

# Insurgency Literature Review

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[Article 1](#) “**The Irresistible Illusion,**” by **Rory Stewart**, **London Review of Books**, 9 July 2009. *President Obama’s new Afghanistan policy has a very narrow focus—counterterrorism—and a very broad definition of how to achieve it: no less than the fixing of the Afghan state. However, the fundamental assumptions remain that an ungoverned or hostile Afghanistan is a threat to global security; that the West has the ability to address the threat and bring prosperity and security; that this is justified and a moral obligation; that economic development and order in Afghanistan will contribute to global stability; that these different objectives reinforce each other; and that there is no real alternative. When we are not presented with a dystopian vision, we are encouraged to be implausibly optimistic. It misleads us in several respects simultaneously: minimizing differences between cultures, exaggerating our fears, aggrandizing our ambitions, inflating a sense of moral obligations and power, and confusing our goals. All these attitudes are aspects of a single worldview and create an almost irresistible illusion.*

[Article 2](#) “**Kunar and Nuristan: Rethinking U.S. Counterinsurgency Operations,**” by **Michael Moore and James Fussell**, **Institute for the Study of War**, **Afghanistan Report No. 1**, July 2009. *Although counterinsurgency doctrine was successfully implemented in urban Iraq, it has proved more difficult to apply in Afghanistan in the sparsely populated mountains of Kunar and Nuristan. U.S. forces are disproportionately committed to defending marginally significant areas in these remote provinces. U.S. missions in eastern Afghanistan must be re-examined and forces must be re-deployed to areas where they will have greater effect. U.S. forces would be better utilized in conducting active patrols to secure the population along the lower Kunar River Valley in places like Mara Wara, Sarkani, and Khas Konar districts where the population desires U.S. support and presence, unlike the population of the Korengal Valley. As they do so, U.S. forces must demonstrate the tangible benefits of their presence to the local population.*

[Article 3](#) “**Tribal Dynamics of the Afghanistan and Pakistan Insurgencies,**” by **Hayder Mili and Jacob Townsend**, **CTC Sentinel (Combating Terrorism Center at West Point)**, Vol. 2, No. 8, August 2009. *There is a renewed public appreciation for the role of tribal allegiances and tribal governance in the Afghanistan and Pakistan insurgencies. This is indicated by the U.S. government’s announcement of an interagency effort to study the insurgencies’ tribes, including a search for “reconcilable” elements. The behavior of most insurgent groups along the Afghanistan-Pakistan border is conditioned by tribal identities, allegiances, and interests. Some fighters are motivated by pan-tribal or global religious sentiment. Most, however, are strongly influenced by the interests and demands of their tribe.*

[Article 4](#) “**Registering the Human Terrain: A Valuation of Cadastre,**” by **Douglas E. Batson**, **National Defense Intelligence College**, 2008. *Though ending conflicts will require many forms of action, one method that can help to create stability is to place more emphasis on political, economic, legal, and educational aid. One very specific aspect of this aid is to have selected U.S. government agencies focus on land tenure and property rights in the developing world. This would, possibly more than any other kind of foreign aid, transform a volatile state into a capable one. Capable, that is, of maintaining stability by resisting and deterring the violent extremism of non-state actors through the strength of its civil society.*

[Article 5](#) “**Understanding Insurgency Violence: A Quantitative Analysis of the Political Violence in Northern Ireland, 1969-1999,**” by **Dominic M. Beggan**, **Studies in Conflict and Terrorism**, Vol. 32, No. 8, August 2009. *There is a definite need for statistical analysis of the Northern Ireland conflict that attempts to develop a more comprehensive theoretical and empirical explanation of the relationship between the use of repression and political violence by applying an econometric approach. The core argument of this study is that repression and grievances lead to increases in violence in a democratic regime; however, severe repression used by authoritarian regimes may indeed be effective in curbing political violence.*

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## Articles

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1. “**The Irresistible Illusion,**” by **Rory Stewart**, **London Review of Books**, 9 July 2009 ([http://www.lrb.co.uk/v31/n13/stew01\\_.html](http://www.lrb.co.uk/v31/n13/stew01_.html)). [KBTIAfghanCase, KBTSAfghanGW, KBTIStrategies, KBTGStrategies, KBTITheory, KBTSPakWT, KBTZDefinitions, KBTWSummary] Rory Stewart is the Ryan Family Professor of Human Rights and Director of the Carr Center on Human Rights Policy at Harvard. We *quote*:

**. . . Barack Obama, in a recent speech, set out our fears. The Afghan government “is undermined by corruption and has difficulty delivering basic services to its people. The economy is undercut by a booming narcotics trade that encourages criminality and funds the insurgency. . . . If the Afghan government falls to the Taliban—or allows Al-Qaeda to go unchallenged—that country will again be a base for terrorists who want to kill as many of our people as they possibly can. . . . For the Afghan people, a return to Taliban rule would condemn their country to brutal governance, international isolation, a paralyzed economy, and the denial of basic human rights to the Afghan people—especially women and girls. The return in force of Al-Qaeda terrorists who would accompany the core Taliban leadership would cast Afghanistan under the shadow of perpetual violence.”**

[Afghanistan policy language makes articulating more moderate approach near impossible]

**When we are not presented with a dystopian vision, we are encouraged to be implausibly optimistic. “There can be only one winner: democracy and a strong Afghan state,” [British Prime Minister] Gordon Brown predicted in his most recent speech on the subject. Obama and Brown rely on a hypnotizing policy language which can—and perhaps will—be applied as easily to Somalia or Yemen as Afghanistan. It misleads us in several respects simultaneously: minimizing differences between cultures, exaggerating our fears, aggrandizing our ambitions, inflating a sense of moral obligations and power, and confusing our goals. All these attitudes are aspects of a single worldview and create an almost irresistible illusion.**

**It conjures nightmares of “failed states” and “global extremism,” offers the remedies of “state-building” and “counterinsurgency,” and promises a final dream of “legitimate, accountable governance.” The path is broad enough to include Scandinavian humanitarians and American Special Forces; general enough to be applied to Botswana as easily as to Afghanistan; sinuous and sophisticated enough to draw in policymakers; suggestive enough of crude moral imperatives to attract the Daily Mail; and almost too abstract to be defined or refuted. It papers over the weakness of the international community: our lack of knowledge, power, and legitimacy. It conceals the conflicts between our interests: between giving aid to Afghans and killing terrorists.**

**It assumes that Afghanistan is predictable.** It is a language that exploits tautologies and negations to suggest inexorable solutions. **It makes our policy seem a moral obligation, makes failure unacceptable, and alternatives inconceivable. It does this so well that a more moderate, minimalist approach becomes almost impossible to articulate.**

Afghanistan, however, is **the graveyard of predictions. None of the experts in 1988 predicted that the Russian-backed President Najibullah would survive for two and a half years** after the Soviet withdrawal. **And no one predicted at the beginning of 1994 that the famous commanders of the jihad, Hekmatyar and Masud, then fighting a civil war in the center of Kabul, could be swept aside by an unknown group of madrassa students called the Taliban. Or that the Taliban would, in a few months, conquer 90 percent of the country,** eliminate much corruption, restore security on the roads, and host Al-Qaeda.

