the United States wanted to turn these countries into ruinous disasters.**

In other words, **the United States faces a catch-22 with its conventional wars in Iraq and Afghanistan:** its presence in these countries allows Al-Qaeda to interpret this as a threat to Islam, but withdrawing from these countries and allowing civil war to take hold, could also be interpreted as a threat to these fragile Muslim states. **The current U.S. policy toward Afghanistan and Iraq therefore offers no easy solution for delegitimizing Al-Qaeda's claims that the United States seeks to destroy Islam.**

The U.S. foreign policy program of democratization also faces a similar problem. On the one hand, the United States has called for the non-Western countries, particularly in the Middle East, to allow its citizens the right to choose their own leaders. **This policy has led to the election of groups that the United States does not like, such as Hamas in Palestine and Moqtada al-Sadr in Iraq.** Key thinkers in Al-Qaeda also have claimed that this is an effort to impose non-Muslim, secular values on the dar al Islam [the "house" of Islam as opposed to dar al Harb, the "house" of war].

However, **allowing non-democratic regimes to persist in the Muslim world also upholds one of Al-Qaeda's key criticisms, that the United States supports corrupt regimes** and therefore should be attacked in order to compel its withdrawal. As with the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, **U.S. policy toward democratization is trapped in a catch-22.**

[Evidence suggests moderate Muslim voices are emerging, offering alternate worldview]

U.S. rhetoric in the GWOT, however, offers some potential avenues for delegitimizing the ideology of Al-Qaeda. Broadly, U.S. policy should aim to depolarize the Manichean thinking of these cosmic warriors and not play into it. Specifically, the U.S. government should stray away from making this a war of values, which mirrors the rhetoric of Al-Qaeda's ideology and feeds the logic that both sides are locked in a zero sum battle of right versus wrong, where the other side wants to take away the other's way of life.

Describing the GWOT as a battle where the terrorists "want to take away our freedom" and other values, places the conflict in the spiritual realm, making it ripe for cosmic war. The U.S. government should also help create space for a spectrum of Muslim voices "in the middle" to be heard. This would serve the dual purpose of depolarizing the Manichean thinking in cosmic war and, possibly, redirecting the theology and steering supporters away from comic war altogether.

There is evidence to suggest that anti-Al-Qaeda, moderate Muslim voices are emerging and offering an alternate worldview to militant Islam. For example, imprisoned members of the Egyptian Gamaat have recently released a four-volume commentary on the Quran, specifically challenging Al-Qaeda's theological arguments for terrorism in general and American citizens in particular. The Egyptian Sheikh Yusuf al-Qaradawy, who has a regular show on Al-Jazeera, has been highly critical of Al-Qaeda's theology; Qaradawy, however, is also critical of the United States. Other examples of individuals and groups that embrace a new ideology of Islam include the Nobel laureate Shirin Ebadi, and moderate Muslims in the United States and Western Europe that act as a beacon of reform for the worldwide Muslim community.

[Indirect support of Islamic renewal groups best strategy for winning cosmic ideology war]

Some analysts have suggested that the best policy for the United States is to support moderate Muslims that are pushing for Islamic renewal—individuals and groups that aim to take back Islam from terrorists like Al-Qaeda by generating a fresh interpretation of the faith for the modern era—as the best means for fighting Islamic militancy.

However, embracing advocates of Islamic renewal, either through diplomacy or monetary support, fails to seriously consider the United States' unpopularity in the Muslim world. With such unpopularity, what would supporting these moderates actually do to their success? U.S. policymakers should consider that its embrace may actually discredit these movements instead of offer encouragement and growth.

In other words, directly supporting these groups would be the kiss of death. Moreover, many of these advocates would probably not accept American support if it were offered. For example, reformists like Qaradawy are anti-Al-Qaeda, but they are also anti-American; he most likely would not partner with the United States.

Rather than promote these groups directly, the U.S. government would do better to approach this problem indirectly and help create the necessary civic space in which these movements could take root and grow. Specifically, the United States could hold accountable the governments of the countries in which these fledgling moderates exist,

using their influence and leverage to discourage governments from cracking down on these movements and imprisoning their leaders.

This approach would have two positive benefits for the United States. **First, it would give these individuals and organizations the necessary public space to present their ideas and, hopefully, promote dialogue, debate, and moderation** within the faith. **Second, making governments accountable for the standards that the United States holds dear—freedom of speech, assembly, and association—would make it look more consistent in its message to support democratization abroad and could offer the United States a chance to improve its image and credibility** within the Muslim world.

The United States needs to remain engaged in this fight, but in a way that will not feed Al-Qaeda’s cosmic war thinking. **Indirectly supporting groups that offer an alternative interpretation of the faith could redirect the theology, which is the best real world strategy for winning a cosmic war.**

The foregoing is Article No. 1 (TL076A01) in the **Terrorism Literature Report (TLR)**, No. 76, 21 April 2009, prepared by Interaction Systems Incorporated (isincreports@mindspring.com).