[Afghanistan most likely to develop into a country like one of its neighbor states]

**It is tempting to assume that economic growth will not make Afghanistan into Obama’s terrorist haven or Brown’s strong democracy but rather into something more like its wealthier neighbors. Iran, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Pakistan, and Afghanistan** were at various points under the same Muslim empires. There are Persian, Turkmen, Uzbek, and Tajik populations in Afghanistan, and the Afghan Pushtun are only arbitrarily divided by the Durand Line from their Pakistani kinsmen. **The economies are linked and millions of Afghans have studied and worked in Iran or Pakistan.**

**There are more reasons for Afghanistan to develop into a country like one of its neighbors than for it to collapse into Somalian civil war or solidify into Malaysian democracy. But Iran, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and Pakistan present a bewildering variety of states:** an Islamist theocracy, a surreal mock-tribal autocracy, a repressive secular dictatorship, a country trembling on the edge of civil war, a military dictatorship cum democracy. **And it will be many years before Afghanistan’s economy or its institutions draw level with those of its neighbors.**

**Pakistan, which is often portrayed as a “failed state,”** has not only the nuclear bomb and the Directorate for Inter-Services Intelligence but also the Friday Times and the National College of Arts. **Progressive views are no longer confined to the wealthy Lahore elite: a mass commercial satellite television station championed a campaign to overturn the hudud ordinances,** which conflated adultery and rape; 1,500 women were released from jail as a result. **There is no equivalent in Afghanistan of the**

**Pakistani lawyers' movement**, which reinstated the chief justice after his dismissal by Pervez Musharraf.

**Every Afghan ruler in the 20th century was assassinated, lynched, or deposed.** The Communist government tried to tear down the old structures of mullah and khan; the anti-Soviet jihad set up new ones, bolstered with U.S. and Saudi cash and weapons supplied from Pakistan. **There is almost no economic activity in the country**, aside from international aid and the production of illegal narcotics. **The Afghan army cannot, like Pakistan's, reject America's attempt to define national security priorities;** Afghan diplomats cannot mock our pronouncements. [Afghan President **Hamid**] **Karzai is widely criticized**, but more than seven years after the invasion there is **still no plausible alternative candidate; there aren't even recognizable political parties.**

[Obama's Afghanistan policy has very narrow focus, broad definition of how to achieve it]

Obama's new policy has a very narrow focus—counterterrorism—and a very broad definition of how to achieve it: no less than the fixing of the Afghan state. He presents this in a formal syllogism.

**The final goal in the region is “to disrupt, dismantle, and defeat Al-Qaeda in Pakistan and Afghanistan, and to prevent their return to either country in the future.”**

**A necessary condition of the defeat of Al-Qaeda is the defeat of the Taliban because “if the Afghan government falls to the Taliban . . . that country will again be a base for terrorists who want to kill as many of our people as they possibly can.”**

**Such efforts are hampered by the nature of the Afghan economy and government. We must implement a counterinsurgency strategy, which includes “the deployment of 17,000 troops [to] take the fight to the Taliban in the south and the east” but also adopt a more “comprehensive approach,” aiming to “promote a more capable and accountable Afghan government . . . advance security, opportunity, and justice . . . develop an economy that isn't dominated by illicit drugs.”**

Finally, Afghanistan cannot be addressed without addressing Pakistan: “To defeat an enemy that heeds no borders or laws of war, **we must recognize the fundamental connection between the future of Afghanistan and Pakistan.**”

Or, in the pithier statement made by Obama last October: “**In order to catch Osama bin Laden we have to win in Afghanistan and stabilize Pakistan.**”

Obama, then, combines a negative account of Afghanistan's past and present—he describes the border region as “**the most dangerous place in the world**”—with an optimism that it can be transformed. He assumes that we have a moral justification and obligation to intervene, that the United States and its allies have the capacity to address the threat, and that our global humanitarian and security objectives are consistent and mutually reinforcing.

**Afghanistan was “the right war.”** In Iraq, one could criticize the breaking of international law, the lies about weapons of mass destruction, the apparent corruption of contractors, the anarchy in Baghdad, and the torture at Abu Ghraib. **But the intervention in Afghanistan was a response to 9/11, sanctioned by international law and a broad coalition; the objectives were those of self-defense and altruism. Al-Qaeda has killed and continues to try to kill innocent citizens, and it is right to prevent them. It is also right to defeat the Taliban, to bring development and an effective legitimate state to Afghanistan, and to stabilize Pakistan. The elected Afghan government and the majority of the Afghan people support our presence. And the international community has the capacity to transform the situation.**

**[Ingredients of successful counterinsurgency campaigns in past are lacking in Afghanistan]**

**Policymakers perceive Afghanistan through the categories of counterterrorism, counterinsurgency, state-building, and economic development. These categories are so closely linked that you can put them in almost any sequence or combination.** You need to defeat the Taliban to build a state and you need to build a state to defeat the Taliban. There cannot be security without development, or development without security. If you have the Taliban you have terrorists, if you don't have development you have terrorists, and as Obama informed the New Yorker, “If you have ungoverned spaces, they become havens for terrorists.”

**These connections are global: in Obama's words, “our security and prosperity depend on the security and prosperity of others.”** Or, as a British foreign minister recently rephrased it, “our security depends on their development.” Indeed, **at times it seems that all these activities—building a state, defeating the Taliban, defeating Al-Qaeda, and eliminating poverty—are the same activity. The new U.S. Army and Marine Corps counterinsurgency doctrine sounds like a World Bank policy document,** replete with commitments to the rule of law, economic development, governance, state-building, and human rights. In Obama's words, “**security and humanitarian concerns are all part of one project.**”

**This policy rests on misleading ideas** about moral obligation, our capacity, the strength of our adversaries, the threat posed by Afghanistan, the relations between our different objectives, and the value of a state. **Even if the invasion was justified, that does not justify all our subsequent actions.** If 9/11 had been planned in training camps in Iraq, we might have felt the war in Iraq was more justified, but our actions would have been no less of a disaster for Iraqis or for ourselves.

**The power of the United States and its allies, and our commitment, knowledge, and will, are limited. It is unlikely that we will be able to defeat the Taliban. The ingredients of successful counterinsurgency campaigns in places like Malaya—**control of the borders, large numbers of troops in relation to the population, strong support from the majority ethnic groups, a long-term commitment, and a credible local government—**are lacking in Afghanistan.**

**General David Petraeus will find it difficult to repeat the apparent success of the surge in Iraq.** There are no mass political parties in Afghanistan and **the Kabul government lacks the base, strength, or legitimacy** of the Baghdad government. **Afghan tribal groups lack the coherence of the Iraqi Sunni tribes and their relation to state structures:** they are not being driven out of neighborhood after neighborhood

and they do not have the same relation to the Taliban that the Sunni groups had to “Al-Qaeda in Iraq.” Afghans are weary of the war but the Afghan chiefs are not approaching us, seeking a deal. **Since the political players and state structures in Afghanistan are much more fragile than those in Iraq, they are less likely to play a strong role in ending the insurgency.**

[Even if the Taliban took the capital, it is unclear how much of a threat this would pose]

Meanwhile, **the Taliban can exploit the ideology of religious resistance that the West deliberately fostered in the 1980s to defeat the Russians.** They can portray the Kabul government as U.S. slaves, NATO as an infidel occupying force, and their own insurgency as a jihad. **Their complaints about corruption, human rights abuses, and aerial bombardments appeal to a large audience. They are attracting Afghans to their rural courts by giving quicker and more predictable rulings than government judges.**

Like some Afghan government officials, **the Taliban have developed an ambiguous and sometimes profitable relationship with the drug lords. They are able to slip back and forth across the Pakistani border and receive support there.** They have massacred Alokozai elders who tried to resist them. **They are mounting successful attacks against the coalition and the Afghan government** in the south and east. **They are operating in more districts than in 2006** and control provinces, such as Wardak, which are close to Kabul. They have a chance of retaking southern district towns such as Musa Qala and perhaps even some provincial capitals.

**But the Taliban are very unlikely to take over Afghanistan as a whole.** Their previous administration provided basic road security and justice but it was fragile and fell quickly. **They are no longer perceived, as they were by some in 1994, as young student angels saving the country from corruption. Millions of Afghans disliked their brutality, incompetence, and primitive attitudes.** The Hazara, Tajik, and Uzbek populations are wealthier, more established, and more powerful than they were in 1996 and would strongly resist any attempt by the Taliban to occupy their areas. **The Afghan national army is reasonably effective. Pakistan is not in a position to support the Taliban as it did before.** It would require far fewer international troops and planes than we have today to make it very difficult for the Taliban to gather a conventional army as they did in 1996 and drive tanks and artillery up the main road to Kabul.

**Even if—as seems most unlikely—the Taliban were to take the capital, it is not clear how much of a threat this would pose to U.S. or European national security.** Would they repeat their error of providing a safe haven to Al-Qaeda? And how safe would this safe haven be? **They could give Al-Qaeda land for a camp but how would they defend it against Predators or U.S. Special Forces? And does Al-Qaeda still require large terrorist training camps to organize attacks? Could they not plan in Hamburg and train at flight schools in Florida; or meet in Bradford and build morale on an adventure training course in Wales?**

[Poor failed state could be easier to handle than a more developed one]

Furthermore, **there are no self-evident connections between the key objectives of counterterrorism, development, democracy/state-building, and counterinsurgency.** Counterinsurgency is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for state-building.

**You could create a stable legitimate state without winning a counterinsurgency campaign** (India, which is far more stable and legitimate than Afghanistan, is still fighting several long counterinsurgency campaigns from Assam to Kashmir). **You could win a counterinsurgency campaign without creating a stable state** (if such a state also required the rule of law and a legitimate domestic economy).

**Nor is there any necessary connection between state-formation and terrorism.** Our confusions are well illustrated by the debates about whether Iraq was a rogue state harboring terrorists (as Bush claimed) or an authoritarian state which excluded terrorists (as was in fact the case).

**It is impossible for Britain and its allies to build an Afghan state.** They have no clear picture of this promised “state,” and such a thing could come only from an Afghan national movement, not as a gift from foreigners. **Is a centralized state, in any case, an appropriate model for a mountainous country, with strong traditions of local self-government and autonomy, significant ethnic differences, but strong shared moral values?** And even were stronger central institutions to emerge, would they assist Western national security objectives?

Afghanistan is starting from a very low base: 30 years of investment might allow its army, police, civil service, and economy to approach the levels of Pakistan. **But Osama bin Laden is still in Pakistan, not Afghanistan. He chooses to be there precisely because Pakistan can be more assertive in its state sovereignty than Afghanistan and restricts U.S. operations.** From a narrow (and harsh) U.S. national security perspective, **a poor failed state could be easier to handle than a more developed one:** Yemen is less threatening than Iran, Somalia than Saudi Arabia, Afghanistan than Pakistan.

[United States should not encourage the creation of an authoritarian military state]

**Yet the current state-building project, at the heart of our policy, is justified in the most instrumental terms—not as an end in itself but as a means towards counterterrorism.** Obama is clear about this: “I want the American people to understand that we have a clear and focused goal: to disrupt, dismantle, and defeat Al-Qaeda in Pakistan and Afghanistan, and to prevent their return to either country in the future. That’s the goal that must be achieved.”

In pursuit of this objective, **Obama has so far committed to building “an Afghan army of 134,000 and a police force of 82,000”**—and adds that “increases in Afghan forces may very well be needed.” **U.S. generals have spoken openly about wanting a combined Afghan army-police-security apparatus of 450,000 soldiers** (in a country with a population half the size of Britain’s). **Such a force would cost \$2 or \$3 billion a year to maintain; the annual revenue of the Afghan government is just \$600 million.** We criticize developing countries for spending 30 percent of their budget on defense; we are encouraging Afghanistan to spend 500 percent of its budget.

**Some policymakers have been quick to point out that this cost is unsustainable** and will leave Afghanistan dependent forever on the largesse of the international community. Some have even raised the specter (suggested by the example of Pakistan) that this will lead to a military coup. **But the more basic question is about our political principles. We should not encourage the creation of an authoritarian military state. The security that resulted might suit our short-term security interests, but it will not**

**serve the longer interests of Afghans.** What kind of anti-terrorist tactics would we expect from the Afghan military? What kind of surveillance, interference, and control from the police? **We should not assume that the only way to achieve security in a developing country is through the restriction of civil liberties, or that authoritarianism is a necessary phase in state formation, or a precondition for rapid economic development, or a lesser evil in the fight against modern terrorism.**

[Reduction in troops, turn away from state-building shouldn't mean total withdrawal]

**After seven years of refinement, the policy seems so buoyed by illusions, caulked in ambiguous language, and encrusted with moral claims, analogies, and political theories that it can seem futile to present an alternative.** It is particularly difficult to argue not for a total withdrawal but for a more cautious approach. **The best Afghan policy would be to reduce the number of foreign troops from the current level of 90,000 to far fewer—perhaps 20,000.**

**In that case, two distinct objectives would remain for the international community: development and counterterrorism. Neither would amount to the building of an Afghan state.** If the West believed it essential to exclude Al-Qaeda from Afghanistan, then they could do it with Special Forces. (They have done it successfully since 2001 and could continue indefinitely, though the result has only been to move bin Laden across the border.) **At the same time the West should provide generous development assistance—not only to keep consent for the counterterrorism operations, but as an end in itself.**

**A reduction in troop numbers and a turn away from state-building should not mean total withdrawal: good projects could continue to be undertaken** in electricity, water, irrigation, health, education, agriculture, rural development, and in other areas favored by development agencies. **We should not control and cannot predict the future of Afghanistan.** It may in the future become more violent, or find a decentralized equilibrium or a new national unity, but **if its communities continue to want to work with us, we can, over 30 years, encourage the more positive trends in Afghan society and help to contain the more negative.**

**Such arguments seem strained, unrealistic, counterintuitive, and unappealing.** They appear to betray the hopes of Afghans who trusted us and to allow the Taliban to abuse district towns. **No politician wants to be perceived to have underestimated, or failed to address, a terrorist threat; or to write off the “blood and treasure” that we have sunk into Afghanistan; or to admit defeat. Americans are particularly unwilling to believe that problems are insoluble;** Obama's motto is not “no we can't”; soldiers are not trained to admit defeat or to say a mission is impossible. And to suggest that what worked in Iraq won't work in Afghanistan (or that what worked in postwar West Germany or 1950s South Korea won't work in Afghanistan) requires a detailed knowledge of each country's past, a bold analysis of the causes of development, and a rigorous exposition of the differences, for which few have patience.

**Sober, intelligent ambassadors who were skeptical about Iraq presided over the troop surge in Afghanistan. Aid agencies, human rights activists, and foreign correspondents have not opposed it. Politicians—Republican and Democrat, Conservative and Labor—have voted for it; the United Nations, NATO and Washington think tanks support it. And finally, many Afghans encourage it, enthusiastically.**

[Language of modern policy does not help us to declare limits to our power and capacity]

**The fundamental assumptions remain that an ungoverned or hostile Afghanistan is a threat to global security; that the West has the ability to address the threat and bring prosperity and security; that this is justified and a moral obligation; that economic development and order in Afghanistan will contribute to global stability; that these different objectives reinforce each other; and that there is no real alternative.**

**One indication of the enduring strength of such assumptions is that they are exactly those made in 1868 by Sir Henry Rawlinson, a celebrated and experienced member of the council of India, concerning the threat of a Russian presence in Afghanistan:** “In the interests, then, of peace; in the interests of commerce; in the interests of moral and material improvement, it may be asserted that interference in Afghanistan has now become a duty, and that any moderate outlay or responsibility we may incur in restoring order at Kabul will prove in the sequel to be true economy.”