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2. “Another Frontier to Fight: International Terrorism and Islamic Fundamentalism in North Africa,” by John M. Nomikos and Aya Burweila, **International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence**, Vol. 22, No. 1, March 2009. This article is available in full at <http://www.informaworld.com/smpp/content~content=a906588025~db=all~jumptype=rss>. [KBTMGSPC, KBTMAQIM, KBTRAfrica, KBTQOverview, KBTSIran, KBTGStrategies, KBTREurope, KBTTRogues] Dr. John M. Nomikos is director of the Research Institute for European and American Studies in Athens, Greece; and Aya Burweila is an analyst at that institute. From this article we *quote* from the initial paragraphs and from the final section (entitled “The Battle Ahead”):

In what was regarded as the deadliest attacks in at least five years, **on 11 April 2007, Al-Qaeda’s Committee in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) conducted two suicide car bombings in Algiers**, the capital of Algeria. **Crushing the assumption that Islamic violence in Algeria had long ceased, the attacks targeted the prime minister’s office, a police station, and purportedly a local office of Interpol, killing 33 people and wounding over 160 others.**

Signifying the increasing importance of North Africa in international terrorism, **Al-Qaeda’s Committee in the Islamic Maghreb is the result of the alliance between Al-Qaeda and the region’s best organized and prolific terrorist group, Algeria’s Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat, known by its French acronym of GSPC.**

Clearly, instead of dissolving under the intense pressure exerted by the Algerian security forces, **the GSPC chose to reemerge and survive by formally allying itself with Al-Qaeda**, with whom it enjoys a common cross-section of personnel as well as parallel agendas. After sharing long-standing links, the process of merging the national Algerian group with its international counterpart initially began in 2005 and **culminated on 11 September 2006, when [Al-Qaeda number two] Ayman al-Zawahiri announced [the**

merger] via Al-Qaeda's media and propaganda organization, as-Sahab Two days later, on 13 September 2006, the GSPC confirmed the alliance in a statement posted on its Website. . . .

Today, the GSPC is considered to be the greatest terror threat in Northwestern Africa, with Algeria, Morocco, and the Sahara region between the two countries serving as the epicenter of the region's terrorist activity. Furthermore, by merging with Al-Qaeda, the GSPC gained an extensive infrastructure throughout the Middle East and Western Europe, along with a greater number of recruits that the newly acquired networks would surely yield.

This new and improved GSPC version has **three objectives: (1) to unite jihadists in the region and bring them under the umbrella of all Al-Qaeda; (2) to recruit and send suicide bombers to join the insurgency in Iraq; and (3) to carry out attacks in Europe and North America.** Not only does the AQIM seek to attack Europe and North Africa, **it is highly probable that it will increase its attempts to attack Western targets in the region,** particularly businesses and employees associated with the United States and France. . . .

[Al-Qaeda leaders met for planning sessions with senior Iranian officials prior to 9/11]

. . . By allying itself with Al-Qaeda, **Algeria's top terror group has become part of the international network of Islamic terror that receives resources from affiliates in Europe, as well as the states that support them.**

According to Aaron Karp, the former director of the Arms Transfer Project at the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, **"During the 1980s, terrorist attacks sponsored by states were generally eight times more lethal than attacks carried out by terrorists without the assistance of states."** Today, four states provide the vital wherewithal for the Islamic terror network: Iran, Saudi Arabia, Syria, and Sudan.

Without a doubt, **the Islamic Republic of Iran, with its long tradition of military skill and strategic deception, is the most important and active state sponsor of terrorism.**

More importantly, what is less commonly known and even less articulated, is the Hamburg (Germany) cell's connection to Iran. **Before 11 September, the hijackers in the World Trade Center attacks and Al-Qaeda planners conducted planning sessions with senior Iranian officials and intelligence officers, the first of which took place in January 2001, when [Al-Qaeda number two] Ayman al-Zawahiri arrived in Iran from Afghanistan, accompanied by 29 other Al-Qaeda members and leaders. Upon arriving, Zawahiri requested from the Iranians special equipment and assistance in laundering money in Dubai, as well as aid with travel documents so that Al-Qaeda operatives could easily move from Iran to Europe without attracting the attention of customs and immigration personnel.**

So successful was this meeting, which took place over four days, that **twelve of Zawahiri's men stayed behind in Iran in order to set up operational headquarters in the city of Karaj, staying in a safe house known as "Three Thousand Mountain."** This first session was followed by a more prestigious one on **4 May 2001, when an Al-Qaeda delegation from Afghanistan, led by Sa'ad bin Laden, the eldest son of Osama bin**

Laden, arrived in Iran. There, the younger bin Laden met with all five members of Iran's leadership council in a session that lasted three hours.

For the next three weeks after his arrival, Sa'ad bin Laden met with leaders from Operational Division Number 43, a Special Forces unit of Iran's Revolutionary Guards and the detail men of Iran's foreign terrorist organization.

Furthermore, Iran's assistance was pivotal not only in the perpetration of the 9/11 attacks, but also in the first post-9/11 terrorist attack that took place on 11 April 2002 on one of the oldest synagogues [at Djerba in Tunisia]. On that day, a natural gas truck fitted with explosives breached the gates of the synagogue, killing fourteen German tourists, six Tunisian tourists, and one French tourist and wounding over 30 others. Though the suicide bomber was a Tunisian, the attack was allegedly organized by Sa'ad bin Laden from his sanctuary in Iran.

In fact, in the north of Tehran, near the town of Chalous on the Caspian Sea coast, between 20 to 25 former leaders of Al-Qaeda and two of Osama bin Laden's sons reside in custody of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard.

[Al-Qaeda's strategy is to exploit democratic loopholes in Europe, target weak states]

The aid of state-sponsors like Iran, as the success of the 9/11 attacks devastatingly demonstrated, is indispensable. For terrorists, finances and armaments are easy to come by, but without the support of states, major terrorist organizations would be crippled because only states can provide safe havens, safe passage, training camps, travel documents, the use of diplomatic pouches, secure communications, as well as the benefit of their own state intelligence service.