The new **United Kingdom strategy** for Afghanistan is described as “**international . . . regional . . . joint civilian-military . . . coordinated . . . long-term . . . focused on developing capacity . . .** an approach that combines respect for sovereignty and local values with respect for international standards of democracy, legitimate and accountable government, and human rights; **a hard-headed approach: setting clear and realistic objectives with clear metrics of success.**”

**This is not a plan: it is a description of what we have not got. Our approach is short-term; it has struggled to develop Afghan capacity, resolve regional issues, or overcome civilian-military divisions; it has struggled to respect Afghan sovereignty or local values; it has failed to implement international standards of democracy, government, and human rights; and it has failed to set clear and realistic objectives with clear metrics of success.** Why do we believe that describing what we do not have should constitute a plan on how to get it? (Similarly, we do not notice the tautology in claiming to “overcome corruption through transparent, predictable, and accountable financial processes.”)

**In part, it is because the language is comfortingly opaque.** We can expose Rawlinson’s blunt calculus of national interest by questioning the costs, the potential gains, or the likelihood of success. **But a bewildering range of different logical connections and identities can be concealed in a specialized language derived from development theory and overlaid with management consultancy.** What is concealed is our underlying assumption that when we want to make other societies resemble our (often fantastical) ideas of our own society, we can.

**The language of modern policy does not help us to declare the limits to our power and capacity; to concede that we can do less than we pretend or that our enemies can do less than we pretend; to confess how little we know about a country like Afghanistan or how little we can predict about its future; or to acknowledge that we might be unwelcome or that our presence might be perceived as illegitimate or that it might make things worse.**

We claim to be engaged in a neutral, technocratic, universal project of “state-building” but we don’t know exactly what that means. **Those who see Afghanistan as reverting to**

**the Taliban or becoming a traditional autocratic state are referring to situations that existed there in 1972 and 1994. But the international community's ambition appears to be to create something that has not existed before.** Obama calls it "a more capable and accountable Afghan government." The U.S. White Paper calls it "effective local governance" and speaks of "legitimacy."

The United States, the United Kingdom, and their allies agreed unanimously at the NATO 60th anniversary summit in April to create "a stronger democratic state" in Afghanistan. **In the new United Kingdom strategy for Afghanistan, certain combinations of adjective and noun appear again and again in the 32 pages: separated by a few pages,** you will find "legitimate, accountable state," "legitimate and accountable government," "effective and accountable state," and "effective and accountable governance." Gordon Brown says that "just as the Afghans need to take control of their own security, they need to build legitimate governance." . . .

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2. "**Kunar and Nuristan: Rethinking U.S. Counterinsurgency Operations.**" by Michael Moore and James Fussell, [Institute for the Study of War, Afghanistan Report No. 1, July 2009](#) ([http://www.understandingwar.org/files/Afghanistan\\_Report\\_1.pdf](http://www.understandingwar.org/files/Afghanistan_Report_1.pdf)). Michael Moore, a former research assistant with the Institute, is an Arabic language specialist who has travelled extensively through Europe and the Mediterranean. James Fussell, a former major in the U.S. Army Special Forces, served two years in northeastern Afghanistan as well as in numerous other combat and non-combat deployments throughout the world. [KBTIAfghanCase, KBTSAfghan, KBTSPakWT, KBTGStrategies] *We quote:*

**Although counterinsurgency doctrine was successfully implemented in urban Iraq, it has proved more difficult to apply [in Afghanistan] in the sparsely populated mountains of Kunar and Nuristan.** U.S. forces are disproportionately committed to defending marginally significant areas in these remote provinces. **U.S missions in eastern Afghanistan, specifically places like the Korengal and Pech River Valley, must be re-examined and forces must be re-deployed to areas where they will have greater effect.**

**The Korengal Valley in Kunar province is the deadliest place in Afghanistan.** The population is historically hostile to any outside influence, including any Afghans from outside the valley. **The Korengalis have successfully fought off every attempt to subdue their valley, including the Soviets in the 1980s, the Taliban rule in the 1990s, and currently, the U.S. military.**

**The presence of U.S. forces in the Korengal generates violence and undermines U.S. efforts to bring stability and security.** The current U.S. force disposition in the inhospitable valleys, like the Korengal, **relies too heavily on isolated outposts that require massive amounts of artillery and airpower to defend.** U.S. forces are not denying the enemy the high ground, allowing insurgents to attack and terrorize the population. **Artillery and airpower are counterproductive** in dealing with the

insurgency in this part of the country because their use alienates the very population that the United States is trying to secure. Committing additional forces in order to hold this remote terrain would be tactically and operationally imprudent. **The resistance in this area is confined to locals in the valley. It does not accelerate the insurgency beyond the valley.**

**Counterinsurgency in Afghanistan requires less interdiction on the borders and greater security in the population centers.** Resources must flow to areas that are strategic priorities in order to allow force densities high enough to practice counterinsurgency effectively. Rather than maintaining positions in the Korengal and many of the small, ineffective posts that dot the Pech River Valley, **U.S. forces should conduct active patrols in the populated areas of the lower Kunar River Valley.**

**U.S. forces must protect the specific populations that oppose the enemy and support the government, rather than fighting populations that historically resist the government.** U.S. forces in Kunar should concentrate efforts in places like Mara Wara, Sarkani, and Khas Konar districts where the population actually desires U.S. support and presence, unlike the Korengalis. Counterinsurgency requires short-term economic support, as well as a dense and mobile force presence. **U.S. forces must pair long-term development projects, such as building roads, with short-term, immediate humanitarian assistance and quick-impact projects. . . .**

[Overview: Kunar and Nuristan provinces]

**Located in eastern Afghanistan, Kunar province borders Nangarhar province to the south, Laghman province to the west, and Nuristan province to the north. Kunar sits on the Pakistani border,** with [Pakistan's] Mohmand and Bajaur Agencies of the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) to the southeast and the Lower Dir, Upper Dir, and Chitral districts of the North-West Frontier Province (NWFP) to the northeast. **Kunar spans roughly 1,908 square miles, slightly larger than the state of Rhode Island.** At its widest point, Kunar is approximately forty-five miles across, while only five miles across at its narrowest point.

Nuristan sits north of Kunar and Laghman provinces, bordering Panjshir province to the west and Badakhshan province to the north. **Prior to 1896, Nuristan was called Kafiristan, or the "land of disbelievers," i.e. non-Muslims.** After the Iron Amir, Abdur Rahman Khan, **finally converted the province at the point of a sword, they renamed the area "Nuristan" for the land of light,** and the people were called Nuristani, for the "enlightened ones," since they had converted to Islam. **Nuristan also shares a border with Pakistan's Chitral district to the east and has an area of 3,561 square miles.**

**Due to mountainous terrain and an almost nonexistent road network, it is extremely difficult to travel east-west across Nuristan, especially in winter.** For example, travelers wishing to go from Nurgaram district in the west to Kamdesh district in the east would first have to travel south through Laghman province to Nangarhar and then north through Kunar.

**Because the harsh terrain limits the movement of individuals and insurgents, this paper will focus on Kunar and eastern Nuristan. This area will be treated as one contiguous enemy system, different from that which emanates from Laghman and western Nuristan.** Despite this distinction, it would be an overstatement to say that there

is absolutely no overlap between the two or that there is no insurgent movement between eastern and western Nuristan. . . .

There are numerous mountain passes along the length of the Pakistani border with Kunar and Nuristan, and the border is roughly five miles from the Kunar River, along which the majority of the population lives. According to the U.S. Agency for International Development, **Kunar has 401,000 residents. The population lives almost entirely in the narrow river valleys, leaving the mountain heights and ridges largely devoid of human settlement. . . . The population of Kunar is overwhelmingly Pashtun** (nearly 95 percent), except for the Nari district, which contains a substantial Nuristani population. It is worth noting that the **many residents of the Korengal Valley are not Pashtun; rather they share ethnic ties with Nuristanis.** Additionally, **the residents of the Korengal speak a separate language called Korengali**, sometimes referred to as Pashai, another name for the ethnic group of the Korengali people.

**Kunar and eastern Nuristan are conservative, rural societies and have been largely influenced throughout history by more extreme interpretations of Islam** (Wahhabi and Salafi). . . . **It was the Nuristanis that first revolted against Communist rule in 1978**, and this rebellion soon spread to the Pashtun areas of Kunar. Because of the realities of the terrain and the lack of a developed road network, many areas of Kunar and Nuristan are isolated. **Their inhabitants are generally suspicious of outsiders, including other Afghans. . . .**

Aside from its symbolic value as the area where the jihad against the Soviet Army and the Communist regime in Kabul began and where the Soviets first suffered defeat at the hands of the mujahideen, **Kunar and eastern Nuristan are strategic terrain. The area constitutes a major infiltration route into Afghanistan, and insurgents can enter these provinces from any number of places along the Pakistani border** to gain access to a vast network of river valleys. **The Kunar River Valley, just five miles from the mountains of the Pakistani border, channels insurgents to the more densely populated areas of Jalalabad and Nangarhar**, from which they can reach Kabul and areas beyond. Alternatively, **insurgents can travel up the Pech River Valley and gain access to Laghman and Kapisa provinces through Nuristan, and ultimately, the northern approaches to Kabul.**

**The vast ungoverned spaces of Nuristan and Kunar provide sanctuary to fighters coming from Pakistan, allowing them to survive for days or even weeks in the mountains away from major population centers. The Taliban has recognized the strategic importance of Kunar and Nuristan.** In 2008, the Taliban claimed that in its annual spring offensive it would “surround” Kabul and create a “strategic corridor” running from the FATA (Bajaur and Mohmand) through Kunar and Nuristan in order to ensure an uninterrupted supply of men and materiel. . . . Finally, **Kunar and Nuristan are important because high-level Al-Qaeda leaders, including Osama bin Laden, are believed to be hiding across the border in Pakistan’s Bajaur and Mohmand Agencies and the Chitral district. . . .**

[Conclusion: Not enough U.S., Afghan forces to protect population, clear and hold territory]

**In counterinsurgency theory, the population is paramount**—it is the center of gravity in the fight. Seizing and holding territory is less important than protecting the population where it lives. **The primary goal of a counterinsurgency strategy should be to secure**

**the populace and thereby legitimize the government rather than focus on militarily defeating the insurgents.** While this theory was successfully implemented in Iraq, it has been difficult to implement in Kunar. **In the sparsely populated mountain regions of eastern Afghanistan, some strategists have argued for holding the high ground—a tenet of classical mountain warfare—as a necessary precondition for protecting the population. The argument suggests that if the counterinsurgent does not deny the enemy the high ground, then the guerillas will be able to attack and terrorize the population at will.** In the Kunar and Nuristan regions, this argument **requires U.S. forces to pursue a combination of counterinsurgency warfare, with its focus on the population, and mountain warfare,** whereby the U.S. forces seize and hold the high ground.

However, **in places like the Korengal and Pech River Valleys, there are not enough U.S. and Afghan forces to protect the population and clear and hold the territory where that population lives.** Furthermore, in some of the interior valleys such as the Korengal, **it is not certain that an increase in manpower would equate to success,** as the population remains distrustful of and even hostile to outsiders. **In the Korengal, the presence of U.S. forces exacerbates tensions and results in anger and resentment. This facilitates violence in the region, rather than stability and security** which is the desired end-state of a counterinsurgency. Given a hostile population and too few troops, **U.S. forces have been forced to pursue a defensive “counter-punch” strategy** whereby they draw the enemy in to attack their patrols and bases in the valleys and then counterattack with their superior firepower. **This approach, however, is neither sustainable nor conducive to waging a successful counterinsurgency strategy.**

**The situation in the Korengal is not the problem; it is a consequence of uninhibited infiltration routes that the insurgents use to cross the border.** There is an almost inexhaustible flow of insurgents into Afghanistan from Pakistan. They can survive for days or weeks in the mountains away from population centers and quickly exfiltrate back to safe havens in Pakistan if needed. **It appears that many insurgents only come to Afghanistan for a few days or weeks at a time.**

**The “counter-punch” strategy assumes a finite number of insurgents** can be captured, killed, or forced to give up. For this assumption to be true, **the Pakistani border would have to be effectively sealed off, or at least adequately interdicted,** especially if substantial forces continue to be dedicated to interior areas like the Korengal Valley. Moreover, **the enemy can attack U.S. and Afghan forces at will and, given the insurgents’ proximity to the border, is probably not entirely dependent on the local Afghan population for support.** In fact, the enemy may be fighting in the interior of Kunar simply because that’s where U.S. forces are vulnerable.

**[Conclusion: Patrols better utilized in areas where population wants U.S. support, presence]**

**There is little reason to establish large COPS [combat outposts] or FOBs [forward operating bases] in the interior mountains.** Strung out at small, isolated posts they cannot effectively mass the necessary force to conduct an offensive or counter an enemy threat without sacrificing security gains made elsewhere, as battles like Wanat and Ranch House have demonstrated. Moreover, **establishing fixed outposts in such inhospitable terrain inevitably leads to the use of massive amounts of artillery and airpower to defend these isolated positions.** Artillery and airpower have often been and continue to be counterproductive in dealing with the insurgency in this part of the country.

Some forty years ago, **John Paul Vann discussed the futility of firepower in insurgencies when he argued that counterinsurgencies call for “the utmost discrimination in killing. The best weapon for killing is a knife. The worst is an airplane. The next worst is artillery. Barring a knife, the best is a rifle—you know who you’re killing.”** The U.S. strategy in valleys like the Korengal has led to **isolated outposts reliant on large amounts of indirect fire which by its very nature often hurts the counterinsurgency strategy by alienating the very population it is trying to secure.** This is the limitation of the “persistent presence” strategy in Kunar province. It is costly, fragile, and requires a long-term commitment and it has gotten U.S. and Afghan forces no closer to victory.

Rather than maintaining positions in the Korengal and many of the small, ineffective posts that dot the Pech river valley, **U.S. forces would be better utilized in conducting active patrols to secure the population along the lower Kunar River Valley** in places like Mara Wara, Sarkani, and Khas Konar districts **where the population desires U.S. support and presence**, unlike the population of the Korengal. **As they do so, U.S. forces must demonstrate the tangible benefits of their presence to the local population.**

**Although the current strategy of building roads and bridges does have an economic impact in the longer term, those projects must be paired with short-term, quick-impact civil affairs and humanitarian assistance projects.** These smaller projects often times **better demonstrate the benefit of an expanded American presence in Afghan villages.** U.S. forces must assess the needs of the local populations and give them immediate, quantifiable humanitarian assistance such as medical and dental aid, radios, and blankets. **Not only will this support demonstrate that the population is the center of gravity, but it will raise the cost of infiltration for the insurgents.**

The foregoing is Article No. 2 (IL042A02) in the [Insurgency Literature Review \(ILR\)](#), No. 42, 14 September 2009, prepared by Interaction Systems Incorporated (isincreports@mindspring.com).