For example, the Iranian Intelligence Ministry (MOIS) produced a training manual for terrorists that was used by Al-Qaeda in Sudan. Described by a top British terror expert as "the mother of all training manuals," this professional product was discovered by the British military forces in a Muslim sector of Bosnia in February 1996. The manual contained detailed instructions on everything from clandestine communication, to the construction of secure terrorist cells, recruitment, morale-building, simultaneous paramilitary attacks, the use of explosives, kidnapping, countersurveillance methods, and extended sections on jihad against the West.

Clearly, the Islamists recognize no boundaries, thus posing a serious problem in combating terror. Because terrorist suspects travel often and have ties to numerous countries, they can easily exploit divisions of responsibility that create jurisdictional and coordination disagreements, making the close cooperation of multiple governments an absolute must for a successful prosecution.

As illustrated by its parallel expansion in both Europe and North Africa, Al-Qaeda's strategy is to exploit democratic loopholes in Europe and to target weak states around the world. Recognizing this, and despite the fact that Algeria and Morocco have chilled relations due to a dispute over a large swath of desert called the Western Sahara, these two countries, under the auspices of Trans Sahara Counter-Terrorism Partnership, an effort led by the U.S. State Department, are cooperating with one another in order to combat their common problem of terrorism. To this end, the [Partnership's] purpose is to integrate and pursue multi-agency objectives in the

region by working with, and providing counterterrorism training to local powers in Mauritania, Morocco, Nigeria, Senegal, and Tunisia.

[Islamist victory in one area of world will translate to security threat in another area]

Designed to help prevent the GSPC and other Islamic groups from making further progress in North Africa, and also to encourage those countries to cooperate with one another, **the United States has learned from the consequences what a lack of cohesive counterterrorism policy within the European Union entails**—though the recent enactment of the European Arrest Warrant should not be underestimated.

Unfortunately, **with the exception of France, other U.S. allies, notably the United Kingdom, had previously failed to respect the relationship between terrorism and instability around the world and their own national security.** Though terrorists may not cooperate with international law, those they identify as their enemies must cooperate with one another.

According to Roger Scruton, **“International law can do nothing to control Al-Qaeda, nor is the United Nations effective** against organizations that neither are, nor aspire to be, nation-states. While it is possible to bring pressure to bear on individual states that harbor terrorists, this **pressure is ineffective against a failed state, or against a state like Iran which is happy to ignore requests from Satan.”**

All acts of terrorism, at one stage of manifestation or another, must be recognized as being the result of an international effort and cooperation, whether in the recruitment of young Muslim British boys to go fight in Afghanistan or Iraq, or **in the ideas and propaganda** flowing from an imam in a Saudi Arabian mosque to the television sets of Dutch-Moroccans in Holland, to **the illegal trafficking of arms and the financing** of terrorism by activists in and outside of Europe.

Learning from the nuclear crisis surrounding the Islamic Republic of Iran, or the centers of international terrorism that were left behind in Afghanistan and in Bosnia, where, **after importing Muslim fighters for their war against the infidels, Islamists began to export them to fight other infidels elsewhere,** or the train-wreck failure of Britain’s appeasement policy, it becomes urgently clear that **an Islamist victory in one part of the world will translate into a security threat in another part of the world.**

[Governments must show equal resolve, solidarity in combating Al-Qaeda in all areas]

Indeed, **in dealing with terrorists, rather than appeasement,** the judgment of the medieval Arab historian Ibn Khaldun is that **those who seek power by manipulating religion are either sick and should be helped, or fools and should be ridiculed, or troublemakers and should be punished.**

Furthermore, recognition of the changing, non-conventional nature of this international war is important. **Herfried Mukler describes Al-Qaeda’s redefinition of warfare in The New Wars:**

In broad terms, **[it is] likely to be widely dispersed and largely undefined:** the distinction between war and peace will be blurred to the vanishing point. **It will be non-linear,** possibly to the point of having no definable battlefield or fronts.

The distinction between “civilian” and “military” may disappear. Actions will occur concurrently throughout all participants’ depth, including their society as a cultural, not just a physical entity.

Hence, **to be truly effective in combating terrorism, governments must also adopt what Paul Wilkinson describes as the “Educative Solution.” This is a solution in which a combination of educational efforts by democratic political parties, the mass media, trade unions, churches, schools, colleges, and other major social institutions attempt to persuade the terrorists, or a sufficient proportion of their supporters, that terrorism is both undesirable and counterproductive to the realization of their political ideals.** In the meantime, the modus operandi of the enemy must be observed and taken at face value. **In the introduction of the Al-Qaeda manual, the following statement is made:**

... Islamic governments have never and will never be established through peaceful solutions and cooperative councils. They are established as they [always] have been: by pen and gun; by word and bullet; and by tongue and teeth.

Al-Qaeda’s words should be taken as seriously as their ruthless explosions, and governments must show equal resolve and solidarity in combating them on every ground on which they wage their battle: ideologically, culturally, militarily, and finally and always, with intelligence.

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3. “Jihad after Iraq: Lessons from the Arab Afghans,” by Mohammed M. Hafez, [Studies in Conflict and Terrorism](#), Vol. 32, No. 2, February 2009. [KBTQNetwork, KBTSIraqGW, KBTSAfghan] Mohammed M. Hafez is affiliated with the Department of National Security Affairs, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California. We *quote* from this item from <http://www.informaworld.com/smpp/content~content=a907947534~db=all>:

The defeat of Al-Qaeda in Iraq may generate new threats associated with the dispersal of its fighters in the region and around the world. Veterans of earlier insurgencies and civil wars in Afghanistan, Bosnia, and Chechnya moved from one conflict zone to another, lending combatants valuable skills and networks of support.

The flight of Iraq’s irreconcilable insurgents is a greater threat to global security than the one posed by the Arab Afghans because of the range of combat experiences and skills acquired in Iraq since 2003. This manuscript revisits the history of Arab veterans of the anti-Soviet struggle in Afghanistan (1979-1989) to draw out lessons for countering the current bleed out from Iraq. . . .

[Afghan insurgency continued after Soviet retreat, became civil war among insurgents]

In 1979, the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan to aid the beleaguered Communist regime that was facing an insurgency from multiple Islamist factions. The Afghan

insurgents, or mujahideen as they came to be known, called on Pakistan and other governments around the world to aid their struggle and provide military, financial, and humanitarian assistance to their fighters and refugees that sought a haven along the Afghanistan-Pakistan border.

Hamid Ghul, Pakistan's intelligence chief under President Muhammad Zia-ul-Haq, was in charge of coordinating international support for the anti-Soviet efforts in Afghanistan. **He served as a major conduit of aid that came mainly from Saudi Arabia, other Gulf countries, and the United States.**

Muslim antipathy toward the atheistic ideology of Communism and images of suffering Afghans **inspired several thousand Arabs to volunteer as aid and humanitarian workers** in the conflict zone. **Some went a step further by volunteering to join mujahideen factions** in rolling back the Soviet invasion through combat. In the context of a Cold War with the Soviet Union, **the United States, Pakistan, and other Muslim governments allied with the United States did not hesitate to give their blessings and material support to these volunteers.**

After a grueling war of attrition, the Soviet Union withdrew its forces from Afghanistan in 1989. However, **the insurgency continued until the remnant Communist regime of Muhammad Najibullah, based in Kabul, fell in 1992.** The victory of the Afghan mujahideen was complete, but it was also mired by **intense factional struggle and internecine bloodletting.** The **civil war among insurgent factions** further burdened an already impoverished and devastated country.

[Three phases define the role of Arab Afghans in the conflict between 1979 and 1992]

The role of the Arab Afghans in the anti-Soviet, anti-Communist struggle in Afghanistan can be divided into three phases:

Phase 1: 1979-1984. A handful of Arab volunteers came to aid the Afghans. **They did so mainly to help in humanitarian efforts** and were mainly sponsored by Arab and Muslim governments, as well as nongovernmental organizations.

Phase 2: 1984-1989. There was a gradual influx of Arab volunteers inspired by Sheikh Abdullah Azzam, one of the fundraisers and recruiters for the Afghan jihad and the founder of the Services Bureau (maktab al-Khidamat) that hosted Arab volunteers in Peshawar, Pakistan.

Phase 3: 1989-1992. The number of Arab volunteers increased substantially from earlier periods. Many came to take advantage of the training camps that have been set up by Afghan and Arab commanders as well as to fight the Najibullah regime.

By 1992, many of the Arab volunteers returned to their home countries or established a haven in Peshawar, Pakistan. Others, inspired by their "successes" in Afghanistan, moved to new conflict zones, principally Bosnia, but also Algeria and Egypt.

Osama bin Laden and the inchoate Al-Qaeda organization moved to the Sudan. Their concern back then was the presence of U.S. forces in Saudi Arabia following the liberation of Kuwait from the Iraqi occupation (1990-1991). **It took some time for the Al-Qaeda threat toward the United States to manifest**, but the Arab Afghans sprang into action in the early 1990s.

[Motivations of Arab volunteers range from religious fulfillment to military training]

It is fair to say that the jihad in Afghanistan was largely an Afghan affair, despite the internationalization of the conflict by the mid-1980s. It was the Afghans who fought, sacrificed their lives, and ultimately triumphed over the Soviet invaders. **International economic, military, and intelligence assistance was instrumental** in the victory of the Afghan mujahideen, **but foreign supporters by and large did not create the insurgent movements nor did they fight their battles.**

The Arab Afghans were a tiny contingent in the anti-Soviet struggle, or “a drop in the ocean” according to one former prominent Arab volunteer. Estimates of Arab volunteers in the Afghan conflict have ranged from **3,000 to 4,000 volunteers at any one time**, especially after 1986. **Most of those served in Peshawar and other Pakistani cities bordering on Afghanistan. They were humanitarian aid workers, cooks, drivers, accountants, teachers, doctors, engineers, and religious preachers.** They built camps, mosques, and make-shift hospitals and schools. They dug and treated water wells and attended to the sick and wounded. **Only later did Arab volunteers come with jihad in mind.**

The motivations of the volunteers can be divided into five categories, mainly those seeking religious fulfillment, employment opportunities, adventure, safe haven, and military training. Initial volunteers were men in their twenties recruited from Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Yemen. Images of Afghani suffering publicized by government media and clerical networks encouraged young Muslims to volunteer. **Governments subsidized the journey of volunteers and paid some salaries.**

Abdullah Azzam, one of the early volunteers to the conflict and a charismatic personality, **was welcomed in the Gulf and given plenty of opportunities to raise awareness of what was happening in Afghanistan, collect donations, and recruit volunteers.** He was given funds to open up the Services Bureau in Peshawar, Pakistan. His magazine, Al-Jihad, was widely distributed in the region. . . .

[Foreign fighters leaving Iraq likely to seek conflict zones in four key countries/regions]

Michael McConnell, the Director of National Intelligence in the United States, recently cautioned that “**as we inflict significant damage on Al-Qaeda in Iraq, it may shift resources to mounting more attacks outside of Iraq.**” The recent history of the Arab Afghans suggests that such an assessment is not unduly alarmist.