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3. “**Tribal Dynamics of the Afghanistan and Pakistan Insurgencies,**” by Hayder Mili and Jacob Townsend, [CTC Sentinel](#) (Combating Terrorism Center at West Point), Vol. 2, No. 8, August 2009 (<http://www.ctc.usma.edu/sentinel/CTCSentinel-Vol2Iss8.pdf>). [KBTSAfghanGW, KBTSPakWT, KBTZNetworks] Hayder Mili, an independent researcher currently based in Central Asia, has published articles on terrorism, the drug trade, and law enforcement responses. Jacob Townsend, currently based in Kabul, is an independent analyst focused on insurgency and transnational organized crime. *We quote:*

**There is a renewed public appreciation for the role of tribal allegiances and tribal governance in the Afghanistan and Pakistan insurgencies.** This is indicated by the U.S. government’s announcement of an interagency effort to study the insurgencies’ tribes, including a search for “reconcilable” elements. **The behavior of most insurgent groups along the Afghanistan-Pakistan border is conditioned by tribal identities, allegiances, and interests.** Some fighters are motivated by pan-tribal or global religious sentiment. Most, however, are strongly influenced by the interests and demands of their tribe.

**Tribal leaders are often forthright in explaining that their decision to support or undermine the Taliban revolves around tribal interests, not through belief in the insurgency's inherent virtue vis-à-vis the Afghan government or foreign forces. Many young men are committed to the insurgency by their elders, becoming indistinguishable in battle from other fighters who belong to the Taliban "proper" or to the Haqqani network. In theory, these tribal fighters could be separated from the insurgency by persuading tribal leaders to withdraw them.**

**If attempts to employ tribes against insurgents are to succeed, the emphasis must be on Pashtun tribes. Although other ethnicities participate in the insurgency, their role is in large part defined by their relationship to the Pashtun tribes that saturate the region.** This is true of groups such as the Uzbek fighters, whose fortunes and strength have been heavily conditioned by the hospitality of their hosts, such as the Darikhel, Tojikhel, and Yarghukhel (sub-tribes of Ahmadzai Wazir in Pakistan's Waziristan).

This article focuses on **the intersection of tribalism and insurgency.** It provides a **history of the three major Pashtun confederations in Afghanistan and Pakistan; examines how the Haqqani network and global jihadists have exploited Pashtun tribalism; and identifies how tribal militias have recently been used to combat the Taliban in both Afghanistan and Pakistan.**

### **Drifting to the Durrani**

**Approximately two-thirds of Afghan Pashtuns belong to the Ghilzai and Durrani confederations. The tribes of the smaller Karlanri confederation live in Afghanistan's eastern and southeastern provinces, providing the strongest kinship bridges into Pakistan. Ghilzai and Durrani tribes, however, are numerically dominant in most of Afghanistan. As a general rule, tribal allegiances and systems of governance are stronger among the mountainous tribes of the Ghilzai and among the Karlanri, while Durrani governance rests more on cross-tribal structures of feudal land ownership.**

**A broad historical view of the Pashtun tribes would depict the Durrani tribes as political leaders and the Ghilzai as providing the fighters.** From Afghanistan's founding to the Taliban's ascendancy, all of Afghanistan's rulers have been from Durrani tribes with the exception of the ill-fated Mohammad Noor Taraki (and a brief interlude of nine months in 1929). **For some, the confrontation between the Durrani's Hamid Karzai and the Ghilzai's Mullah Muhammad Omar is a continuation of the confederations' traditional roles as rulers and insurgents, respectively.**

**Fighting between tribes and sub-tribes of the same confederation is one indication that the confederation level of analysis has never been adequate.** A notable shift in the current phase of insurgency, for example, has been the groundswell of Durrani fighters beneath the Ghilzai-dominated Afghan Taliban leadership. **Distinguishing cause and effect is difficult, but the increasing prominence of Durrani fighters and commanders correlates with the geographical spread of the insurgency through Durrani areas in Helmand, Nimroz, Farah, and Herat provinces.**

**Durrani are being recruited at lower levels and their traditional leaders are becoming insurgent leaders, with varying degrees of integration into the Taliban**

“proper.” Some intra-insurgency tensions appear to be the result of locally-empowered Durrani Taliban commanders disliking the rotation of senior Ghilzai Taliban commanders into “their” territory. Notably, in 2008 such tensions included disagreement over tax revenue, with a specific concern for drug-derived money.

**The result is that a government dominated by Tajiks and Durrani is facing off against a Ghilzai-led Taliban that has incorporated significant numbers of Durrani fighters.** To the extent that the power bases of the Durrani in government depend on rural constituencies in provinces such as Helmand and Farah, they must balance official interests with maintaining tribal satisfaction in anti-government areas. Moreover, **within this mix are the Karlanri tribes, providing major ethnic bridges between the Afghan and Pakistani Taliban by virtue of straddling insurgent strongholds in southeastern Afghanistan and the tribal areas of Pakistan.**

### The Zadran and the Haqqani network

**The Haqqani network is an excellent example of how global jihadists and Taliban fighters have been able to exploit Pashtun nationalism. Jalaluddin and Sirajuddin Haqqani are prominent members of the Pashtun Zadran tribe, and a great deal of their political capital was amassed by Jalaluddin in fighting the Soviets.** Former U.S. Congressman Charlie Wilson famously called Jalaluddin “goodness personified” and he received a disproportionate share of U.S. money. The Haqqanis have also been effective in attracting Arab donations due to their tactical efficiency and assisted by Jalaluddin’s marital and linguistic connection to the Gulf states. **The present strength of the Haqqani network owes much to Jalaluddin’s fighting prowess, accompanying fundraising skills, and the power these skills gave Jalaluddin in the Zadran tribe.**

**Much of the Zadran population lives in Afghanistan’s Spera (Khost), Zadran (Paktia), and Gayan (Paktika) districts, which have long histories of resisting foreign influence. The arrival of international forces in 2001 energized a struggle for control over the Zadran between the Haqqanis and Padcha Khan Zadran,** a warlord with his power base in Khost province. The latter was hardly pro-government, but he positioned himself as anti-Taliban and utilized foreign assistance. In that sense, Padcha Khan was an old-style leader who placed tribal power and independence over external allegiances and interests.