It is reasonable to assume that those who took extraordinary risks to travel to Iraq, especially the irreconcilable elements of the insurgent movements, **will seek to further their militant careers if staying in Iraq is no longer a viable option.** Moreover, in the context of a multi-front “global jihad” waged by Al-Qaeda’s leaders against the United States and its allies, **it is reasonable to assume that Iraq’s dispersing jihadists will seek linkages with radical groups that could benefit from their skills and**

experiences. Learning the lessons of the Arab Afghans, therefore, is vitally important for dealing with the bleed out from Iraq.

Arab Afghans were able to exploit four factors when they decided to leave Afghanistan and Pakistan in the early 1990s: emerging conflicts, safe havens, governmental support, and militant networks.

Emerging civil wars and insurgencies in Algeria, Bosnia, and Chechnya enabled some Arab Afghans to move to inviting conflict zones where they could extend their militant carriers. Therefore, **foreign fighters that wish to leave Iraq in the near future are likely to seek other conflict zones, such as Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Somalia,** where they are likely to be welcomed by fellow militants in need of support. Foreign fighters might also seek to join insurgent Islamist groups in **North Africa,** especially in Algeria.

[Iran, Syria, Lebanon, Yemen might shelter, exploit radical Islamists for political reasons]

Dispersing Arab Afghans exploited safe havens and governmental support in Pakistan, the Sudan, and Yemen. All three countries had populations sympathetic to radical Islamists, were weak states with limited capacity to monitor borders, and harbored political calculations that involved exploiting militants. Pakistan and Yemen used veterans of the Afghan jihad as assets in their national and regional conflicts, while the government in the Sudan sought to benefit from the largess of Osama bin Laden. Therefore, **countries and communities with populations sympathetic to jihadism and governments unwilling or unable to monitor their borders are at risk of attracting dispersing foreign fighters in the near future.**

Iraq's dispersing foreign fighters are likely to seek safe havens in places like Pakistan's tribal regions where radicals have been receiving shelter since the 1980s and where Al-Qaeda's core leaders are currently based. **Another possible destination is Palestinian refugee camps in Lebanon because those camps are policed by Palestinian factions, not the Lebanese government.**

Moreover, **countries like Iran also might shelter radical Islamists if it perceives them as potential assets to be deployed against Western governments opposed to its nuclear program. Syria may shelter some dispersing jihadists to use them as assets against anti-Syrian forces inside Lebanon. Yemen might shelter radical Islamists in its war with the Zaydi (Shiite) Huthi movement in the north.**

Arab Afghans during the 1990s benefited from the network ties that developed during the anti-Soviet campaign. It took network links to enter into new conflict zones, finance training camps, and acquire forged documents to move from country to county. **Facilitators of jihad in Pakistan, Europe, and the Sudan were the backbone of the emerging Al-Qaeda global network and the key to its high-profile operations.** Even those who did not join Al-Qaeda during the early 1990s sought haven in its Afghanistan camps during the second half of the 1990s, which later facilitated their merger with Al-Qaeda.

Foreign fighters in Iraq have succeeded in forging new network ties with former Baathists and Sunni insurgents. Therefore, **dispersing jihadists are likely to exploit**

these networks to exit from Iraq or build connections between facilitators inside Iraq and terrorist cells outside the country.

[Broad strategy for governments worldwide to counter the threat of dispersing jihadists]

Governments concerned about the threat of dispersing jihadists can broadly pursue a number of measures.

First, they must make the dispersion of Iraq's jihadists a top intelligence concern. Counterterrorism services must dedicate resources and personnel to assess the extent of dispersion from Iraq and track its development over time. At a minimum, **they should develop databases on terrorism incidents with links to Iraq-based groups to look for patterns** in network facilitation, methods, and tactics. Given that friendship and kinship ties are salient features of terrorist radicalization and recruitment, **persons linked to insurgents in Iraq could be flagged for additional scrutiny when crossing borders.**

Second, governments must treat emerging conflicts, weak states, and ungoverned regions as potential magnets for dispersing jihadists. **Collaboration with allied intelligence services** to anticipate the influx of militants into these areas is necessary, so is the need to **develop information on smuggling networks and routes that may facilitate the transfer of dispersing jihadists.** Routes to Afghanistan and Pakistan's Federally Administered Tribal Areas should be a top priority because Al-Qaeda is sheltered there and has strong support structures in both countries.

Third, Western states could aid vulnerable countries to improve the quality of their passports and update their border control technologies to make it difficult for individuals to enter their territories with falsified documents.

Fourth, concerned governments must engage in robust diplomacy to dissuade other states from offering unofficial safe havens to fleeing militants.

Finally, it may be beneficial to offer amnesty and reintegration programs to repentant foreign fighters seeking to exit the path of jihad. Those who return and provide information on their networks **could be given immunity** from prosecution or reduced sentences to be served in rehabilitation centers.

Returnees should be monitored and have their passports confiscated to prevent them from traveling abroad until their rehabilitation is complete.

These measures comprise a comprehensive strategy to counter the threat of dispersing jihadists. **They make the dispersion of Iraq's foreign fighters more difficult, expose them to the risk of being apprehended at borders, deprive them of support networks and new safe havens, and encourage them to exit the path of jihad** through rehabilitation and reintegration.

The foregoing is Article No. 3 (TL076A03) in the [Terrorism Literature Report \(TLR\)](#), No. 76, 21 April 2009, prepared by Interaction Systems Incorporated (isinreports@mindspring.com).

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4. “Looking for Waves of Terrorism,” by Karen Rasler and William R. Thompson, **Terrorism and Political Violence**, Vol. 21, No. 1, January 2009. [KBTZGeneral] Karen Rasler and William R. Thompson are professors of political science at Indiana University, and are the co-editor and managing editor, respectively, of the International Studies Quarterly. David C. Rapoport referred to below is a professor emeritus of political science at UCLA. From this item at <http://www.informaworld.com/smpp/content~content=a907844131~db=all~jumptype=rss> we quote:

This article uses ITERATE data on international terrorism from 1968 to 2004 to test David C. Rapoport’s wave-like behavior of modern terrorism. While the interpretation encompasses a much longer period of time than can be tested empirically with readily available data, **it is possible to examine the past three to four decades of terrorist activity for traces of the coming and going of old and new groups. The article codes the type of group** (anarchists, nationalists, leftists/Marxists, and religious fundamentalists) **and then examines the type of tactics employed, deaths, and targets across time. The results confirm the presence of heterogeneous, wave-like behavior that conforms to the Rapoport interpretation as new and old groups/tactics/issues cycle in and out of activity. . . .**

Our findings, **limited to the 1968 to 2004 period, provide empirical support for the Rapoport model that depicts succeeding waves of anarchism, nationalism, leftist/Marxism, and religious fundamentalism.** Waves do indeed appear to characterize contemporary terrorist activity.

[Four generational waves characterize terrorism since the late-1870s]

Rapoport’s argument is particularly distinctive because of its emphasis on generational waves of terrorism. Specifically, Rapoport observes **four waves since the late-1870s**—each one lasting approximately 40 years.

The first wave began in Russia and was largely the result of slow democratization processes. Russian anarchists conceptualized the idea and tactics for a **strategy of overthrowing political systems by conducting serial attacks on public conventions. The predominant strategy in this first wave centered on the assassination of authority figures,** which anarchists sometimes financed through bank robberies. . . .

. . . [The] **second wave of terrorism focused on dissident efforts to secure European withdrawal from overseas territories,** particularly in areas where some elements of the local public preferred their colonial status quo in comparison to what independence might bring (e.g., Ireland, Palestine, Algeria). **Although World War II extended this second wave of terrorism, it decreased the ability of the European states to hang on to their empires and hastened the disintegration of the remaining European empires. Consequently, this second wave of terrorism produced by nationalists and anti-colonial groups tapered off.**

A third wave of terrorism which predominated in the last third of the twentieth century centered on Marxist revolution. It was also reinforced by

the Viet Cong's abilities to withstand the military might of the United States in Vietnam. **Tactics such as assassinations came back into favor, along with hijackings of airplanes and public offices, as well as increasingly lucrative kidnappings** of individuals whose release required concessions and/or ransoms. Within the Cold War context, **training and support for terrorists became increasingly internationalized, as did the targets** of terrorist attacks. **The end of the Cold War and the international community's sustained resistance** to these terrorist demands eventually led to the phasing out of this wave by the 1980s.

A fourth wave coincided with the confluence of two major events in Southwest Asia. The first event occurred with the overthrow of the Shah in Iran, bringing to power Islamic clerics who sought to "export the revolution." In the same year, the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan in an attempt to save a client regime against an internal revolt, mobilizing Muslims to wage a holy war against the infidels. The fourth wave of terrorism quickly assumed a strongly religious orientation, initially centered on Islam. Eventually, **terrorism spread to include actions from radical wings of other religions in reaction to militant Islam.** In the process, **a new tactic, suicide bombings, emerged, as did a strong emphasis on attacking U.S. targets** in order to encourage American withdrawal from the Middle East. . . .

[Eight patterns should be discernible in the 1968 to 2004 period if waves of terrorism exist]

. . . In addition to the four types of groups emphasized by Rapoport, we found groups that could best be categorized as rightist, racist, environmental, tribal, or state agents. For present purposes, **we focus exclusively on the activities of the anarchist, nationalist, leftist/Marxist, and religious groupings.**

Beyond looking at the simple frequency of activity, we also follow Walter Enders and Todd Sandler in **grouping the types of incidents into three basic types: BOMBING events** include explosive, letter, incendiary, car, and suicide car bombings, missile attacks, and mortar/grenade attacks; **HOSTAGE events** include kidnappings, skyjackings, non-aerial hijackings, barricade and hostage-taking missions; and **ASSASSINATIONS** encompass politically motivated murders. In addition, **we look at the number of deaths, casualties (dead and wounded), and location and targets.**

If there are waves of terrorism, we should expect to find the following patterns discernible in the 1968 to 2004 period:

- [1] Anarchist terrorism was extremely low in frequency or extinct.**
- [2] Nationalist terrorism would be declining.**
- [3] Leftist/Marxist terrorism should have first increased, peaked, and then declined.**
- [4] Religious terrorism would be increasing.**

If waves of terrorism do indeed exist and certain groups favor different tactics, **we also expect that the frequency of bombing, hostage-taking, and assassinations will change over time.** Since hostage-taking was especially prominent in the New Left/Marxist era and some types of bombing appear to be quite prominent in the most recent era, **we anticipate that hostage-takings will decline and bombings will**

increase. We have no basic expectation about assassinations—a type of tactic historically linked to anarchists but certainly not restricted to the late-nineteenth century.

[5] **The use of bombing will be increasing over time.**

[6] **The use of hostage-taking will be decreasing over time.**

One of the central arguments in the debate about old and new terrorism is that “old” terrorists sought to minimize deaths in order to avoid alienating audiences from whom they were seeking support for their political cause. “New” terrorists, in contrast, are less concerned with eliciting support from external audiences and more concerned with maximizing casualties.