**Since 2002, the Haqqanis’ reversion to jihadist-aligned resistance has leveraged Jalaluddin’s continuing fame and obtained protection from the Zadran in much of their territory.** By contrast, Padcha Khan has entered the *Wolesi Jirga* (Afghanistan’s upper house of parliament) and his power base has narrowed, a move supported by Hamid Karzai in an effort to neutralize his anti-government appeal. **By cooperating with the Karzai government, Padcha Khan has allowed the Haqqanis and, by extension, Al-Qaeda and the Taliban, to become the Zadran’s main option for resisting international and government influence.**

The Haqqani network’s solid control of Miran Shah in Pakistan and most Zadran districts in Khost, Paktika, and Paktia in Afghanistan gives it an effective base for operations in Afghanistan. **The Haqqanis have consistently pledged their allegiance to the Taliban, but United Nations and International Security Assistance Force sources agree that the Haqqanis have demonstrated greater imagination, intent, and capability for complex attacks than regular Taliban commanders.** While difficult to confirm, the

Haqqanis have also been credited for **driving the growth of suicide bombings in Afghanistan.**

**The Haqqanis' continuing effectiveness draws on and reinforces their long-standing relationship with Al-Qaeda's leaders.** Historically, this was demonstrated in Osama bin Ladin's choice of Haqqani territory for Al-Qaeda's first significant training camps in Afghanistan. Currently, Western and Afghan intelligence officials **assess that Al-Qaeda places greater trust and accompanying funding in the Haqqani network to execute complex attacks.**

**The Haqqanis' reliance on Zadran territory is not a fatal vulnerability, but it does offer the possibility of constraining their operational capability.** Jalaluddin's apparent implacability and Sirajuddin's turn toward greater radicalism make it highly unlikely that Zadran areas can be pacified through engagement with the Haqqanis. A better strategy would work from the ground up, particularly in Paktia, where leaders combine affection for Jalaluddin with an often stronger concern for the local welfare of their tribe.

**In the short-term, the most realistic accomplishment would be to increase the reluctance of Zadran community leaders to allow direct access to and through their villages by the Haqqani network.** As in other "pro-insurgent" areas, **some Zadran communities would prove willing to cooperate with the government when enjoying an ongoing security presence and constructive engagement to support self-policing and immediate reconstruction benefits.**

### *Lashkars and arbakees*

**The Afghanistan and Pakistan governments have also tried to leverage tribal networks to support their objectives.** Both countries have armed and supported anti-insurgent tribes to combat the Taliban, the Haqqani network, and Al-Qaeda. **In FATA [Pakistan's Federally Administered Tribal Areas], this has taken the form of *lashkars*, tribal militias formed either within one tribe or through an alliance of several tribes following a *jirga* decision.**

**The Mamond tribes and the Salarzai tribe** (a small sub-tribe of the Tarkani Pashtuns who live in two valleys of Bajaur Agency) **have raised their own *lashkars* and can be legitimately considered anti-Taliban/Al-Qaeda. The price has been high and scores of tribal elders have been assassinated since the start of the movement.** For example, in November 2008 four "elders" of the Mamond tribe and several Mamond *lashkar* members were killed after a suicide bomber detonated at a tribesman's house in Bajaur. Other tribes that reportedly raised *lashkars* are the Orakzai of Orakzai Agency in FATA. This has naturally created tensions between the Orakzai and more militant tribes such as the Mehsud in South Waziristan.

**Overall, however, these efforts have not resulted in any significant losses for the Taliban.** In fact, **until the recent forays by the Pakistani military against the Taliban, the Taliban encountered relatively little tribal resistance as they quickly and brutally established their hold across FATA and the NWFP [Pakistan's North-West Frontier Province].** The tribes in FATA are quite scattered and little unity exists, particularly against a Taliban movement recruiting from almost every tribe (excluding Shi'a Turis). This failure was most obvious in North and South Waziristan when the *lashkars* of 2003 and 2007 were effectively impotent. Nevertheless, **the *lashkars* have**

**had some positive effects in pressuring the Taliban;** for example, Taliban spokesman Maulvi Omar's August 2009 arrest was credited to the work of a *lashkar* in Mohmand Agency.

**Another region where Pashtun tribal militias have been utilized is in southeastern Afghanistan's Loya Paktia,** the area encompassing Paktika, Khost, and Paktia provinces. **In this region the Afghan equivalent of *lashkars* exists.** Apparently an institution limited to Loya Paktia, **the *arbakee* (guardians) are the traditional tribal security of the southeast.** The *arbakees* (like the *lashkars*) do not exist permanently in every district, but are an ad hoc and reactive force. The *arbakee* is also used by the *jirga* as a law enforcement tool, which makes the *jirga* in this region far more powerful than in southern and eastern Afghanistan where this tradition does not exist.

**The capacities of Afghan military and law enforcement are minimal in Loya Paktia and they often count on the support of *arbakees*.** The tribal elders identify those citizens who will be used to support the police to ensure effective interventions. According to the Tribal Liaison Office, a European-funded non-governmental organization, **"Despite the fact that each *arbakee* has a clear leader (*amir*), accountability goes back to the tribal council (*jirga* or *shura*) that called upon the *arbakee*, which in turn is accountable to the community.** Furthermore, *arbakees* only function within the territory of the tribe they represent. Their fighters are volunteers from within the community and are paid by the community. **This emphasizes again that their loyalty is with their communities and not an individual leader."**

**One important demonstration of the government's reliance on *arbakees*** was the continuous funding until at least 2007 for 40 to 60 *arbakee* members in each district in the southeast, including a sizeable expansion of force numbers to secure the 2004-2005 elections.

## Conclusion

As Afghanistan's and Pakistan's insurgent conflicts drag on, **the stress on tribal structures will continue, pressured by jihadists and the international community alike. Both antagonists have a long-term interest in undermining tribalism, but both also have an interest in using tribalism to support immediate military aims.**

**For the governments of Afghanistan and Pakistan and their international supporters, this implies a difficult trade-off.** Immediate military interests in bargaining with tribes require subordination of interests in issues such as human rights and good governance. Notably, as the *arbakee* tradition illustrates, **a resort to tribally-mediated security structures implies a continuing devolution by the central government of its core responsibilities. This may be functional in the short-term, but will likely leave unchanged the uneasy relationship between relatively progressive governments and conservative tribal traditions**—an uneasiness that proved fertile ground for jihadism in the first place.

The foregoing is Article No. 3 (IL042A03) in the [Insurgency Literature Review \(ILR\)](#), No. 42, 14 September 2009, prepared by Interaction Systems Incorporated (isinreports@mindspring.com).

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4. “**Registering the Human Terrain: A Valuation of Cadastre,**” by Douglas E. Batson, **National Defense Intelligence College, 2008** (<http://www.ndic.edu/press/10279.htm>). [KBTSAfghan, KBTWPeaceOps, KBTkConflicts, KBTGDOS] This publication is the culmination of research by Douglas Batson while he was an Office of the Director of National Intelligence Research Fellow in 2006-2007 at the National Defense Intelligence College, Washington, D.C. “Cadastre” is a Latin term referring to a registry of lands. Cadastral surveying is the process of determining and defining land. We *quote* from this report’s conclusion chapter:

**. . . According to U.S. Government Accountability Office figures, the conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq have been costing the United States about \$70 billion per year, and by 2007, over 4,000 Americans had died in the conflicts.** The loss of life and resources has placed an economic and emotional drain on Americans. **A strategy that can stabilize the Afghan and Iraqi governments and allow the United States to depart would be beneficial to the American people.** Creating stable, legitimate governments in these and other volatile states is a goal of American foreign policy.

Though ending conflicts will require many forms of action, **one method that can help to create stability is to place more emphasis on political, economic, legal, and educational aid. One very specific aspect of this aid is to have selected U.S. government (USG) agencies focus on land tenure and property rights (LTPR) in the developing world.**

**This would, possibly more than any other kind of foreign aid, transform a volatile state into a capable one.** Capable, that is, of maintaining stability by resisting and deterring the violent extremism of non-state actors through the strength of its civil society. . . .

**. . . The following recommendations [specify] a whole-of-government effort to strengthen LTPR** in volatile areas of the world instrumental to U.S. national security.