[7] **Deaths and casualties from terrorist activity will be increasing over time.**

Finally, if we find evidence of terrorist waves, we anticipate that leftist/Marxists will have increasingly focused their actions against the United States as the most affluent leader of the capitalist world. Religious groups, especially fundamentalist Islamic groups, will gradually, but not immediately, increase their focus on targeting the United States as an adversary. This gradual development of an anti-U.S. focus is the result of two significant events: the U.S. support for the Afghani mujahideen against the Soviet Union and the Iranian Revolution.

[8] **Leftist/Marxist and religious terrorist groups will increasingly focus their terrorism against the United States during their respective “heydays” or waves. . . .**

[Conclusion]

We advanced eight generalizations related to the notion that terrorism comes in waves in which the predominant groups and tactics change from wave to wave. After differentiating the ITERATE data on transnational terrorism by groups, we find that seven of the eight generalizations were supported.

- **Anarchism was nearly non-existent.**
- **Nationalistic groups had reduced their level of activity substantially.**
- **Leftists/Marxists had first increased their activity, peaked, and then declined markedly in the 1990s.**
- **Religious terrorism has been increasing throughout much of the last 37 years.**
- **We did not find that the frequency of bombings was increasing in the absolute sense. That generalization only applied to religious bombings.**
- **The frequency of hostage-takings has declined somewhat.**
- **Deaths and casualties have definitely increased, due to the activity of religious groups.**
- **Finally, leftist/Marxist and religious groups increasingly focused their violence on the United States as a target, but these tendencies did not eclipse European and, earlier, Middle Eastern targets.**

All in all, we find these outcomes highly supportive of the wave approach to conceptualizing the history of terrorism and, in particular, the Rapoport interpretation. The ITERATE data, corrected for group identifications, show nationalist

groups surrendering to leftist/Marxist groups that, in turn, have yielded to religious groups. These waves do not eliminate all traces of earlier wave behavior. On the contrary, **traces of earlier waves are apparent—weakly as in the case of anarchism and quite strongly as in the case of nationalism.**

Thus, **the intermingling of “old” and “new” terrorism is an old pattern—not something completely novel.** Terrorist movements work much like sectors of economic growth. **At any point in time, there are old sectors dying off, new ones just getting started, and others proceeding more or less in their “normal” growth phase.**

At the same time, **the decline in leftist/Marxist activity is quite abrupt in the 1990s.** **One possibility that deserves more examination is whether, for some if not all questions, we can talk of terrorist activity per se or whether we need to qualify our generalizations in terms of the types of groups that are carrying out the terrorist tactics.** It is evident that the systematic data that we possess are characterized by a high degree of heterogeneity that may preclude our ability to aggregate all terrorist activity at any point in time, but especially in the last 40 years or so.

Most likely, **the advisability of aggregation will hinge on the nature of the question being pursued.** If we ask, for instance, whether deaths from terrorism are increasing or decreasing, aggregation is appropriate. Should we ask, however, why terrorist groups appear or disappear, aggregation would not help us answer this question.

Another related implication is that we need to focus more closely on the life cycles of the waves and individual groups. Why do groups, once formed, become defunct or inactive? Some of the answers are obvious in the sense that a number of terrorists end up dead or imprisoned by governments. But that does not necessarily explain why their places fail to be filled by new recruits. **There are rhythms that may have to do with generations, government suppression, or changing issue salience underlying the flow of terrorist activity for which we need to develop a better understanding.**

While it might be tempting to restrict our foci on contemporary behavior, **we should also examine the earlier manifestations—if only to investigate the claims for waves preceding the late-nineteenth century. But if terrorism comes in waves, the more waves that we can delineate and validate, the better are the chances of deciphering how terrorism waves work.**

We also need to find ways to assess possible systemic influences—wars, inspirations, globalization accelerations, and changing technology—on the coming and going of waves. It is not too difficult to present attractive hypotheses. It is another matter entirely to find ways of substantiating them.

The foregoing is Article No. 4 (TL076A04) in the [Terrorism Literature Report](#) (TLR), No. 76, 21 April 2009, prepared by Interaction Systems Incorporated (isinreports@mindspring.com).

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5. “Review,” by Joshua Sinai, [Studies in Conflict and Terrorism](#), Vol. 32, No. 2, February 2009—a review of [The Mind of the Terrorist: The Psychology of Terrorism from the IRA to](#)

Al-Qaeda, by **Jerrold Post** (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007). [KBTZOrigins] Dr. Sinai is deputy program manager, Counterterrorism Studies, Analysis Corporation, McLean, Virginia. From <http://www.informaworld.com/smpp/content~content=a907947529~db=all~jumptype=rss> we quote:

Jerrold Post's The Mind of the Terrorist: The Psychology of Terrorism from the IRA to Al-Qaeda attempts to provide a framework for understanding modern day terrorism's psychological mindset. Such an approach is crucial, Dr. Post argues, because in order to deter terrorists in a way that is effective and durable one must understand their psychological origins and motivations. **Some 15 terrorist groups, some of whom began their operations in the late-1960s, are profiled.**

Dr. Post, a psychiatrist and veteran terrorism analyst, is professor of psychiatry and political psychology at George Washington University. Earlier, **he had a 21-year career at the CIA,** serving as director of the Center for Analysis of Personality and Political Behavior.

Dr. Post's theoretical framework is based on two components. The first is a generational pathways to terrorism matrix, which he developed in 1984. It postulates that **an individual's loyalty or disloyalty to one's parents and the nature of the parents' relationship to the regime** (e.g., whether they are loyal to or damaged by the regime) **are important determinants of whether that person becomes a nationalist-separatist or social revolutionary terrorist.**

[Generational pathways to terrorism matrix problematic for three main reasons]

Dr. Post's generational pathways model is **problematic for at least three reasons. First, today's most lethal terrorists are religiously fundamentalist, but his matrix does not account for their psychological origins, because it only refers to nationalist-separatist and social revolutionary terrorism.** Discussing the origins of religiously fundamentalist terrorists is important because their pathways are the opposite of becoming a social revolutionary because the former call for retaining traditional ways of life and imposing orthodox religious institutions and values over society, as opposed to the latter's call for progressive social change (albeit, through terrorism).

The traditional strictures of religious fundamentalism apply to all the major religions of Christianity, Hinduism, Islam, Judaism, and others, **and are the foundations for the emergence of terrorist groups that view themselves as divinely inspired to attack their religious adversaries.** Thus, if one accepts the validity (which I do not) of the notion of generational pathways in forming terrorist types, a discussion is warranted to examine the different generational factors that drive individuals to become religious fundamentalists.

Second, the nature of the parental relationships of several terrorist leaders profiled by Dr. Post contradict his model. Despite their troubled relationships with their parents, both the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO)'s **Yasser Arafat** and the Sri Lankan Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE)'s **Vellupillai Prabhakaran** became **nationalist-separatists, not the social revolutionaries predicted by his model.**

Finally, **following its elaboration on pages 7-8, Dr. Post's matrix is not mentioned again** in his assessment of the origins of the 15 terrorist groups and their leaders, **making one wonder if he really takes his own theory seriously.**

[**Other factors play more crucial roles than a terrorist's family disposition**]

Even Dr. Post adds to the skepticism about his own matrix, when he explains that his conceptual framework's second component emphasizes "the importance of understanding the historical/cultural/political/economic context in which terrorism develops and terrorist identities are shaped." He then adds that:

"Explanations of terrorism at the level of individual psychology are insufficient in trying to understand why people become involved in terrorism. . . . It is not individual psychopathology, but group, organizational, and social psychology, with a particular emphasis on 'collective identity,' that provides the most powerful lens through which to understand terrorist psychology and behavior. . . . Terrorists have subordinated their individual identity to the collective identity, so that what serves the group, organization, or network is of primary importance."

Thus, **an individual's family disposition does not necessarily play a role in that person's decision to become a terrorist.** No one doubts that parental relations shape one's upbringing, but **other factors play more crucial roles** in an individual's decision to become a terrorist.

In some cases, such as in the Palestinian environment, **individuals become radicalized and recruited into terrorism through a "top-down" process**, with various societal institutions, such as media, schools, and mosques spearheading radicalization and terrorist groups recruiting operatives directly, **while in other cases**, such as Al-Qaeda-inspired groups in Western Europe and North America (and elsewhere), **the process is "bottom up," with radicalization and recruitment done through friends and family members**, extremist mosques, as well as what is termed **"self-radicalization" over the Internet**—although Al-Qaeda operatives in Pakistan may also play a role in facilitating terrorist operations.

[**Terrorist group leaders' profiles one of the book's strengths**]

Terrorist leaders, according to Dr. Post, play a crucial role in "creating the dominant terrorist psychology." As he explains, "Portraits of terrorist leaders, as a result, offer windows into the psychology and motivations of the followers who are attracted to their hate-mongering messages." **In one of the book's strengths, terrorist group leaders are profiled, although without reference to his generational pathways model.** Some leaders, such as the Peruvian Shining Path's Abimael Guzman and the LTTE's Prabhakaran, are characterized by Dr. Post as charismatic "consummate narcissists" who consider their groups to be extensions of themselves.

However, **one may disagree with Dr. Post's characterization of Osama bin Laden as a leader of a dispersed organization who delegates responsibilities to subordinates.** To the contrary, **published reports show bin Laden**—at least through 11 September 2001—**to be a micro-manager** who forbade his subordinates from changing direction.

He may not be able to do that today because U.S. pressure has forced Al-Qaeda to decentralize its operations, but it is doubtful that his “personality” has changed.

It’s disappointing that Dr. Post’s profiles of Hezbollah’s Sheikh Hassan Nasrallah and Hamas’s founder, Sheikh Ahmad Yassin, and its current leader, Ismail Haniya, receive little or no psychological treatment, except for brief accounts of their careers that are easily found in media accounts.

[The Mind of the Terrorist: Inconsistent, flawed overview of terrorist groups, their leaders]

The book’s other weaknesses are structural. I found more than **62 instances in which Dr. Post neglects to document facts with a footnote.**

How can modern day terrorism be defeated? Dr. Post formulates a psychological warfare program based on four elements: **Inhibiting potential terrorists from joining terrorist groups by de-romanticizing terrorism and providing members with alternate pathways** for redressing grievances; **promoting dissension, mistrust, and organizational paralysis within a group**; **facilitating exit from the group by creating amnesty programs**; and **reducing support for the group and its leaders by de-legitimizing its leaders and marginalizing the group’s appeal.**

Dr. Post concludes that the plague of terrorism will decline when its reservoir of recruits is decreased. **“Hope is the antidote to despair. It is only when youth begin to be hopeful about their future and fully participate in their societies that we will see the plague of terrorism decline. And that will take a comprehensive program sustained over decades** to alter these deep-seated attitudes, for when hatred is bred in the bone, it does not easily yield.”

The Mind of the Terrorist is an inconsistent and flawed overview of modern day terrorist groups and their leaders.

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