- **Recognize the importance of land in conflict prevention. . . . [Land] issues are often at the epicenter of violent conflict around the world, a dimension at times lost on U.S. policymakers.** For half a century American institutions of secondary and higher education have not emphasized geography and have all but ignored land issues. The post-Cold War period has been marked by few foreign policy, and fewer post-conflict nation-building, successes. The USG must recognize anew the importance of registering the human terrain. **A land registration system, with its dispute resolution component, can prevent or lessen conflict by bringing simmering land and property disputes into the public forum and recording the resulting local adjudications.**
- **Expand the definition of national security to include security of land tenure.** [Policymakers must] understand that a nation will never be secure as long as its citizens’ LTPR are not, and the insecurity of other nations erodes U.S. national security. Specifically, [policymakers must] **commit to win the peace as much as to win the war by aiding other countries to build land information systems and the human resources capacity to maintain them.** Where a cadastral system is in use, rule of law is evident, and, according to International Federation

of Surveyors President Stig Enemark, “**the system acts as the backbone of society.**” This change is optimal to the projection of U.S. soft power.

- **Construct states capable of administering land.** Capable states are characterized by: [a] **Representative governance based on rule of law.** [b] **Market economic activity.** [c] **A thriving civil society.** [d] **Security, well-being, and justice available to all citizens.** [e] **The ability to manage internal and external affairs peacefully.** [This book’s Chapter 3 suggests] that registering multiple rights and interests in land and property is the missing foundation to six years of reconstruction and stability (R&S) efforts in Afghanistan. **Afghanistan’s overlapping and poor governance of land matters is not an isolated occurrence. Most developing countries have far too many institutions involved in land matters.** Where land information exists, it is housed not in a single system but in several government ministries, which makes access exceedingly difficult. **Without proper standardization and agreements, a multipurpose, interoperable cadastral system cannot be realized. . . .**
- **Build local capacity in resolving land conflict. . . .** The Land Administration Domain Model (LADM) is **the first viable cadastral model to incorporate informal, customary land claims and records into a comprehensive land registry so that the institutions of civil society, even the shuras and jirgas of Afghan society, can apply the rule of law.** The LADM’s distributed data environment offers communities the opportunity to record land rights and interests and resolve disputes themselves. **When the central government develops the capacity for a regional or national land information system, local communities can be confident that their land records will integrate into the larger system.**
- **Engage multiple actors in land-related R&S.** Intervening military forces must be prepared to retrieve and assess land records, and in some cases, begin determining the degree of their validity. Within 30 to 60 days, a hand-off of land administration tasks from military to deployed R&S civilian personnel must occur. **The transition from post-conflict R&S to long-term sustainable development will require years, if not decades, and thus a host of civilian specialists (USG employees, contractors, non-governmental organizations, academics, and students) to work the legal issues . . . [and] train nationals in cadastral surveying and land administration.**
- **Develop better mechanisms for collaboration.** National Security Presidential Directive 44, mandating civil-military cooperation in reconstruction and stability, is in early development. But without resources, this directive’s ideals cannot be realized . . . .

. . . [Land] administration must become an essential USG civilian occupation and a community of practice must be established.

The foregoing is Article No. 4 (IL042A04) in the [Insurgency Literature Review \(ILR\)](#), No. 42, 14 September 2009, prepared by Interaction Systems Incorporated (isincreports@mindspring.com).

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5. “Understanding Insurgency Violence: A Quantitative Analysis of the Political Violence in Northern Ireland, 1969-1999,” by Dominic M. Beggan, **Studies in Conflict and Terrorism**, Vol. 32, No. 8, August 2009. [KBTSU1ster, KBTITheory, KBTIHistory]. From this article at <http://www.informaworld.com/smpp/content~content=a913296334~db=all~jumptype=rss> we *quote* from the abstract and the concluding comments:

. . . Like numerous other scholars, the present author has written qualitative articles examining the political violence in Northern Ireland; however, **there is a definite need for statistical analysis of the Northern Ireland conflict that is largely absent from existing literature**, a gap that this research seeks to fill. Therefore, this research attempts to develop a **more comprehensive theoretical and empirical explanation of the relationship between the use of repression and political violence by applying an econometric approach**. . . .

. . . The findings in this article were primarily focused on and limited to repression used by a democracy. **The core argument is that repression and grievances lead to increases in violence in a democratic regime**; however, **severe repression used by authoritarian regimes may indeed be effective in curbing political violence** as numerous cases in Latin America and elsewhere have demonstrated. The author contends that **a democracy may be caught in a dilemma where it is constrained in its policy choices for various reasons and rather than introduce repressive measures, it has a tendency to rely on half-way measures that may have the opposite effect of their intent**. Rather than defuse a situation, such measures may indeed help ignite the path toward an escalation of political violence.

Consequently, **policymakers in democracies who wish to avoid a greater probability of violence need to be conscious of the fact that specific forms of violence should be matched with appropriate policies** that include consistent measures to quell violence as well as compromising and accommodating attributes that address the root of the problem. This article argues that **force should only be used by a democratic state for short periods of time to stabilize the situation**, while diplomatic measures are brought to bear to address the true nature of the violence.

. . . [In Northern Ireland] **too much emphasis was placed on the use of force and too little emphasis was placed on diplomacy**. Another limiting factor that may impact the generalizations in this research is that the insurgency in **Northern Ireland could be characterized as unique in one respect because it was an urban-based insurgency unlike the majority of insurgencies**. However, the author contends that more insurgencies in the future will mirror this case so it is imperative that the understanding of this new phenomenon be expanded. . . .

#### [Concluding comments]

. . . In conclusion, the findings in this research supported the theoretical framework developed. **The models indicated that the state’s reliance on repression when combined with political grievances and economic disparities** (employment, housing, etc.) **led to the escalation of the political violence that occurred**. The time-series

analysis revealed two important facts that may contribute to the varied outcomes of repression used by a state.

First, **this research suggests that the introduction of the internment had an overall negative impact on the violence in Northern Ireland (1969-1999).** The models examining internment appear to support the common theme of this research that **this inconsistent policy if not applied in a strategic, focused manner increases the level of political violence.**

Second, **this research suggests a mixture of different forms of repression and different linear and curvilinear relations may explain why various outcomes to the use of repression are highly probable and so difficult to predict especially if these relationships shift over time.**

Perhaps the most important information to be learned from the mixed curvilinear findings in this research is that **when contemplating such policies, democratic governments need to be aware of the various implications of their actions, and understand that half-hearted policies linked to insufficient intelligence may in fact contribute to more violence.** These findings also suggest that a greater understanding of these anomalies could help explain why the varied outcomes of repression arise, and also what appropriate policies should be considered during times of political unrest.

A point that needs to be emphasized when comparing the performance of these models is that **regardless of how these models are specified the same fundamental findings emerge, namely, the application of repression in a democracy over long periods of time is positively associated with more insurgent violence.**

**Various types of repression by the state appear to have different impacts on different forms of violence.** Just as D. Gupta, H. Singh, and T. Sprague (1993) were able to demonstrate empirically that there is a qualitative difference in repression employed by democracies and non-democracies, **this research suggests that varied outcomes to the use of repression may be due to the nature of the type of repression and also to the form of violence adopted by insurgents to combat it.**

These findings also suggest that **variations in outcomes may also be related to the impact of various forms of repression (formal/informal).** . . .

The foregoing is Article No. 5 (IL042A05) in the [Insurgency Literature Review](#) (ILR), No. 42, 14 September 2009, prepared by Interaction Systems Incorporated (isinreports@mindspring.com).

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